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This report was prepared as part of the New Zealand 
Law Foundation-funded project: Artificial Intelligence 
and Law in New Zealand. The overall focus of the report 
is on the regulatory issues surrounding uses of AI in New 
Zealand. But this is a big topic: there are many types of 
AI system, and many spheres within which AI systems 
are used (in New Zealand and beyond). In the design 
of our project, we wanted to identify some coherent 
sub-topics within this general area—and in particular, 
sub-topics where New Zealand could play an important 
role in a broader international discussion. We identified 
two such sub-topics; and accordingly, our project was 
divided into two Phases. The current document reports 
on Phase 1. 
Phase 1 of the project focuses on regulatory issues 
surrounding the use of predictive AI models in New 
Zealand government departments. As discussed in 
Sections 1B and 1C, while there are many types of AI 
model, the concept of a “predictive model” picks out 
a reasonably well-defined class of models that share 
certain commonalities, and are fairly well characterizable 
as a regulatory target. We specifically focus on the use 
of predictive models in the public sector because we 
want to begin by discussing regulatory options in a 
sphere where the New Zealand Government can readily 
take action. New Zealand’s Government can relatively 
easily effect changes in the way its own departments 
and public institutions operate. New Zealand has a 
small population, and its institutions are comparatively 
technology-literate, as evidenced by its membership 
of the D9 group of “digital governments”. We believe 
New Zealand is well placed to serve as a model for 
how governments can “put their own house in order” 
in their uses of AI technology. New Zealand has often 
been able to provide a model to other countries in 
IT-related areas—for instance, in its early adoption of 
debit cards, its early use of online medical records, and 
more recently, in its integrated data infrastructure. We 
believe it can provide similar leadership in the area of 
government AI oversight. 
INTRODUCTION
Our emphasis in Phase 1 is certainly not intended to 
suggest that government uses of AI are in some way 
more important than commercial uses when it comes 
to regulatory discussions. If anything, we believe the 
opposite is the case: regulation of the AI technologies 
used by the multinational giants (Google, Facebook, 
etc.) is urgently needed. But we think there is a 
natural ordering to the topics of government AI and 
commercial AI. As just noted, government AI regulation 
is quite readily achievable, especially in small countries. 
Regulation of international tech giants is a much trickier 
issue. While some issues can be addressed separately 
within individual countries, many issues can only be 
dealt with in international agreements. Such agreements 
require lengthy international trade negotiations, so 
regulation of AI use by the big multinationals is going to 
happen over a longer timescale. At the same time—as 
also emphasised in Section 1B—the actual technologies 
used by multinational giants to build predictive models 
(deep networks, random forests, Bayesian models, 
regression techniques) are very similar to those used 
by governments. Experience in developing regulatory 
frameworks for these models in government is likely to 
be very helpful in tackling the harder problem of how to 
regulate their commercial use by the tech giants. Phase 
1 of our project thus prepares us to participate in follow-
up projects—perhaps international ones—focused on the 
regulation of commercial uses of AI by Google, Facebook 
and so on. 
Phase 2 of the project will focus on the implications on 
employment of the increasingly widespread use of AI. 
Again, there will be a New Zealand focus. This research 
will primarily target commercial uses of AI. But we will 
not just be considering the technologies themselves: we 
are also interested in charting the social effects of these 
technologies, and considering whether regulation could 
help control some of these. While regulation of the 
technologies used by international companies requires 
a protracted international effort, it may be that we can 
find useful ways of controlling their effects locally (i.e. in 
New Zealand) within a shorter timeframe.
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Artificial intelligence or “AI” encompasses a wide variety 
of technologies. We focus on “predictive algorithms”, 
an important class of algorithms that includes machine 
learning algorithms. The general concept of a “predictive 
algorithm” is useful for many regulation/oversight 
purposes, and covers a useful subset of the algorithms 
referred to as “AI” in recent public discourse.
The use of predictive algorithms within the New 
Zealand government sector is not a new phenomenon. 
Algorithms such as RoC*RoI in the criminal justice 
system have been in use for two decades. However, 
the increasing use of these tools, and their increasing 
power and complexity, presents a range of concerns 
and opportunities. The primary concerns around the use 
of predictive algorithms in the public sector relate to 
accuracy, human control, transparency, bias and privacy.
Primary concerns
Accuracy: There should be independent and public 
oversight of the accuracy of the predictive models being 
used in government. This is of central importance, but 
such information is not yet readily or systematically 
available.
Human control: Solutions such as requiring a “human 
in the loop” have an obvious appeal. But there is a 
risk that, if we do not approach them carefully, such 
guarantees could serve as regulatory placebos. In 
some situations, the addition of a human factor to an 
automated system may have a detrimental effect on 
that system’s accuracy. 
Nonetheless, a human in the loop can be useful: 
where automated systems are not reliable enough to 
be left to operate independently; where factors need 
to be considered that are not readily automatable; 
or in situations where a measure of discretion is 
for whatever reason desirable. If a general right to 
human involvement were deemed to be desirable, 
such provision should be accompanied by a “right to 
know” that automated decision-making is taking place 
(otherwise how would a person be able to demand 
human oversight in the first place?).
A legal obstacle to automated decisions may arise in 
public sector contexts, where statutory powers generally 
cannot be delegated or fettered without parliamentary 
approval. Statutory authorities that use algorithmic tools 
as decision aids must be wary of improper delegation to 
the tool, or otherwise fettering their discretion through 
automation complacency and bias.
Transparency and a right to reasons/explanations: 
New Zealand law already provides for a right to 
reasons for decisions by official agencies, primarily 
under section 23 of the Official Information Act. This is 
supported by judicial authority that such reasons must 
be understandable, both to a review body, to someone 
with vested interests in the decision and at least in some 
cases to the public at large. Where individuals affected 
have a right to an explanation, predictive tools used 
by government must support meaningful explanations. 
In cases where the workings of the system are 
inherently complex, this means augmenting the system 
with an “explanation system”, geared to producing 
understandable explanations.
Independently of commonsense explainability, the 
algorithms used by government predictive models should 
be publicly inspectable. To ensure that agencies can 
comply with this requirement, policies should be adopted 
to ensure that algorithms are either developed “in house”, 
or, when purchased from outside vendors, acquired on 
terms that allow for inspectability, so that neither their 
form nor conditions of sale preclude or obstruct details of 
the algorithm being made publicly available. 
Bias, fairness and discrimination: “Fairness” in a 
predictive system can be defined in several ways. It may 
be impossible to satisfy all definitions simultaneously. 
Government agencies should consider the type(s) of 
fairness appropriate to the contexts in which they use 
specific algorithms.
Exclusion of protected characteristics from training data 
or input variables does not guarantee that outcomes are 
not discriminatory or unfair. For example, other variables 
can serve as close proxies for protected characteristics, 
and input data that appears innocuous can nonetheless 
be tainted by historic discrimination.
Privacy: In the realm of privacy and data protection law, 
we recommend that effect be given to more specific 
requirements to identify the purpose of collection of 
personal information (information privacy principle 3). 
New Zealand should also consider introducing a right 
to reasonable inferences along with better protections 
regarding re-identification, de-identification, data 




There are various general approaches to regulation of AI. One involves the use of what is 
sometimes called “hard” law, in the form of legislation as interpreted and applied through 
court decisions; another involves self-regulatory models; a third involves a regulatory 
agency of some kind. 
A range of legal protections—around accuracy, privacy, transparency and freedom from 
discrimination—already exist in New Zealand law, and all are likely to have important 
roles in the context of predictive algorithms. The possibility of strengthening or fine-
tuning these rights so that they better respond to this technology is certainly worthy of 
consideration. In this regard, continued attention should be paid to international initiatives 
such as the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation for comparison. 
While important, though, regulatory models that rely on affected individuals enforcing 
legal rights are unlikely to be adequate in addressing the concerns around increasing use 
of algorithms. Often, affected individuals will lack the knowledge or the means effectively 
to hold these tools and processes to account. They are also likely to lack the “wide-angle” 
perspective necessarily to evaluate their effect across populations.
In addition to individual rights models, then, some form of “top-down” scrutiny is likely to  
be required if the benefits of predictive algorithms are to be maximised, and their risks 
avoided or minimised. To that effect, we have proposed the creation of an independent 
regulatory agency.
There are several possible models for a new regulatory agency. These all have strengths 
and weaknesses. At present, there are very few international examples from which to 
learn, and those which exist are in their very early stages.
We have proposed a possible structure for how the new regulatory agency could work 
with government agencies. The new regulator could serve a range of functions, including:
• Producing best practice guidelines;
• Maintaining a register of algorithms used in government;
• Producing an annual public report on such uses;
• Conducting ongoing monitoring on the effects of these tools.
If a regulatory agency is to be given any sort of hard-edged powers, consideration will 
need to be given to its capacity to monitor and enforce compliance with these. 
If the agency is to be charged with scrutinising algorithms, it must be borne in mind 
that these are versatile tools, capable of being repurposed for a variety of uses. Scrutiny 
should apply to new uses/potential harms and not only new algorithms.
Our study has been an initial exploration of the significant issues posed by some forms 
of artificial intelligence. These issues present risks and also unique opportunities for 
New Zealand to contribute new ways of thinking about and engaging with these new 
technologies. To minimize these risks and make the most of these opportunities we stress 
the need for consultation with a wide variety of stakeholders, especially those most likely 
to be affected by algorithmic decisions, including Māori and Pacific Islands people.
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The broad aim of our study is to survey “uses of AI 
technology in the public sector”, and discuss the ethical 
and legal implications of these. But how should we 
define the relevant technology? In this first chapter, we 
begin by considering this question. In Section 1A we 
argue that general definitions of AI, or of “algorithms”, 
are not very helpful in identifying the technology of 
interest. In Section 1B, we propose a more precise and 
restricted technical definition of the systems we will 
focus on: namely, the class of “predictive systems”. 
We argue that this definition identifies a coherent 
collection of systems in actual use within government 
departments, and elsewhere in the public sector, 
including systems at the forefront of the AI revolution, 
but also statistical tools that have long been in use. 
In Section 1C we note that our definition should also 
pick out a class of tools for which a well-defined set of 
ethical issues arise, so that laws invoking this definition 
can coherently target these issues. We argue that 
predictive systems raise a well-defined set of ethical 
issues of this kind: this alignment makes the class of 
predictive systems a useful one for regulators. However, 
it is not the only class that regulators need to reference. 
In Section 1D, we note some important cases where the 
relevant ethical issues apply to a wider group of systems 
and methods.
A. The challenge of defining  
AI technologies
Our aim is to discuss regulatory options for “AI systems” 
in use in the public domain. An important task from a 
legal perspective is to frame a definition of the intended 
target of regulation. Of course, it may be that existing 
laws or structures of more general application are found 
to be adequate. But if this is not the case, then some 
more precise definition of the technology in question will 
need to be offered.
In a context where a definition is considered necessary, 
consideration will have to be given to how tightly the 
definitional parameters are to be set. Courts, after all, 
need to know how to apply new rules, regulators need 
to know the boundaries of their remit, and stakeholders 
need to be able to predict how and to what the rules 
will apply. If a new legal rule, regulatory body or code of 
practice were to be created to respond to “AI algorithms” 
in government, for instance, it would be important to 
know exactly which algorithms are in scope. 
We suggest that seeking to restrict the scope of 
any rules to those algorithms which use “artificial 
intelligence” techniques is unlikely to clarify matters. As 
recognised by the House of Lords Select Committee 
on Artificial Intelligence in its 2018 report AI in the UK: 
Ready, Willing and Able? (2018, [9]): “There is no widely 
accepted definition of artificial intelligence. Respondents 
and witnesses provided dozens of different definitions”.
New Zealand’s AI Forum (2018, p. 14) has also 
acknowledged the problem in its report Artificial 
Intelligence: Shaping a Future New Zealand:
“ The term “Artificial Intelligence” is notoriously hard to define, spanning a 
wide range of reference points from 
data science, machine learning and 
conversational interfaces right through to 
debate about whether AI will displace jobs 
and lead to science fiction scenarios.” 
Of course, many situations that have come to pass started 
off as “science fiction scenarios”. The challenge of how 
to define these terms is a real one. The AI Forum report 
settles for a characterisation of AI as “advanced digital 
technologies that enable machines to reproduce or 
surpass abilities that would require intelligence if humans 
were to perform them” (2018 p. 26). This is a simple 
and useful definition for the purposes of public debate, 
but it is less clear that it would suffice to identify a clear 
regulatory target. We might wonder what sort of digital 
technologies count as sufficiently “advanced”. Most people 
think of the perceptual capacities of a self-opening door 
and the arithmetic capacity of a pocket calculator are 
too simple to count as AI. Yet denying that these count 
as advanced digital technologies seems to owe more to 
the fact that we are used to them than to facts about 
the complexity of their workings or manufacture. After all, 
the great majority of people cannot explain how these 
machines actually work. In a word, they aren’t simple, and 
yet the intuition that they should be excluded from AI 
regulation seems to be strong (we’re willing to bet). So a 
definitional threshold that refers to the “advanced” nature 
of a technology is probably not going to help regulators 
sharpen their focus. 
1. DEFINING THE TECHNOLOGY OF INTEREST
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The challenge is not made easier by what some perceive 
as a disconnection between technical uses of terms from 
the manner in which they are more widely understood. 
For example, one influential article by Mittelstadt and 
colleagues (2016) makes the claim that “Any attempt 
to map an ‘ethics of algorithms’ must address this 
conflation between formal definitions and popular usage 
of ‘algorithm’”.
As the influential law and technologies writer Roger 
Brownsword has warned, the risk of “descriptive 
disconnection” is ever-present in any attempt to 
regulate a technology that is still in an emergent stage. 
In particular, the disconnect poses a risk of definitional 
over-specificity and deprives regulators of the sort 
of flexibility necessary to respond to a fast-moving 
technology. Brownsword (2008, p. 27) puts it this way:
“ the details of the regulatory regime will always reflect a tension between the 
need for flexibility (if regulation is to move 
with the technology) and the demand for 
predictability and consistency (if regulatees 
are to know where they stand).” 
This tension creates something of a dilemma for those 
charged with making the rules, since
“ the more that regulators (in an attempt to let regulatees know where they stand) 
try to establish an initial set of standards 
that are clear, detailed and precise, the 
more likely it is that the regulation will lose 
connection with its technological target 
(leaving regulatees unclear as to their 
position).” (2008, P. 27)
While “descriptive disconnection” refers to the situation 
where the technology takes a different form from what 
was anticipated by regulators, what Brownsword calls 
“normative disconnection” refers to the scenario where 
the technology is put to an unanticipated use, particularly 
one that poses different risks or ethical concerns. In that 
situation, it may be that the rules as originally framed 
remain connected to the technology itself, but are a bad 
“moral fit” for the manner in which it is used.
This is not to say that any attempt at anticipatory 
regulation is doomed to fail. Neither is it to say that any 
definition must be framed as loosely as possible; overly 
vague definitions, after all, are likely to serve as poor 
action guides for those seeking to be guided by the rules.
One possible response to this dilemma is to foreswear 
an all-purpose definition, and adopt a definition suited 
to a particular risk or problem. In October 2018, Internal 
Affairs and Stats NZ released their Algorithm Assessment 
Report, which chose to concentrate on “operational 
algorithms”. The report defined these as:
“ analytical processes [which] interpret or evaluate information (often using large 
or complex data sets) that result in, or 
materially inform, decisions that impact 
significantly on individuals or groups.”  (STATS NZ 2018, P. 4)
This approach combines a very broad definition of 
the technical processes under scrutiny, with a very 
broad definition of the impacts that qualify them for 
inclusion. The report still explicitly excludes certain 
kinds of algorithm, namely “Algorithms used for policy 
development and research” and “Business rules”, which 
we will consider further in Section 1B. But given that 
our focus is on “AI” algorithms in government, we will 
attempt to formulate a slightly tighter definition, both of 
the technical processes that are the object of our study, 
and of the relevant kinds of impact that might need to 
be regulated and the form this regulation might take. 
We will propose a technical definition in Section 1B, and 
sketch the range of relevant impacts in Section 1C. 
B. A technical focus:  
“Predictive models”
The tools we would like to focus on are “predictive 
analytics” models, or simply “predictive models”. This 
technical definition will encompass many systems that 
are squarely at the centre of the current “AI revolution”—
but it also extends to systems that have been in use in 
governments for decades (and sometimes longer). It’s 
a definition that emphasises the continuity of computer 
modelling work within government, and indeed within 
industry too. This continuity is important in policy terms, 
because there are already regulations and conventions 
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surrounding the use of traditional models: to the extent 
that the new models resemble the traditional ones, 
some of these regulations and conventions may extend 
to the new models. Our presentation will also emphasise 
that the AI models used in government departments 
(the focus of the current report) are technically very 
similar to those used in modern commercial settings, for 
instance by Google, Amazon and Facebook. Regulation 
of the use of AI models in government may look quite 
different from regulation of their use in industry, due to 
the very different social functions of the institutions in 
these two spheres—but it’s helpful to understand that 
the models that are the object of regulation in these 
areas are basically the same.
Policymakers sometimes think of AI models as recent 
arrivals in the fields of government and commerce. It’s 
certainly true that AI models are newly prominent in 
these fields, but it’s a mistake to think of them as new 
as such. There is a long tradition of statistical modelling 
in both government and commerce—and the statistical 
models used historically in these fields have much in 
common with the AI models that are now becoming 
prevalent. 
In this section, we will give a simple introduction to 
modern AI models, targeted at policymakers who are 
new to the subject, and with a focus on predictive 
models. Our approach will be to start by introducing an 
earlier generation of statistical models. This approach is 
helpful because the earlier models are simpler. But it is 
also helpful in highlighting what the new AI models have 
in common with the earlier models, and how they differ 
from them. 
Simply put, predictive models are models which make 
predictions about some unknown variable, based 
on one or more known variables. A “variable” can be 
any measurable aspect of the world. For instance, a 
predictive model might predict a person’s weight based 
on their height. Such a model would be useful if for 
some reason we can readily get information about 
people’s height, but not about their weight (and we 
are nonetheless interested in their weight). Note that a 
predictive model doesn’t have to predict an occurrence 
in the future. The unknown variable might relate to 
the current moment, or even to times in the past. The 
key thing is that we need to guess it, because we can’t 
measure it directly. More neutrally, we can define a 
predictive model as a tool that can make guesses about 
some outcome variable, based on a set of input variables. 
To build a predictive model, the key ingredient is a 
training set of cases where we know the outcome 
variable as well as the input variables. In the above 
example, the training set would be measurements of 
the height and weight of a number of sample people. 
There is a (loose) relationship between people’s height 
and weight. The training set provides information 
about this relationship. A predictive model uses this 
information to compute a general hypothesis about the 
relationship between height and weight, which it can 
use to make a guess about someone’s weight given their 
height. A training set is in essence a database of facts 
about known cases: the larger this database, the more 
information is provided about the outcome variable. 
We will take it as part of the definition of a “predictive 
model” that it is derived from training data, through a 
training process of some kind.
A brief history of predictive models
Mathematical methods have been in use for centuries 
to guess an unknown variable by consulting a database 
of known facts. The first serious applications were in 
the insurance industry. The Lloyd’s register, developed 
in 1688, which assessed the likely risks of shipping 
ventures, is a well-known early example (Watson 2010). 
Equitable Life, the earliest company to use “actuarial” 
methods to predict life expectancy, was founded in 
1762 (Ogborn 1962). The earliest predictive models with 
relevance to government date from around this time. For 
instance, in the 1740s, the German statistician Johann 
Süssmilch used data from church records to devise a 
model that used the availability of land in a given region 
to predict marriage age and marriage rate (and through 
these, birth rates) (Kotz 2005). Governments have 
been maintaining databases of information about their 
citizens from time immemorial, largely for the purposes 
of assessing their tax obligations. As the science of 
predictive modelling developed, these databases 
could be reused for other government functions, 
particularly those relating to financial planning. The 
British Government employed its first official actuary in 
the 1830s: an employee who worked in naval pensions, 
and is credited with saving the government hundreds 
of millions of pounds in today’s money (Clarke 2018). 
Already at that time, the predictive models used in 
government mirrored those used in commerce—a trend 
that continues to this day. 
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To begin with, developing predictive models involved 
calculations done by hand, using databases stored in 
written ledgers. Computers can help in two ways: they 
facilitate the storage of large amounts of data, and they 
can perform calculations automatically. Predictive models 
are now routinely implemented as computer programs 
that consult databases held in computer memory.  
When computers were first introduced, their only users 
were governments and large corporations, due to their 
great expense. Both companies and governments 
quickly started to develop computer-based predictive 
models. For instance, the FICO corporation in the US, 
which specialises in predicting credit risk, produced 
its first computerized model of risk scores in 1958. 
The US government used computers to predict missile 
trajectories in the 1940s (Weik 1961), to predict 
weather in the 1950s (Platzman 1979), and to predict 
suitability of military personnel for missions in the 1960s 
(Roomsburg 1988). Governments across the world 
have been using predictive models for a wide variety of 
purposes ever since. 
We will introduce modern predictive AI systems by first 
presenting some older predictive statistical models, and 
then showing how the AI models extend (and differ 
from) these. 
Actuarial tables
The Equitable Life company made a novel contribution 
to insurance when it produced a table showing for each 
age, the probability that a person will die at that age 
(based on available mortality statistics), and computing 
an associated insurance premium for that age. This kind 
of “actuarial table” is a simple form of predictive model. 
Its innovation lay in systematically charting probabilities 
for each possible age. As actuarial science progressed, 
more complex tables were developed, taking into account 
factors other than age, so that more accurate predictions 
could be made, and more accurate premiums charged. 
Geometric approaches to predictive 
modelling
A drawback with actuarial tables is that they treat ages 
as discrete categories, and then compute probabilities 
for each age separately, without regard for one another. 
But age varies continuously, and the probability of 
dying varies smoothly as a function of age. It is useful 
to be able to think about probabilities geometrically, 
as functions on graphs, so that probability models can 
be expressed in the terminology of Cartesian geometry. 
For instance, we can define a mathematical function 
that maps a variable “age” represented on the x axis of 
a graph onto a probability of dying represented on the 
y axis, as shown in Figure 1. This idea was pioneered 
by the nineteenth century actuary Benjamin Gompertz, 
who found that the probability of dying can be modelled 
quite accurately by a simple function, examples of which 
are shown in Figure 1. The four curves in this figure show 
the function with different sets of parameter values.
 
We still have to use actual training data to estimate 
these functions, of course. But now, estimation involves 
setting the parameters of a continuous mathematical 
function—“fitting a function” to some data—rather than 
estimating many separate probabilities. On this approach, 
age is modelled as a “random variable”: we don’t know 
its actual value, but we have a mathematical function 
that models the “distribution” of its possible values.
Regression models
An important class of predictive model that uses a 
geometric conception of probability is the regression 
model. The first such model was the linear regression 
model developed in the early nineteenth century 
(independently, by Gauss and Adrien-Marie Legendre). 
The key idea in linear regression is to model the 
relationship between variables with a mathematical 
function. For instance, recall from our earlier discussion 
that there is a “loose” relationship between height and 
weight. To quantify this relationship, we can gather a 
set of known height-weight pairs, to serve as a “training 
set” for our model. An example training set is shown in 
Figure 2, as a set of data points on a two-dimensional 
graph, where the x axis depicts height, and the y axis 
depicts weight.
Figure 1. Examples of the Gompertz curve: a mathematical function 
mapping age onto probability of dying.
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Crucially, having represented the training set as points 
in a graph, we can learn a mathematical function that 
maps every possible height onto a weight, as shown 
by the red line in Figure 2. (The training points include 
“noise”: miscellaneous factors that are relevant to 
weight, but aren’t included in the model.) The line gives 
an answer even for heights which aren’t included in the 
training set, and thus can be used to estimate weights 
for people who aren’t exactly like those in the training 
set. It does this by smoothly interpolating between the 
known points. Note that the line doesn’t go through 
many of the training points. (It might not go through 
any at all.) In the presence of noise, we have to make 
our best guess. Linear regression is a mathematical 
way of making a best guess by finding (or “defining”) 
the function that makes least error in its approximation 
of the training points. Note that a “function” is just a 
particular kind of “model”. So a function learned by 
regression from a set of datapoints can be used as a 
“predictive model” of the kind that is our focus. 
Modern regression models
Regression is a key technique in modern statistical 
modelling. The basic method outlined above has been 
expanded on in a multitude of different ways. For 
instance, linear regression models can involve many 
variables, not just two. If we have exactly three variables, 
datapoints can be visualised in a three-dimensional 
space, and regression can be understood as identifying 
a three-dimensional plane that best fits the points. (For 
more than three dimensions, we have “hyperplanes” 
that are hard to visualise, but the mathematical 
techniques are just the same.) Moreover, regression 
modelers are free to decide how complex the function 
that fits the training datapoints should be. In Figure 2, 
the function is constrained to be a straight line, but we 
can also allow the function to be a curve, with different 
amounts of squiggliness1—or, in three dimensions or 
more, planes with different amounts of “hilliness”. 
Furthermore, regression techniques can also be used to 
model relationships between variables in circumstances 
where outcome variables can take a number of discrete 
values (unlike the above examples, where, for a given 
input variable like “height”, only one outcome variable 
is calculated, such as “weight”). This is done in “logistic 
regression” models. Finally, there are many varieties of 
regression model specialised for particular tasks. An 
important variety for many government applications 
is “survival analysis”, which is a method for estimating 
the likely amount of time that will elapse before some 
event of interest happens. The original applications of 
these methods were in drug trials, where the “event of 
interest” was the death of a patient under some form of 
therapy. But there are many applications in government 
planning where it is very useful to have a way of 
predicting how far in the future some event may be, for 
different people or groups. Again, the same regression 
methods are used both within government and industry.
We should also note that regression models don’t have 
to be used for prediction. Scientists who use it are often 
just interested in stating relationships between variables 
in some domain. A scientist might, for instance, want 
to be able to state as an empirical finding that “there 
is a relationship between height and weight”. Methods 
relating to regression can be used to quantify the strength 
of this relationship. (These methods were pioneered by 
Francis Galton and Karl Pearson in the early twentieth 
century in their concept of “correlation”.) Often, scientists’ 
main agenda in using regression models is to identify 
the strength of the correlations between variables in a 
dataset—again, purely for the purpose of describing the 
data succinctly, and therefore understanding the domain 
of study. Nonetheless, regression models can be used to 
make predictions about unknown variables in a domain, 
based on a sample of known cases. And the stronger 
the correlations are between variables, the better these 
predictions will be. 
This raises an important point in relation to discussions 
about AI. The field of AI has had a dramatic impact on 
predictive modelling, an impact due only to a particular 
Figure 2. A function defining a relation between people’s height and 
weight, learned by linear regression from the datapoints shown in black. 
1. Or more technically, “polynomials” of different degrees.
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branch of AI—the field known as “machine learning” (our 
focus in this report). Current commentators often refer 
to “machine learning” as if it’s a new phenomenon. But 
regression models are, fundamentally, machine learning 
techniques. They take a finite set of training instances to 
learn a general model, which can be applied to unseen 
cases. Even an actuarial table can be considered a 
simple machine learning technique, in that it can make 
predictions about cases beyond those used to construct 
it. What has changed over the years is that our machine 
learning models have become more complex, and as a 
result more powerful. 
In what follows, we will introduce some newer machine 
learning techniques that are often associated with the 
field of AI: decision trees, neural networks, and Bayesian 
models. In fact, all of these techniques have a history in 
statistics as well as in AI: only neural networks squarely 
originated within AI. All share a focus on the process 
of learning, which distinguishes them from regression 
modelling, where the focus is on fitting mathematical 
models to data. They also share a focus on complex 
data, where it’s not obvious which mathematical models 
are to be fitted.
Decision trees
Decision trees are a fairly simple machine learning 
method, and are often used to introduce machine 
learning models. A decision tree is a set of instructions 
for guessing the value of some outcome variable, by 
consulting the values of the input variables one by 
one. A toy example in the domain of criminal justice 
(a domain that features prominently in this report) is 
shown in Figure 3. This decision tree provides a way of 
guessing whether a prisoner up for bail will reoffend 
(the outcome variable), based on whether they have 
behaved well in prison, and whether they committed a 
violent offence (two toy input variables). 
The tree states that if the prisoner didn’t behave well, 
they will reoffend, regardless of whether their original 
offence was violent. If they did behave well, they will 
reoffend if their original offence was violent, and they 
won’t if it wasn’t. (We use this crude example for 
illustration, but decision trees—admittedly with many 
more variables—are widely used to aid with practical 
decisions in public policy, as we will describe later.) 
The key task in decision tree modelling is to devise an 
algorithm that creates a good decision tree from the 
training data it is given.2 (Such an algorithm models 
a learning process: there’s no comparable model of a 
learning process in regression modelling.) In the classic 
algorithm, we build the decision tree progressively, 
starting from the top: at each point in the tree, we find 
the input variable that supplies the most “information” 
about the outcome variable in the training set, and add 
a node consulting that variable at that point. Stepping 
back from this particular algorithm, it’s also useful to 
see decision tree modelling as embodying a particular 
approach to statistics that starts with the data, and asks 
pragmatically how we can best make use of it. 
An attractive feature about a decision tree is the 
procedure for reaching a decision can be readily 
understood by humans: at base, a decision tree is just 
a complex “if-then” statement. Understandability is an 
important attribute for machine learning systems making 
important decisions. However, modern decision tree 
models often use multiple decision trees, embodying a 
range of different decision procedures, and take some 
aggregate over the decisions reached. “Random forests” 
are the dominant model of this kind at present. For 
various reasons, these aggregate methods are more 
accurate. There is frequently a tradeoff between a 
machine learning system’s explainability/complexity and 
its predictive performance. (This is true for regression 
models as well, incidentally.) 
Decision trees provide a useful opportunity to introduce 
the problem of overfitting in machine learning (and 
statistical modelling more widely). Say we have a 
training set of prisoners for whom we record the values 
of many variables. We could readily construct a large 
decision tree that lets us decide whether prisoners will 
reoffend based on this training set. But reoffending is 
likely to be at best a “loose” function of these variables: 
Figure 3. A simple decision tree for predicting a prisoner’s reoffending.
2. For example, you can imagine the sort of data that would lead 
an algorithm to create the decision tree in Figure 3: data on good 
behaviour, episodes of violence, and so on.
behaved well?






they are unlikely to correlate perfectly with reoffending. 
Put another way, the training set is likely to contain a 
considerable degree of noise, which is not helpful to 
the machine learning system, as it won’t carry over to 
new prisoners. If we are not careful, our decision tree 
will simply be a detailed description of the training set, 
rather than a model of the complete population of 
prisoners from which the training set is drawn. There are 
various ways of preventing overfitting, which we won’t 
describe here—but it is important to be aware that this 
problem can arise. 
We can also use decision trees to introduce the concept 
of a “classifier”, which is widely used in machine learning. 
A classifier is simply a predictive model whose outcome 
variable can take a number of discrete values. These 
discrete values represent different classes that the 
input items can be grouped into. Decision trees have 
to operate on variables with discrete values, so they 
can easily implement classifiers. Our decision tree for 
reoffending can be understood as a classifier that sorts 
prisoners into two classes: “will reoffend” and “won’t 
reoffend”. (To implement classifiers with regression 
techniques, we must use logistic regression models, 
which were specifically designed to handle discrete 
outcome variables.)
Neural networks
Neural networks (sometimes called “connectionist” 
networks) are machine learning techniques that are 
loosely inspired by the way brains perform computation. 
A brain is a collection of neurons, linked together by 
synapses. Each neuron is a tiny, very simple processor: 
the brain can learn complex representations, and 
produce complex behaviour because of the very large 
number of neurons in the brain, and the even larger 
number of synapses that connect them together. 
Learning in the brain happens through the adjustment 
of the “strength” of individual synapses. (The strength of 
a synapse determines how efficiently it communicates 
information between the neurons it connects.) We are 
still far from understanding how this learning process 
works, and how the brain represents information.
A neural network is a collection of neuron-like units that 
perform simple computations and can have different 
degrees of activation. These units are connected by 
synapse-like links, that have adjustable weights. (It’s 
important to emphasize that in most practical networks, 
these “units” and “links” are only based in the loosest terms 
on real neurons and synapses.) While neural networks 
were originally developed by researchers interested in 
biological learning processes, they are now also widely 
used by people who have no interest in brain modelling, 
simply because of their power as learning devices.
There are many different types of neural network—but 
networks that learn a predictive model are predominantly 
“feedforward networks” of the kind illustrated (very 
roughly) in Figure 4. A feedforward network used to 
learn a predictive model has a set of input units which 
encode the input variables of training items (or test 
items); it has a set of output units which encode the 
outcome variable for these same items; and it has a set 
of intermediate “hidden units”. Activity flows from the 
input units, through the hidden units, to the output units: 
through this process, the network implements a function 
from input variables to the outcome variable, just like a 
regression model or a decision tree model. Often there 
are many “layers” of hidden units, each connected to the 
layer before and the layer after. (The network in Figure 4 
has one hidden layer.)
To give a simple example: imagine the network in Figure 
4 is a very simple image classifier that takes a tiny image 
comprising 6 pixels, and decides whether these pixels 
represent an image of type A or type B. The intensity of 
each pixel would be encoded in the activity of one of 
the input units. The activity of the output units encodes 
the type, in some designated scheme. (For instance, 
type A could be encoded by setting the activity of one 
unit to 1, and the other unit to 0, while type B could be 
encoded by setting the activity of the former unit to 0, 
and the latter unit to 1.)
Figure 4. A simple feedforward network. (A template for a “deep network”.)
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There are many different learning algorithms for 
feedforward networks. But the basic principle for all of 
them is “supervised learning”. In this learning algorithm, 
we begin by setting the weights of all the links in the 
network to random values. The network then implements 
a function from inputs to outputs in successive rounds 
of training. (In our case, it makes guesses—essentially 
random guesses—about the type of each training image.) 
To train the network, we present the training inputs to 
the network one at a time, in each case computing what 
its guesses are. Crucially, we compute the “error” of each 
guess by comparing the network’s actual output values 
to the output values it should have produced, making 
small changes to the weights of all links in the network 
so as to reduce that error. This gradually improves the 
performance of the network.
All the smarts in a supervised learning algorithm relate 
to how to tweak its weights so as to reduce error. A 
big breakthrough in this area is the technique of “error 
backpropagation”, which was invented (or at least 
made prominent) in 1986 by David Rumelhart and 
colleagues at the University of California, San Diego. This 
algorithm allowed the weights of neurons in a network’s 
hidden layer(s) to be sensibly adjusted. The invention 
of backpropagation led to a wave of academic interest 
in neural networks, but not to immediate practical 
effect. The development of “deep networks” in the late 
1990s and early 2000s was due partly to a number 
of separate extensions to the algorithm, and partly to 
the huge increases in computing power that occurred 
around that time. The most salient feature of deep 
networks is that they have many layers of hidden units 
(unlike the single layer in Figure 4). There are now many 
varieties of deep networks, deployed in many different 
areas of machine learning. Deep networks of one sort or 
another are often the best performing models. The field 
of machine learning has in fact undergone a paradigm 
shift: the majority of researchers in this area currently 
focus their attention on deep networks. There are several 
software packages that support the implementation, 
training and testing of deep networks (of which the 
most prominent at the moment is Google’s TensorFlow). 
These packages have undoubtedly helped to consolidate 
the new paradigm, and their ongoing development has 
helped to progress it. 
Deep networks still rely crucially on supervised learning 
and backpropagation. The main thing to understand 
about this training regime is that it gradually improves 
the network’s performance by making small changes 
to its weights. The training process is often construed 
by imagining a large multidimensional space that 
represents all the possible weight combinations the 
network can have. Each point in this space represents a 
different model (or “function”) the network can express. 
To describe how supervised learning selects the model 
which best represents the training set, we can envisage 
a space with one additional dimension representing 
the network’s total error on the training set. Within this 
larger space, we can define an “error surface”: a hilly 
landscape, where peaks correspond to high error, and 
troughs to low error. In backpropagation, the network 
starts at a random place in this landscape, and simply 
follows the slope of the landscape downwards, by 
many small steps, until it can’t go any further down. It’s 
quite possible that there are points in the landscape 
with lower error: backpropagation is only guaranteed 
to find a “local minimum”. This rather heuristic method 
of finding the best model is very different from the 
regression algorithm described earlier, which provably 
finds the function with the very lowest error on the 
training set. What makes deep networks competitive 
with regression is that their hidden units allow them 
to learn their own internal representation of the 
training items. Regression, and other machine learning 
techniques, don’t have this ability. 
It should be noted that deep networks are also 
susceptible to overfitting. In fact they are more 
susceptible, because the models they learn can be 
very complex. (In graphical terms, they can describe 
almost arbitrarily “curvy” or “squiggly” functions.) But 
many of the techniques that address overfitting for 
other machine learning methods also work for neural 
networks—and there are other useful techniques that are 
specific to neural networks. 
Nonetheless, a significant drawback with deep networks 
is that the models they learn are so complex that it is 
essentially impossible for humans to understand their 
workings. Humans have a reasonable chance of being 
able to understand a decision tree (or even a set of 
such trees), or to understand a regression model that 
succinctly states the relationships between variables. 
But they have no chance of understanding how a deep 
network computes its output from its inputs. If we 
want our machine learning tools to provide human-
understandable explanations of their decisions, we need 
to supplement them with additional tools that generate 
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explanations. The development of “explanation tools” is a 
growth area of AI, and sufficiently important that we will 
discuss explanation systems separately in this section 
(see below). They will also feature in our discussion in 
Section 4B.
Bayesian models
Thomas Bayes formulated his famous theorem around 
the time the first actuarial tables were produced: “Bayes’ 
theorem” was published posthumously in 1763. The 
theorem was applied in various scientific fields, notably 
through the work of Pierre Laplace—and in fact, was 
used implicitly by Alan Turing in some of his code-
breaking work (Fienberg 2006). But its widespread use 
in predictive modelling is relatively recent: like neural 
networks, practical Bayesian models require a lot of 
computing power, and it was only in the 1980s that they 
became popular as a machine learning technique.
Bayesian models can be introduced in various ways. One 
approach is to focus on Bayesian models as models of a 
learning process whereby an initial hypothesis is refined, 
or updated, when new data arrives. Another approach 
is to focus on the Bayesian conception of probability as 
modelling the degree of belief that an observer has in 
some proposition, given the facts she has encountered, 
plus some initial predisposition. We will pursue a third 
approach, which sees Bayesian models as a practical 
way to address a problem often encountered when 
gathering training data for predictive models. 
Say we are interested in building a model that predicts 
the presence or absence of some disease, given a large 
set of symptoms. It is often complex combinations of 
symptoms that diagnose diseases: the relevance of 
individual symptoms is hard to quantify. More generally, 
we are often interested in predicting a cause variable 
from its observable effects. (Remember, the “predicted” 
variable in a predictive model can be in the past.) Again, 
the relevance of individual effects in diagnosing the 
cause is hard to quantify. 
We can illustrate the difficulty by considering the case 
of disease diagnosis a little further. If we have a training 
set of people with the disease we are interested in, and 
people without the disease, we can readily estimate 
the probability of each individual symptom given the 
presence or absence of the disease. But what we want 
to estimate is the probability of the disease, given some 
particular combination of symptoms. Using standard 
models for estimation (e.g. regression), this would 
require us to gather a training set in which there are 
people with every possible combination of symptoms. 
(In fact, to make accurate estimates, we would need 
large numbers of people with each combination of 
symptoms, so we are not misled by individual cases.) As 
we increase the number of symptoms in our model, this 
quickly becomes impossible. 
Bayesian models address this problem. Bayes’ theorem 
allows us to infer the probability of a cause given its 
effects—the probability we want, but which is hard to 
estimate—from the probabilities of individual effects 
given the cause (which are easier to estimate). For 
instance, the theorem lets us infer the probability of a 
disease given a particular combination of symptoms, 
from the probabilities of each symptom given the 
presence or absence of the disease. Bayes’ theorem is 
of great practical use in many cases where we wish to 
predict (or diagnose) some hidden cause from a set of 
readily observable effects.
Bayesian models are often used in classification tasks. 
For instance, spam filters, which classify email documents 
into the categories “spam” and “non-spam” are often 
implemented as Bayesian models. In this context, the 
category of a document is the “cause” which is hidden to 
the user, and the effects of this cause are the observable 
words in the document. Using a training set of known 
spam and non-spam documents, we can readily estimate 
the probability of any given word appearing in a spam 
document, and in a non-spam document. We can then 
use these probabilities, together with Bayes’ theorem, to 
infer the probability of a document being spam or non-
spam, given the words it contains. 
Explanation tools for complex  
predictive models
Modern predictive models operating in real-world 
domains tend to be complex things, regardless of which 
of the above machine learning methods they use. If 
we want to build a predictive system that can convey 
to a human user why a certain decision was reached, 
we have to add functionality that goes beyond what 
was needed to generate the decision in the first place. 
The development of “explanation tools” that add this 
functionality is a rapidly growing new area of AI.
The basic insight behind the new generation of 
explanation tools is that to understand how one 
predictive model works, we can train another predictive 
model to reproduce its performance (see Edwards & 
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Veale 2017 for a good review). While the original model 
can be very complex, and optimised to achieve the 
best predictive performance, the second model can be 
much simpler, and optimised to offer maximally useful 
explanations. These “model-of-a-model” explanation 
systems have the additional benefit that they provide 
an account of how a system arrived at a given decision 
without revealing any of its internal workings—essentially, 
by treating it as a “black box”. Some of the most 
promising systems in this space are ones that build a 
local model of the factors most relevant to any given 
decision of the system being explained (see e.g. Ribeiro 
et al. 2016). How best to configure a model-based 
explanation tool is still an active research question—but 
the availability of such systems should certainly inform 
current discussions of transparency in AI tools. We will 
return to this topic in Section 4B.
Non-predictive algorithmic tools  
used in government
Our review has focused on “predictive models” and their 
use in government. Before we conclude, we will briefly 
note some other types of computer tool in widespread 
use in government departments, which will ultimately 
fall outside the scope of our recommendations. 
“Optimisation systems” are sophisticated computer 
programs that are designed to find an optimal solution 
to some complex problem featuring many variables. 
Common applications are in timetabling, route planning 
or resource allocation. In a typical application, there is 
a large multidimensional space of possible solutions, 
and a way of computing the “goodness” of any given 
solution: the optimisation algorithm has to find the 
solution with the best “goodness”. For instance, it might 
have to find the “best” bus route that passes through a 
certain set of stops. (Often, the algorithm searches for an 
optimal solution by exploring a hilly “goodness surface”, 
similar to the “error surface” explored by neural network 
learning algorithms, travelling upwards to find peaks, 
rather than downwards to find troughs.) The goodness 
of a bus route might take into account measures such 
as how much petrol is used, how much time is taken, 
and the likely demand of people at stops. These define 
the algorithm’s “goodness” function. Typically, the 
goodness function is a weighted sum of several such 
measures. (How the different measures are weighted 
is often an ethically-laden issue: for instance, stops in 
neighbourhoods that rely more on buses might be 
weighted more heavily than other stops.) 
Optimisation algorithms are an important tool for 
government planners, but they are not systems that 
make decisions or judgements about individuals in the 
way that predictive models can. In a sense, they make 
a single “decision” about how to solve a particular 
problem. While this de cision may determine government 
strategy in some particular area, and thus have importan 
t relevance for groups of people, such as populations (or 
subpopulations), it never affects people as individuals, 
the way predictive tools frequently do. The New Zealand 
government’s recent Algorithm Assessment Report (Stats 
NZ 2018) distinguished helpfully between “operational” 
algorithms, which make decisions about individuals based 
on their personal circumstances, and other decisions 
that could be called “strategic”, which are used to inform 
policy development or research and don’t impact on 
individuals directly in this way. The report’s focus was on 
operational algorithms—and ours will be too. 
“Ranking systems” are also extensively used in 
government. A ranking algorithm takes a set of items 
as input, and ranks them according to some predefined 
criterion. For instance, an algorithm might rank patients 
waiting for surgery, using a criterion capturing some 
measure of urgency. The criterion of a ranking algorithm 
is like the goodness function of an optimisation 
algorithm: it is typically defined as a weighted sum of 
attributes. In a system ranking patients for surgery, it 
might take into account the seriousness of a patient’s 
condition, the likelihood of the surgery being successful, 
the patient’s age, and so on. As with the goodness 
function in optimisation, everything hangs on the 
attributes picked, and the weights assigned to them. The 
aim is often to use weights that deliver rankings similar 
to those of human experts. 
Ranking algorithms certainly “make decisions” about 
individual people—often very important ones. They 
are certainly “operational” algorithms, in the Algorithm 
Assessment Report’s sense. But they don’t make 
predictions that can be independently verified; and they 
don’t typically need to be trained. For this reason, we 
distinguish them from predictive systems.
An important class of computer algorithms to mention 
is that of “business rules”. While optimisation systems 
can be very complex, business rules are at the other end 
of the spectrum: they are simple pieces of code, that 
automate routine procedures. A payroll program may 
implement a number of business rules. Such systems 
are in very common use: they have no autonomy of their 
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own, and they certainly don’t involve AI techniques. The 
Algorithm Assessment Report excluded these from its 
remit, and we will too.
We should finally note that we include within our class 
of “predictive models” models that advocate some 
course of action, rather than a prediction per se. For 
instance, a model that advocates a range of medical 
interventions given patients’ circumstances is advising on 
courses of action, rather than predicting facts or events. 
But such systems are still trained on corpora of actions 
actually taken in different circumstances, and their 
training can use exactly the same methods as predictive 
models. They can be thought of as predicting human 
decisions about how to act.
Protocols for testing predictive models
It’s essential to test predictive algorithms against 
independent data, as we have already noted. But it’s 
important to stress that if a predictive algorithm is 
deployed it should be regularly tested, and if necessary 
retrained. It’s essential that the items used to train an 
algorithm are representative of those on which the 
algorithm is deployed. If they are not, performance 
will decrease, and biases of various kinds may be 
introduced. This principle leads to many precepts 
in statistics—for instance, a system trained on one 
population should not be used on a different population. 
“Populations” can vary over space, but also over time, 
as people’s behaviours and characteristics change. For 
any continuously deployed predictive algorithm, there 
should be a protocol for regular re-evaluation. There 
should also be a protocol for regular gathering of new 
training data, so that the system’s data do not fall out of 
date. Sometimes this new training data requires human 
judgements uncontaminated by the predictive algorithm 
currently in use—which is something to bear in mind 
when predictive algorithms are deployed. 
Often, a predictive algorithm can make several different 
types of error, which have very different implications for 
its use in the field. Consider a “binary classifier” that is 
trained to recognise members of one particular class. 
During testing, this classifier labels each test individual 
either as “positive” (a member of the class in question), 
or “negative” (not a member). If we also know the actual 
class of the test individuals, we can chart how often it is 
right and wrong in its assignment of these labels, and 
express these results in a “confusion matrix”. An example 
of a confusion matrix is shown in Table 1. The classifier in 
this case is a system trained to predict fraudsters: it makes 
a “positive” response for people it predicts will commit 
fraud, and a “negative” response for everyone else. 
 Did commit Did not commit  
 fraud fraud
Predicted to True positives False positives  
commit fraud  (type 1 errors)
Not predicted to False negatives True negatives  
commit fraud (type 2 errors) 
The confusion matrix shows how frequently the system 
is right or wrong in both kinds of prediction. A “false 
positive” is a case where the system wrongly predicts 
someone to commit fraud; a “false negative” is a case 
where it fails to detect an actual fraudster. If a system 
is not perfect, there will always be a tradeoff between 
false positives and false negatives (and between true 
positives and true negatives). For example, an algorithm 
that judges everyone to be a fraudster will have no false 
negatives, while one judging no-one to be a fraudster will 
have no false positives. Importantly, in different domains, 
we might want to err on one side or the other. For 
instance, if we are predicting suitability for a rehabilitation 
project, we might want to err on the side of false 
positives, while if we are predicting guilt in a criminal case, 
we might want to err on the side of false negatives. For 
many applications, we would like the evaluation criterion 
for a classifier to specify what counts as acceptable 
performance in relation to the confusion matrix: that is, 
what sorts of error we would prefer the system to make.
One other evaluation metric we should introduce here is 
the “receiver operating characteristic” (ROC) curve. It is 
often possible to tune a binary classifier, so it occupies 
different points on the tradeoff between false positives 
and false negatives. For instance, we could tune a 
fraud detection algorithm to err on the side of finding 
all fraudsters, or to err on the side of making no false 
accusations, and to all settings in between. If we want 
to compare two classifiers, we often want to do so in a 
way that considers performance for all possible tuning 
settings. The ROC curve for a binary classifier is a graph 
plotting its false positive rate against its true positive rate 
for a variety of settings. A classifier that always returns a 
negative result has a false positive rate of 0, and by the 
Table 1. A confusion matrix for a fraud detection algorithm.
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same token, a true positive rate of 0 as well. A classifier 
that always returns a positive result has a false positive 
rate of 1, and a true positive rate of 1. For classifiers 
that can be tuned to these extremes, and all settings in 
between, we can plot a full ROC curve. In other cases, we 
might have to plot performance for just some settings, 
and estimate the rest of the curve. In either case, the 
metric we are interested in is the “area under the curve” 
(or AUC), which charts the performance of the classifier 
at all points on the false positives/negatives tradeoff.
Conclusion
In this section we have presented the main varieties 
of predictive models currently used by government 
departments around the world. Our aim has been to 
emphasize the continuity of modelling techniques: 
today’s models are extensions of predictive models 
that have been in use since the start of the computer 
age, and in some cases, well before that. We have also 
emphasised that while these models are often referred 
to in current discussions as “AI” models, they are often 
equally well described as “statistical” models. (We will 
mostly use the term “AI model” in what follows, because 
of our project’s explicit focus on AI.) The main novelty 
of modern AI predictive models is that they often 
perform better than traditional models, partly because of 
improvements in techniques, and partly due to the many 
new data sources that are coming online. For this reason, 
they are becoming more widely adopted in government 
departments (and elsewhere). A positive feedback loop 
is in evidence. Because the new models are successful, 
considerable effort is expended to improve the software 
implementing these models, making it more efficient 
and easier to use. Practitioners are also increasingly 
being taught about these models, and trained in the 
use of the associated software. This in turn leads to 
further proliferation in the use of the models, further 
improvements in the software, and so on.
In the case of modern AI technologies, it has to be 
said that commercial companies have taken the 
lead in development and adoption. But government 
departments are catching up, and are increasingly 
deploying these tools. The new interest shown by 
policymakers is partly due to the genuinely novel 
features of these tools, and partly due to the new 
prevalence of these tools in government operations 
(and elsewhere). Both of these factors should indeed 
occasion a renewed interest in the use of AI tools in 
government among regulators and policymakers.
C. Ethical and regulatory issues 
arising for predictive models
In defining a class of AI systems to serve as a regulatory 
target, we need to identify a class which is coherent 
from a technical perspective—but also one that is 
coherent as regards the set of ethical issues that 
arise, and the types of regulation that are necessary. 
Regulation will dictate a particular approach to 
systems of the identified type: certain aspects of their 
performance that must be scrutinised, or evaluated, or 
controlled, in order to address the relevant ethical issues. 
It is therefore important that the same ethical issues 
arise for all instances of these systems. 
We believe that a reasonably well-defined set of ethical 
issues arise in relation to government use of predictive 
models. That is, we believe that predictive models are 
a well-defined technical class of models—which nets in 
modern AI models as well as older statistical models—
but we also believe they are a well-defined ethical 
object of study. This convergence of technical and ethical 
definitions makes them a helpful category of algorithms 
for regulators. 
The ethical issues at play will be discussed at length in 
Chapter 4, after the wider context is set in Chapters 2 
and 3. But we will briefly summarise the issues here. 
First, if predictive models are being used to aid humans 
in making decisions, how can we ensure that the 
interaction between humans and machines is optimal? 
In particular, how can we ensure users don’t become 
passive partners in this interaction? Second, if models 
are contributing to decisions about people, how can 
those affected obtain explanations about the decisions 
that were taken? Third, how can we ensure that the 
machine’s decisions are not biased, for or against 
some particular group? Cutting across all of these 
questions is the wider question, how well is the machine 
performing? As discussed in the previous section, there 
are standard ways of evaluating predictive models 
on unseen test data, and looking for various kinds of 
error: false positives, false negatives, and so on. Our key 
point for the moment is that all these questions can be 
coherently asked of any predictive model, regardless of 
how it is implemented: whether it is a random forest, 
or a neural network, or a regression model, is of little 
importance. If the target of regulation is “predictive 
models”, it should be possible to propose regulatory 
mechanisms that apply in sensible ways across these 
different technologies.
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D. A wider view of government 
algorithms and mechanisms
We certainly don’t want to suggest that the ethical 
issues that arise for predictive systems only arise for this 
type of system. Many of them apply more widely—and 
regulatory options should certainly reflect this. In this 
section, we will flag two important ways in which the 
ethical issues we focus on extend to a wider group of 
algorithms and mechanisms. 
Firstly, many tools that subserve “policy development 
and research” (as flagged in the Algorithm Assessment 
Report) raise important ethical issues. Optimisation and 
ranking algorithms, in particular, can raise issues around 
bias. For instance, an algorithm optimizing bus transport 
routes might not take into account special circumstances 
for certain groups. But the issue of human-machine 
interaction in decision-making does not apply in the 
same way. Policy development and research tools are 
used by government experts, rather than by caseworkers 
in the field. As they are not used as part of a routine 
practice, there is little danger of users becoming passive 
partners. The fact that users are experts also somewhat 
obviates the requirement for explanations of decisions 
for these systems. Finally, there is no analogue for these 
systems of the performance evaluations that can be 
conducted for predictive models, to see how well they 
have learned their task. They are not trained to perform 
a task in the same way as predictive models, so different 
evaluation methods must be applied.
Secondly, there are some decision-making mechanisms 
in government domains which have a component of 
automation, even though they are not implemented in 
computers. To illustrate, we will briefly consider a very 
simple tool for structured decision-making. The Youth 
Offending Risk Screening Tool (YORST) was first deployed 
by the New Zealand Police in 2007. It appears in the 
Algorithm Assessment Report but is an “algorithm” only 
in a weak sense of the term. The YORST is a simple 
checkbox form (see Appendix 1). The answers for 
each question are summed at the bottom of the form 
providing a risk score. Crucially, this process does not (as 
far as we are aware) result from any automated training 
regime: as well as being implemented by hand, it was 
also devised by hand. The YORST is not a “predictive 
model”, as we define the term, because it isn’t trained 
on data using automated means. And it certainly 
seems unlikely that anybody would count it as a form 
of artificial intelligence. Yet some of the ethical issues 
it raises are similar to those associated with bona fide 
predictive models that provide much more sophisticated 
automated support for decisions in government.
The YORST is similar to tools used in many jurisdictions 
for the case management of at-risk young offenders. 
External review (Mossman 2010) has found it to be 
a reliable evidence-based tool for risk assessment in 
that the factors it measures are reliable indicators of 
reoffending in young people. In the context of case 
management, the tool seems to be well-designed and 
fit for purpose. Yet, when in the lead up to the 2017 
election, the National Party proposed using the YORST as 
a tool for screening young offenders into “boot camps”, 
public debate turned to a variety of aspects in which the 
YORST seemed problematic. The proposed policy was to 
apply to any “Young Serious Offender”. This was a new 
category of young person who had committed a serious 
offence, scored highly on the YORST, and had offended 
after being in a youth justice or adult custodial facility. 
Public concerns quickly coalesced around the algorithmic 
component of this test.
These concerns were understandable. One issue 
was that while the YORST does not use ethnicity as 
a variable, many of the variables it employs, while 
predictively accurate, are also proxies for ethnicity. Māori 
youth are more likely to come from families that have 
been subject to Child Youth and Family notifications. 
They are also more likely to live in poor neighbourhoods. 
So while the YORST follows accepted practice by 
focusing on the causes of criminal behaviour rather 
than on ethnicity (Gottfredson & Snyder, 2005), the 
proposed policy seemed likely to result in boot camps 
disproportionately populated by Māori youth. And while 
the stated aims of the policy were to turn the lives of 
young people away from crime, in the short term it 
seemed likely to exacerbate rather than alleviate existing 
racial inequality in New Zealand (Harris 2017). A second 
issue arises from the sources of data that the YORST 
employs. Part B of the tool focuses on “Peer Group 
Factors” and part C on “Family Factors” including family 
violence and living situation (see Appendix 1). This led 
to concern that the proposed policy was effectively 
punishing young people, not for their own behaviour, 
but for the behaviour of those around them.
So an “AI” like YORST poses substantial risks, even 
though it’s technically speaking “AI lite”, and these risks 
are no less serious than those posed by more “heavy-
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duty” AI tools utilising more advanced machine learning 
methods. In light of that, there is clearly value in crafting 
regulations so that the kind of harms or risks posed 
by a technology, rather than its architectural design or 
modelling principles, dictates whether and how it may 
be used. Conversely, regulation which does specifically 
define and target a type of artificial intelligence should 
generally only be appropriate where the issues raised by 
that technology are not found elsewhere. 
For example, in Chapter 4, we survey the risks 
associated with using automated decision-making tools 
in government contexts and elsewhere. These include 
difficulties in retaining meaningful control over decision-
making, algorithmic opacity, bias, privacy intrusions, 
and so on. Most of these issues are not unique to 
applications of any one system that is used by the New 
Zealand Government. Appropriate levels of transparency 
in public decision-making are essential no matter who 
or what is making the decisions, and no matter whether 
a tool uses random forests or Bayesian methods to 
arrive at its decisions. Data protection principles must 
be respected regardless of the technology that is used. 
Discrimination on prohibited grounds is no more allowed 
by a deep learning tool than by a simple decision tree. 
And so on. In all these cases, the key point is to identify 
the relevant risks the decision-making technologies pose, 
and to respond to these risks. 
To summarise: while for some purposes it is useful to 
pick out a particular class of technologies (like the class 
of predictive models), the development of technology-
specific regulations is likely going to be insufficient to 
tackle all the various issues discussed in this report. The 
issues of bias and fairness which arise from the use of a 
simple tool like the YORST are exactly the same as those 
which arise from the use of complex random forest 
and deep learning tools. A technology-specific (“AI-
centric”) approach to such issues would probably miss 
simple tools such as the YORST altogether. As well as 
attempting to define regulations that apply specifically 
to predictive models, we should keep in mind that many 
of the ethical issues that apply to this class of model 
may also apply much more widely within operation of 
government departments. 
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A. The New Zealand Government’s 
algorithmic stocktake
Recent years have seen significant attention drawn to 
the use of algorithms by the New Zealand Government 
and Crown entities. Specific applications, including those 
by ACC and Immigration NZ, have attracted criticism 
from the media and academic commentators (e.g. 
Johnston 2017; Tan 2018).
Aside from these individual cases which have come to 
media attention, however, not much has been known 
about how—and how widely—algorithms are being used 
in New Zealand’s public sector. In October 2018, Internal 
Affairs and Stats NZ took a first step in answering such 
questions. The Algorithm Assessment Report documented 
32 algorithms being used for a variety of purposes across 
14 agencies, including ACC, Department of Corrections, 
Department of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Social 
Development and New Zealand Police (Stats NZ 2018).
As we discussed in Chapter 1, the Algorithm Assessment 
Report focused primarily on “operational algorithms”, 
those which “impact significantly on individuals or 
groups” (Stats NZ 2018,  p. 7). Those used for policy 
development and research were excluded from the 
report, as were what it referred to as “business rules”, 
which it defined as “simple algorithms created by people 
that use rules to constrain or define a business activity” 
(a definition similar to the one we gave in Section 1B).
The Algorithm Assessment Report presents a fairly 
upbeat perspective on government algorithm use. The 
Executive Summary begins with the claim that “All of the 
algorithms considered in this review are embedded in 
policies that deliver clear public benefit”. Reassurances 
are given throughout about, for example, transparency 
and human review of decisions. The Algorithm 
Assessment Report does, however, note a degree of 
inconsistency across the agencies it examined. It makes 
a number of proposals for better practice, some of 
which we consider in the final section of this report.
The algorithms described in the Algorithm Assessment 
Report range from the very well established to the 
very recent. An example of the former is RoC*RoI 
(which stands for “Risk of re-Conviction x Risk of 
re-Imprisonment”). RoC*RoI is a predictive model 
developed primarily by New Zealand Department of 
Justice senior psychologists in the mid 1990s (Bakker et 
al. 1999; DoC 2009). RoC*RoI uses a formula involving 
a number of static variables (see Appendix 2), that is, 
factors that are not possible or reasonably practicable 
for the person being assessed to alter, such as age at 
first offending. 
RoC*RoI scores have “been included in pre-sentence 
reports provided to judges at sentencing, and in reports 
to the Parole Board” and have played a part in allocating 
offenders to sentence management categories, which in 
turn determine eligibility for rehabilitation programmes 
and other services (DoC 2009, p. 14) 
RoC*RoI is a relatively simple algorithm, using well-
established statistical techniques—in particular, logistic 
regression models with a limited number of input 
variables. Nonetheless, the decisions that it informs 
could hardly be more important. Indeed, the application 
of predictive algorithms to matters of criminal justice are 
one of the most controversial aspects of their use. 
According to the Algorithm Assessment Report, the 
Department of Corrections and Police “use algorithms 
less extensively [than other agencies], supporting their 
frontline staff to make decisions in certain specific 
circumstances as opposed to informing the majority of 
interactions” (Stats NZ 2018, p. 30). Other predictive 
tools have, however, been developed and used within 
the New Zealand corrections system, which are not listed 
in the Algorithm Assessment Report. These include the 
Automated Sexual Recidivism Scale (ASRS), a “validated 
actuarial measure of sex offender risk based on New 
Zealand data” (DoC 2009, p. 19). The ASRS “estimates 
the probability of sexual recidivism using electronically 
accessible static factors: enabling the identification of a 
subgroup with a significantly higher-than-average sexual 
recidivism rate” (Wilson 2013, p. 2). The recently revised 
version is known as the ASRS. 
Even more recent assessment tools include the Dynamic 
Risk Assessment for Offender Re-entry (DRAOR), 
which is used by probation staff to measure dynamic 
(changeable) factors relevant to offender risk. Unlike 
the RoC*RoI and ASRS, the DRAOR is not automated, 
but rather, is scored manually. An interesting question 
for any regulatory or oversight system for “predictive 
algorithms” is whether it should apply only to automated 
tools, and not to manual tools like DRAOR. Possibilities 
of arbitrary distinctions and perverse incentives would 
need to be kept in mind, and we return to these in the 
final part of the report.
2. CURRENT AND PROJECTED USE
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The Algorithm Assessment Report is not only concerned 
with algorithms in the criminal justice sector. In 
July 2018, the Accident Compensation Corporation 
announced the introduction of an automated claim 
system in which “ACC system uses statistical models and 
a rules engine to automate much of its current, manual, 
registration cover process” (ACC 2018b).
The new system is intended to automate and expedite 
the processing of the large majority of compensation 
claims—around 90% according to ACC—that it regards 
as straightforward. Claims that are more complex or 
sensitive will still be referred to staff members. The 
system relies upon two models, a Cover Decision Service 
and an Accident Description Service. The Cover Decision 
Service—the part of the system that determines whether 
a claim can be accepted without manual review—“uses 
two statistical models that work in tandem”. The 
Probability of Accept model “predicts the likelihood that 
a claim would be approved, based on historical data”, 
while the Case Complexity model—as the name would 
imply—predicts the complexity of a case. Both models 
use data such as injury diagnosis, claimant age and 
earner status (ACC 2018b, p. 7). Together, these models 
will produce a decision either to “auto-accept” the claim, 
or to refer it for manual review. The Accident Description 
Service classifies the text entered into the “free text” 
fields of an ACC claim form into one of a number of 
preset categories. These categories are not used in cover 
decisions: they are used for various descriptive purposes, 
such as injury prevention initiatives, and summary 
statistics, as well as for actuarial purposes.
The automated process uses logistic regression. ACC 
have explained that this was regarded as best meeting 
key requirements of transparency and flexibility. 
Regarding the latter, they explain that this will allow 
them to adjust inputs “in response to external or policy 
changes” (ACC 2018b, p. 9). ACC have repeatedly 
stressed that the automated system can only accept 
or refer claims: no claims will be declined on the basis 
of the automated process. They have also insisted that 
ethnicity and gender have been specifically excluded 
from the input variables. Nonetheless, the new system 
has attracted considerable criticism (Maude 2018).
B. The use of algorithms in the 
criminal justice system
The Government’s Algorithm Assessment Report listed 
a fairly small number of algorithms being used in the 
New Zealand criminal justice system. We have already 
discussed three of these: YORST, RoC*RoI and ASRS-R. 
An international perspective, however, shows a much 
wider range of uses right across the criminal justice 
system: from policing to decisions about sentencing, 
parole and post-sentence detention. 
The criminal justice system has probably proved to be 
the most controversial use of algorithms to date. A recent 
report from the UK human rights campaign group Liberty 
claimed that “predictive policing programmes entrench 
pre-existing inequalities while being disguised as cost-
effective innovations in time of austerity—and their use 
puts our rights at risk” (Couchman 2019). It should be 
noted that some of the opposition to the use of such 
techniques is rooted in hostility to the idea of “predictive 
justice” more generally. Jamie Susskind (2018), for 
example, argues that there is “something philosophically 
problematic about restricting people’s freedom on the 
basis of predictions about their future conduct”.
In this section, we describe a range of these systems. 
None of them is currently in use in New Zealand, and 
we have no particular reason to believe that systems like 
these are being actively considered here. Nonetheless, 
the rapidity of their uptake in the USA, UK and other 
jurisdictions makes them relevant to New Zealand  
policy-makers.
There are four key junctures in the criminal justice 
system where predictive algorithms have already been 
deployed or at least trialled:
• Predictive policing (PredPol);
• Crime detection (VALCRI);
• Prosecution decisions (HART); and
• Post-conviction decisions (including sentencing,  
 parole and post-sentence detention) (COMPAS).
We will discuss a number of these in turn.
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PredPol
While we may think of the criminal justice system 
primarily in terms of detecting and responding to crime, 
algorithms are also being used to inform decisions 
“upstream” from actual offending. “Predictive policing” 
has been defined in an influential report as:
“ the application of analytical techniques—particularly quantitative techniques— 
to identify likely targets for police 
intervention and prevent crime or 
solve past crimes by making statistical 
predictions.” (PERRY ET AL. 2013)
As the report makes clear, the use of statistical 
approaches to forecasting crime is a long-established 
practice. (Statistical methods have a long history of 
use right across government, as emphasised in Section 
1B.) What is most novel in the new generation of crime 
forecasting tools is the size and variety of the datasets 
that are consulted. It is this novelty which is of primary 
interest for the purposes of our report.
Predictive policing can operate in a range of settings. 
Marion Oswald and colleagues (2018) list three different 
contexts in which algorithmic data can be used to assist 
or inform policing:
(i) predictive policing on a macro level incorporating 
strategic planning, prioritisation and forecasting; 
(ii) operational intelligence linking and evaluation which 
may include, for instance, crime reduction activities; 
and 
(iii) decision-making or risk-assessments relating to 
individuals.
Perry et al.’s (2013) report offers its own taxonomy of 
potential applications:
Methods for predicting crimes: these are 
approaches used to forecast places and times with 
an increased risk of crime. 
Methods for predicting offenders: these 
approaches identify individuals at risk of offending 
in the future. 
Methods for predicting perpetrators’ identities: 
these techniques are used to create profiles that 
accurately match likely offenders with specific past 
crimes. 
Methods for predicting victims of crimes: Similar 
to those methods that focus on offenders, crime 
locations, and times of heightened risk, these 
approaches are used to identify groups or, in some 
cases, individuals who are likely to become victims 
of crime.
Probably the best known company name in predictive 
policing to date is PredPol. Incorporated in 2012, the 
company’s origins go back to 2006, and a collaboration 
between the Los Angeles Police Department and a 
group of criminologists and mathematicians at the 
University of California, San Diego. Their objective 
was to try to use historical crime data to track crime 
“hotspots”—understanding and predicting their 
appearance and recurrence. Adopting an approach 
previously used in analysing earthquakes, the project’s 
objective was “identifying the times and locations where 
specific crimes are most likely to occur, then patrolling 
those areas to prevent those crimes from occurring”.
Predpol, it has been claimed, is now used by used by 
more than 60 police departments around the USA 
(Rieland 2019). Until November 2018, it was also used 
by Kent Constabulary in England. (Chowdhury 2018).
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Using PredPol, high risk crime “hot-spots” are shown displayed as red boxes in a Google Maps window.  
Each box represents an area 150 square metres. 
PredPol claims to use only three data points in its 
predictions: crime type, crime location, and crime date/
time. Since “[n]o personally identifiable information is 
ever used”, this, they claim, “eliminates the possibility 
for privacy or civil rights violations seen with other 
intelligence-led or predictive policing models”. 
This has not, however, spared Predpol—and other 
predictive policing technologies—from criticism. A joint 
statement by American Civil Liberties Union, NAACP 
and 14 other civil rights and related organisations 
identified a number of concerns about the use of such 
technologies—in particular, in relation to bias:
“ Predictive policing tools threaten to provide a misleading and undeserved 
imprimatur of impartiality for an institution 
that desperately needs fundamental 
change. Systems that are engineered to 
support the status quo have no place 
in American policing. The data driving 
predictive enforcement activities — such 
as the location and timing of previously 
reported crimes, or patterns of community- 
and officer-initiated 911 calls—is profoundly 
limited and biased.” (ACLU ET AL. 2016)
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The Brennan Center for Justice has expressed concerns 
about the self-fulfilling nature of the prophecies 
generated by such systems, claiming that:
“ most of these tools rely on historical policing data to generate their predictions; 
in the absence of meaningful oversight  
and transparency, the software may  
instead simply recreate and obscure  
the origins of racially biased policing.” (BRENNAN CENTER 2018)
And in a similar vein, Kristian Lum and William Isaac 
(2016) have warned that:
“ Predictive policing software is designed to learn and reproduce patterns in 
data, but if biased data is used to train 
these predictive models, the models will 
reproduce and in some cases amplify 
those same biases. At best, this renders 
the predictive models ineffective. At worst, 
it results in discriminatory policing.” 
They too are concerned that Predpol and similar 
initiatives risk generating self-fulfilling prophecies:
“ Because these predictions are likely to over-represent areas that were already 
known to police, officers become 
increasingly likely to patrol these same 
areas and observe new criminal acts 
that confirm their prior beliefs regarding 
the distributions of criminal activity. The 
newly observed criminal acts that police 
document as a result of these targeted 
patrols then feed into the predictive 
policing algorithm on subsequent days, 
generating increasingly biased predictions. 
This creates a feedback loop where the 
model becomes increasingly confident 
that the locations most likely to experience 
further criminal activity are exactly the 
locations they had previously believed 
to be high in crime: selection bias meets 
confirmation bias.” 
Recent mathematical modelling by Ensign et al. (2018) 
appears to substantiate this risk:
“ Since such discovered incidents only occur in neighborhoods that police have been 
sent to by the predictive policing algorithm 
itself, there is the potential for this 
sampling bias to be compounded, causing 
a runaway feedback loop.” 
It is possible to imagine steps to mitigate against this 
kind of risk—for example, by only recording reported 
incidents of crime and excluding those discovered by 
police officers despatched in response to the prediction. 
Ensign et al. (2018, p. 11) suggest a possible solution 
“to counteract runaway feedback in predictive policing 
by appropriately filtering the inputs fed to the system”. 
Such steps should be seriously considered by any law 
enforcement agency considering the deployment of 
these tools.
Another suggested risk is of displacement: a heavy 
police presence might reduce the rate of crime in an 
identified “hot spot” at the expense of “pushing” it 
elsewhere. Opportunistic offenders, it is thought, might 
target their efforts at less heavily policed areas, leaving 
the police engaged in a game of “whack-a-mole”. Yet 
another concern relates to the potential erosion of 
relations between police and communities identified as 
crime “hot-spots”. The Liberty report warns that
“ Focusing on abstract data, isolated from its human context, is at the expense 
of building proper community trust 
and understanding. This is particularly 
important in relation to over-policed 
communities.” 
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The Brennan Center also raised concerns about the lack 
of transparency and accountability around the use of 
such systems. In June 2016, the Center filed a Freedom 
of Information Law request, seeking information 
about the use of predictive policing software by the 
New York Police department, “in the interest of better 
understanding and informing the public about the use 
of these systems”. The request sought, among other 
things, communications between the NYPD and private 
developers of the software (predominantly in this case 
Palantir), details of inputs and outputs of the software, 
and records of its testing and utilisation. (The Center 
originally sought access to the “algorithm and code” 
used, but later narrowed its request.) 
The NYPD refused to provide all of the information 
requested, claiming that it “would reveal non-
routine techniques and procedures”, and also violate 
nondisclosure agreements between NYPD and vendors 
bidding for contracts to supply predictive software 
products.
The Brennan Center filed suit. On 27 December 2017, 
the New York State Supreme Court found substantially in 
favour of the petitioner. It noted that the relevant statute 
places the burden of proof firmly with the respondent 
to demonstrate that the information sought fell within 
statutory disclosure exemptions. The NYPD had failed 
to discharge this burden, and therefore had to provide 
email correspondence with vendors and output data. 
The nature of the Center’s changed request meant that 
the NYPD had not had sufficient time to respond to that 
part of the request, and the Court therefore rejected 
that part of the Center’s case; that will need to be the 
subject of a new request. Finally, a decision about the 
trials of various vendors’ products was to be conducted 
in camera, to allow the Court to determine whether they 
fell within permitted disclosure exceptions.
HART
Algorithmically-informed deployment decisions have 
proved controversial, but probably even more so is 
Oswald et al.’s (2018) third category: “decision-making or 
risk-assessments relating to individuals”. This may arise in 
the context of predictive policing—granular assessments 
attempting to identify individual offenders. More typically, 
though, it will occur once an individual has come to the 
attention of law enforcement officials.
Some of these tools are used to inform decisions about 
prosecution. Durham Constabulary are currently involved 
in a trial of a Harm Assessment Risk Tool (“HART”). This 
is intended
“ to aid decision-making by custody officers when assessing the risk of future offending 
and to enable those arrestees forecast 
as moderate risk to be eligible for the 
Constabulary’s Checkpoint programme.”
namely, an “‘out of court disposal’ … aimed at reducing 
future offending” (Oswald et al. 2018). (In New Zealand 
terms, the Checkpoint programme is what we would 
refer to as “diversion”.)
The aim of the HART tool is to identify those who 
present “an appropriate risk of offending” for inclusion 
on the Checkpoint programme. “Only those forecasted 
as Moderate Risk—who are expected to offend, but 
not in a seriously violent manner—are permitted into 
Checkpoint”. At present, this assessment is conducted 
shortly after arrest by a custody officer.
The HART model uses a random forest technique (see 
Section 1B). It
“ is built using approximately 104,000 custody events over a five year period 
(2008-2012). It uses 34 different 
predictors to arrive at a forecast, most 
of which focus upon the prior offender’s 
history of criminal behaviour. The random 
forest is constructed from 509 separate 
classification and regression decision trees 
(CART), which are then combined into the 
full forecasting model.”
The use of the HART tool has been supported by 
ALGOCARE, a “decision-making guidance framework” 
(Oswald et al. 2018). Standing for Advisory-Lawful-
Granularity-Ownership-Challengeable-Accuracy-
Responsible-Explainable, Oswald et al. (2018) are fairly 
modest in their claims for the framework
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“ We appreciate that this framework does not provide any firm answers, nor do we 
claim to have covered every issue that 
may be relevant to the deployment of 
an algorithmic tool within policing or the 
wider public sector. In taking the first 
cautious steps into the use of algorithmic 
tools, Durham Constabulary is essentially 
engaging in experimental research, with the 
resultant requirement for ongoing testing 
and validation that such research entails.…
Careful consideration of the factors set out 
in Algo-care should assist in reducing those 
uncertainties.” (2018, P. 27)
This cannot be a once-and-for-all assessment however, 
as future impact is often uncertain, thus supporting 
our parallel proposal for new procedures to keep the 
proportionality of these technologies under review.
In April 2018, the Durham initiative came under scrutiny 
when civil liberties and privacy group Big Brother Watch 
revealed that Durham Constabulary “paid global data 
broker Experian for UK postcode stereotypes built on 
850 million pieces of information”. The group claimed 
that 
“ Experian’s “Mosaic” links names to stereotypes: for example, people called 
“Stacey” are likely to fall under “Families 
with Needs” who receive “a range of 
benefits”; “Abdi” and “Asha” are “Crowded 
Kaleidoscope” described as “multi-cultural” 
families likely to live in “cramped” and 
“overcrowded flats”; whilst “Terrence” and 
“Denise” are “Low Income Workers” who 
have “few qualifications” and are “heavy  
TV viewers”.”
Silkie Carlo, Director of Big Brother Watch, argued that 
“for police to feed these crude and offensive profiles 
through artificial intelligence to make decisions on 
freedom and justice in the UK is truly dystopian”. In a 
similar vein, the Liberty report warned that 
“ Running this data through individual risk assessment programs inevitably 
encourages a discriminatory and offensive 
association between factors such as family 
circumstances, income, class and the 
propensity to commit crime.”
COMPAS
Of all the uses of algorithmic tools in criminal justice, 
perhaps the most scrutinised and debated has been 
COMPAS. First developed in 1998 by the company 
Northpointe (now Equivant), COMPAS (Correctional 
Offender Management Profiling for Alternative 
Sanctions) was described by Northpointe as a “risk 
and needs assessment instrument”, used by criminal 
justice agencies all across the USA “to inform decisions 
regarding the placement, supervision and case 
management of offenders” (Northpointe 2015).
As Northpointe explain:
“ COMPAS has two primary risk models: General Recidivism Risk and Violent 
Recidivism Risk. COMPAS has scales that 
measure both dynamic risk (criminogenic 
factors) and static risk (historical factors).” 
The exact models used by COMPAS are a trade secret. 
Essentially, Northpointe has only disclosed the types of 
machine learning technique that are used:
“ the COMPAS risk and classification models use logistic regression, survival analysis, and 
bootstrap classification methods in a broad 
repertoire of prediction and classification 
procedures.” (BRENNAN ET AL. 2009)
26
In recent years, COMPAS has been at the centre of two 
high profile controversies. In 2016, Eric Loomis brought 
a legal challenge against the use of COMPAS in the 
determination of his sentence (Wisconsin v Loomis 881 
N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016)). Loomis argued that the use of 
the algorithm violated his due process rights. His case 
consisted of various strands, but of particular interest 
for our purposes are certain arguments directed at the 
use of the COMPAS algorithm. The first strand of his case 
was based on the absence of transparency around the 
algorithm:
“ Northpointe, Inc., the developer of COMPAS, considers COMPAS a proprietary 
instrument and a trade secret. Accordingly, 
it does not disclose how the risk scores 
are determined or how the factors are 
weighed. Loomis asserts that because 
COMPAS does not disclose this information, 
he has been denied information which the 
circuit court considered at sentencing.”
Without access to this information, Loomis and his 
team could not verify or challenge the accuracy of the 
information used by the sentencing court.
Second, Loomis argued that 
“ a circuit court’s consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment amounts to sentencing 
based on group data, rather than an 
individualized sentence based on the 
charges and the unique character of the 
defendant.”
Third, he argued that 
“ because COMPAS risk scores take gender into account, a circuit court’s consideration 
of a COMPAS risk assessment violates a 
defendant’s due process right not to be 
sentenced on the basis of gender.” 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected each of Loomis’s 
arguments. With regard to the issue of transparency, it 
held that
“ Although Loomis cannot review and challenge how the COMPAS algorithm 
calculates risk, he can at least review and 
challenge the resulting risk scores set forth 
in the report attached to the [pre-sentence 
investigation].”
Regarding the issue of individualised sentencing, the 
Court was reassured by the fact that the COMPAS risk 
assessment was not the determinative factor considered 
at sentencing, and that human discretion would remain 
an important aspect: “we expect that circuit courts will 
exercise discretion when assessing a COMPAS risk score 
with respect to each individual defendant”.
The claim of gender discrimination too was rejected. 
The Court held that “there is a factual basis underlying 
COMPAS’s use of gender in calculating risk scores”, to 
the extent that “any risk assessment tool which fails to 
differentiate between men and women will misclassify 
both genders”. And “if the inclusion of gender promotes 
accuracy, it serves the interests of institutions and 
defendants, rather than a discriminatory purpose”.
Loomis’s challenge, then, was unsuccessful. The Court, 
however, expressed certain concerns about the use of 
COMPAS in sentencing decisions. It noted, for example, 
that 
“ there is concern that risk assessment tools may disproportionately classify minority 
offenders as higher risk, often due to factors 
that may be outside their control, such as 
familial background and education.”
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This reflects a concern that has been articulated 
elsewhere in the literature around COMPAS. Sara 
Wachter-Boettcher (2017) has warned that 
“ many of these questions [that are used in the COMPAS assessment] focus on 
whether people in your family or social 
circle have ever been arrested. According 
to Northpointe, these factors correlate to a 
person’s risk level. But in the United States, 
black people are incarcerated at six times 
the rate of white people—often because 
of historical biases in policing, from racial 
profiling to the dramatically more severe 
penalties for possession of crack compared 
with possession of cocaine (the same 
drug) throughout the 1980s and 1990s. So 
if you’re black—no matter how lawfully you 
act and how careful you are—you’re simply 
a lot more likely to know people who’ve 
been arrested.” (2017, PP. 126-127)
The Wisconsin Supreme Court also stressed that a 
COMPAS risk assessment informs only one of the aims 
of sentencing, and would be a “poor fit” for determining 
length or severity of sentence overall.
The decision in Loomis reflects the legal and 
constitutional position in Wisconsin and the USA. It does 
not provide much clarity about the likely legal status of 
a tool like COMPAS were it to be used in New Zealand. 
It is interesting to note, though, what the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court required to be told to any sentencing 
court seeking to use COMPAS in a sentencing decision:
(i) the proprietary nature of COMPAS has been invoked 
to prevent disclosure of information relating to how 
factors are weighed or how risk scores are to be 
determined;
(ii) risk assessment compares defendants to a national 
sample, but no cross-validation study for a Wisconsin 
population has yet been completed; 
(iii) some studies of COMPAS risk assessment scores 
have raised questions about whether they 
disproportionately classify minority offenders as 
having a higher risk of recidivism; and 
(iv) risk assessment tools must be constantly monitored 
and re-normed for accuracy due to changing 
populations and subpopulations. 
Earlier that year, the COMPAS algorithm was at the centre 
of another high profile controversy. The independent 
journalism organisation, ProPublica, conducted a study 
which looked at “more than 10,000 criminal defendants 
in Broward County, Florida, and compared their predicted 
recidivism rates with the rate that actually occurred over a 
two-year period” (Larson et al. 2016). The study 
“ found that black defendants were far more likely than white defendants to be 
incorrectly judged to be at a higher risk of 
recidivism, while white defendants were 
more likely than black defendants to be 
incorrectly tagged as low risk.” 
ProPublica’s claims were widely reported, and 
Northpointe was quick to reply, publishing a report 
in which they “strongly reject the conclusion that the 
COMPAS risk scales are racially biased against blacks” 
(Northpointe 2016). In particular, Northpointe’s report 
claims that 
“ ProPublica made several statistical and technical errors such as misspecified 
regression models, wrongly defined 
classification terms and measures 
of discrimination, and the incorrect 
interpretation and use of model errors.” 
In particular, Northpointe claimed that ProPublica 
“focused on classification statistics that did not take 
into account the different base rates of recidivism for 
blacks and whites”. Considered against a backdrop of 
those different base rates, the algorithm’s predictions 
“are equally accurate for blacks and whites”. (ProPublica 
issued a point by point response, published later that 
month, affirming their earlier conclusions.)
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The details of the dispute are fairly technical. For 
some commentators, though, what lies at its heart 
are contested concepts of fairness and bias. Wachter-
Boettcher has described the situation like this:
“ At Northpointe, fairness was defined as parity in accuracy: the company tuned its 
model to ensure that people of different 
races who were assigned the same score 
also had the same recidivism rates.…At 
first glance, that makes intuitive sense. But 
parity in accuracy is only one measure of 
fairness.” (2017, P. 127)
Sam Corbett-Davis and colleagues (e.g. 2016; 2017; 
2018) have written quite extensively on the issue 
of fairness in predictive algorithms. In their (2016) 
Washington Post article about the dispute, they 
addressed the question of whether the COMPAS scores 
are “fair”:
“ Northpointe contends they are indeed fair because scores mean essentially the 
same thing regardless of the defendant’s 
race. For example, among defendants 
who scored a seven on the COMPAS 
scale, 60 percent of white defendants 
reoffended, which is nearly identical to 
the 61 percent of black defendants who 
reoffended. But ProPublica points out that 
among defendants who ultimately did not 
reoffend, blacks were more than twice as 
likely as whites to be classified as medium 
or high risk (42 percent vs. 22 percent). 
Even though these defendants did not go 
on to commit a crime, they are nonetheless 
subjected to harsher treatment by the 
courts. ProPublica argues that a fair 
algorithm cannot make these serious errors 
more frequently for one race group than 
for another.”
As the authors note, the problem is that “it’s actually 
impossible for a risk score to satisfy both fairness criteria 
at the same time” (except in the special case where the 
rates of recidivism happen to be identical for whites 
and blacks: certainly not the case in the actual data). 
In an important sense, they argue, a departure from 
Northpointe’s definition of fairness—where a risk score 
should mean the same for all defendants regardless 
of race—would be highly problematic. All the same, 
they warn of the need to acknowledge that in cases 
like these, classification errors might disproportionately 
affect certain parts of the population, and where this is 
the case, “we have an obligation to explore alternative 
policies”. (For a more detailed discussion of these issues, 
see Section 4C.)
Corbett-Davis et al. (2016) also allude to a problem 
that was also acknowledged by the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court in Loomis:
“ Northpointe has refused to disclose the details of its proprietary algorithm, 
making it impossible to fully assess the 
extent to which it may be unfair, however 
inadvertently. That’s understandable: 
Northpointe needs to protect its bottom 
line. But it raises questions about relying 
on for-profit companies to develop risk 
assessment tools.”
The challenge of commercial sensitivity in the context 
of algorithmic transparency is one that re-emerges 
frequently throughout our research, and it is one to 
which we return later in this report.
In the first part of this chapter (Section 2A), we have 
discussed the current state of play—as best as it 
can be ascertained—regarding government use of 
predictive algorithms in New Zealand. While most 
government departments are using these techniques 
in some capacity or another, the Algorithm Assessment 
Report found little in the way of consistency in terms 
of procedures around their use. But it also offered 
reassurance about their use, pointing out that, for 
example, they are not being used to make adverse 
judgments about affected individuals, and that they are 
augmenting rather than replacing human judgment.
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In the second part of this chapter (Section 2B), we have 
discussed some of the more contentious use cases 
from other jurisdictions. We have elected to focus on 
examples within the criminal justice sector. While this is 
certainly not the only area of state decision-making that 
can have significant impacts on lives (decisions about 
immigration status and custody of children are also, of 
course, highly important), decisions that can result in 
the derivation of liberty must rank as among the most 
significant. 
We have shown that the use of predictive algorithms in 
the criminal justice context remains highly controversial. 
To some extent, this reflects the more general suspicion 
of “actuarial justice”—of locking people up on the basis 
of what we think they will do in future, rather than 
what they have done in the past. Insofar as this is the 
basis for the concern, we note that it is not one that is 
particular to the use of predictive algorithms. But as the 
examples we have discussed show, the increasing use of 
predictive algorithms in this context is raising a number 
of concerns that merit serious attention.
The case studies we have selected for discussion here 
are by no means an exhaustive list of the predictive 
algorithms used in the criminal justice sector. It may be 
that, as the cases that have attracted most attention and 
controversy, they are not even especially representative. 
Nonetheless, we think there is merit in considering the 
sorts of problems, challenges and suggested solutions 
that have arisen elsewhere, with a view to informing the 
options for New Zealand.
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There is great enthusiasm in New Zealand and 
elsewhere for the potential of artificial intelligence to 
enhance commerce, government, and everyday life: 
“ Artificial intelligence technology is the next frontier. Its impact has been compared 
with the invention of electricity and 
according to the World Economic Forum, 
[it is] an important component of the 
Fourth Industrial Revolution.”  (AI FORUM 2018, P. 12)
Such descriptions give the impression that sectors of 
society that do not wholeheartedly embrace AI risk 
falling behind and missing out on great advantages on 
offer. But what exactly are these advantages and what 
do they mean for the current and future provision of 
public services in New Zealand?
A. Novel aspects of today’s 
analytics
New Zealand’s recent Algorithm Assessment Report 
opens with the observation that:
“ Algorithms have an essential role in supporting the services that government 
provides to people in New Zealand and 
in delivering new, innovative, and well-
targeted policies to achieve government 
aims.” (STATS NZ 2018, P. 4)
This should not be surprising. Contrary to popular 
perceptions of government departments, New Zealand, 
like other modern democracies, is often highly innovative 
in its delivery of public services (Rashbrooke 2018, p. 105). 
Statistics has long been an aid to good government. 
Indeed, it was invented as a means of enhancing 
government, making it more accurate, efficient, and fair. 
The field was originally known in English as “political 
arithmetic” with the modern term “statistics” coming 
from the Latin “statista” meaning statesman and the 
German “statistik” often interpreted as the science of 
the state. But while the statistical ideas underpinning 
much AI are not new (as discussed in Chapter 1), the 
computerised and robotic systems on which they are 
implemented as well as the commercial environments 
in which they are developed and deployed are certainly 
new. There are in fact four novel features characteristic 
of modern predictive algorithms used by governments in 
New Zealand and internationally.
Complexity and opacity
Recent advances in machine learning have allowed for 
the development of predictive tools that are much more 
complex than the actuarial tables and checkbox forms 
common for much of the history of modern government. 
While this has greatly enhanced the accuracy of 
machine learning tools, it also limits the ability of 
government workers making operational decisions to 
understand the tools they are working with. While the 
idea of a decision tree is simple, it is not possible for 
users to envisage the operation of a random forest 
model (see Section 1B) composed of decision trees 
with millions of nodes such as the HART model (see 
Section 2B). Similarly a user might understand that a 
deep learning algorithm with a neural net architecture 
is able to learn patterns in the data which it reflects in 
the results it delivers. Nonetheless, unlike the traditional 
checkbox form, deep learning systems are essentially 
“black boxes” from the point of view of those that use 
them (but see Section 4B). 
Commercial sensitivity
The success of artificial intelligence in many fields has 
resulted in the commercial development of predictive 
algorithms for government use. COMPAS is produced 
by the private American firm Equivant (formerly 
Northpointe). Although we have some broad-brush 
information about the machine learning techniques 
used in COMPAS (see Section 2B), commercial sensitivity 
means that its workings are effectively opaque not 
just to prisoners, but also to the corrections agencies 
that use it. (The opacity here is not due to complexity, 
but rather the inability to scrutinise the system’s code, 
and find out what algorithms it is actually running—
the problem we call “accessibility” in Section 4B). 
Of course the protection of intellectual property is a 
normal part of the commercial world. Nonetheless, 
this commercial opacity has been problematic for data 
subjects appealing its use (e.g. in Loomis v Wisconsin, 
discussed in Section 2B) and increasingly for the 
company itself. If it was in a better position to disclose 
3. THE PUBLIC DEBATE AND  
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the workings of its algorithm, it might be better able to 
respond to recent studies claiming to demonstrate that 
the results produced by company’s 137 question  data 
collection tool can be bettered by an extremely simple 
algorithm based only on the offender’s age, sex, and 
prior convictions (Dressel & Faird 2018) or that COMPAS 
can be outperformed by the untutored judgements of 
groups of non-experts provided with only very basic 
information (Angelino et al. 2017).
Availability
At the same time as the statistical instruments are 
becoming more complex and less transparent in their 
operation, they are also becoming more available 
and easier to use. Some of the very newest and 
most powerful machine learning systems are actually 
available free, as open source—for instance, Google’s 
TensorFlow system—and every system developed by the 
“OpenAI” project (openai.com). On the data side, like 
most countries, New Zealand is capturing an increasing 
amount of it. In an era in which we are used to complex, 
powerful (and often proprietary) algorithms based on 
massive datasets accessible through our smart phones 
(e.g. Google’s “pagerank”), it will seem remiss for 
government agencies not to employ similar methods 
to enhance the accuracy and fairness of operational 
decisions. This promises the efficient, timely and 
accurate delivery of public services in a way that was not 
previously possible. 
The exciting opportunities offered by predictive 
algorithms are also fuelling increasing concern that 
advances in data science will make governments ever 
more efficient at collecting a growing volume of data 
about their citizenry (Susskind 2018) and that this 
increase in surveillance is likely to fall unevenly (Eubanks 
2017), with groups that are already over-represented in 
various social statistics experiencing greater and greater 
levels of scrutiny.
Automation
Technology has long been deployed for the automation 
of routine tasks. Artificial intelligence promises to 
relieve workers of cognitive drudgery, just as industrial 
automation spared human labour from much 
physical drudgery. There is considerable scope across 
government for speeding up the resolution of routine 
requests without human intervention. Internationally 
there is increasing development of robotic process 
automation for the delivery of government services. 
These systems join together machine learning, basic 
business rules, computer vision, speech recognition and 
natural language processing to automate transactional 
tasks via a human-like interface. Such virtual assistants 
are increasingly being used in unsupervised triage roles 
in governmental contexts such as primary health care 
and immigration. 
The “principles for the safe and effective use of data 
and analytics” developed by New Zealand’s Privacy 
Commissioner and the Government Chief Data Steward, 
recommend that government use of predictive 
algorithms include “retaining human oversight” on the 
grounds that “analytical processes are a tool to inform 
human decision-making and should never entirely 
replace human oversight” (2017). However, in response 
to this principle, the Algorithm Assessment Report (Stats 
NZ 2018, p. 29) notes that “As technology continues 
to evolve, this will continue to be an area where 
government agencies must balance the importance of 
human oversight with possible efficiencies in service 
delivery”. Indeed, the ACC’s “Cover Decision” algorithm 
mentioned earlier is already configured to make 
decisions to award ACC cover in simple cases, without 
any human intervention. (See Section 4A for discussion 
of the efficacy and desirability of human supervision of 
complex algorithms.)
Thus a variety of computational, social and commercial 
factors make the new generation of predictive 
tools worthy of assessment as a new, powerful and 
potentially very beneficial mechanism for the delivery 
of government services. A further justification for the 
current focus on these technologies is that they have 
become an essential feature of New Zealand’s “social 
investment” approach to the delivery of public services.
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B. Social investment
A recent working group report for the New Zealand 
Treasury describes social investment as an investment 
in the welfare of New Zealanders predicated upon the 
successful use of information and technology: 
“ Social investment is about improving the lives of New Zealanders by applying 
rigorous and evidence-based investment 
practices to social services. It means 
using information and technology to 
identify those people for whom additional 
early investment will improve long term 
outcomes, better understanding their 
needs and what works for them, and  
then adjusting services accordingly.  
What is learnt through this process  
informs the next set of investment 
decisions.” (SCOTT ET AL. 2017)
Proposed in 2011, it is a whole-of-government approach 
to tackling persistent social problems affecting New 
Zealand’s most vulnerable citizens. In the introduction 
to Social Investment: A New Zealand Policy Experiment, 
Jonathan Boston and Derek Gill note that, while there 
is disagreement about its effects, the intention of those 
developing the new approach was a major paradigm 
shift in the operation of New Zealand’s provision of 
social services including: 
“ greater reliance on integrated data, information sharing, risk profiling, actuarial 
analyses, outcomes-based contracting 
and joined-up services together with new 
institutional arrangements, a stronger focus 
on prevention rather than cure, and a drive 
for enhanced accountability.” (2017, P. 11)
At the heart of social investment then is the prediction 
of outcomes for individuals as well as the segmentation 
of the population (Destremau & Wilson 2017) into 
groups of individuals with specific needs able to be 
met by newly designed policy interventions. Long range 
prediction of the effects of policy interventions and 
operational decision-making is of course epistemically 
challenging, but these are exactly the sort of tasks at 
which predictive algorithms are most competitive with 
humans: they can take into account large numbers of 
variables, and identify complex relationships between 
these (see e.g. De Baets & Harvey 2018 for a review). 
As a result it is possible to chart an increase in the use 
of these tools as a result of the implementation of the 
social investment approach (Hughes 2017, p. 162). 
New Zealand is not the only country to employ social 
investment as an instrument for policy-making but its 
approach is unique. Where European programmes 
have focused on investment in education and in wealth 
redistribution, New Zealand has instead developed 
a framework based on (1) client segmentation, (2) 
intervention innovation and (3) governance to drive 
institutional change, along with pioneering the use of 
forward liability as a measurement tool (Destremau & 
Wilson 2017, p. 63). Social investment in New Zealand 
has also undergone significant changes. In the initial 
operation of the approach, the Crown’s long term fiscal 
liability came to be a very important metric at the heart 
of New Zealand’s welfare system (Boston & Gill 2017, 
pp. 18). In 2015-2016, the initial model was revised. 
The target population was broadened beyond working-
age beneficiaries to include other at risk groups such 
as at risk children. There was some softening of the 
focus on long term fiscal liability. At the same time, use 
of actuarial analysis was increasingly to be replaced 
with use of predictive algorithms. After New Zealand’s 
2017 election there was considerable speculation that 
the incoming Labour government would scrap social 
investment altogether (Coughlan 2018a). This has 
not happened, although there has been a significant 
change in focus. The acting Chief Executive of the Social 
Investment Agency, Dorothy Adams, describes the 
change as a move from a social investment approach to 
an investing for social wellbeing approach.
“ The agency is broadening its focus from highly targeted interventions to 
broader measures of improving general 
wellbeing. There is less of a focus on 
fiscal measurement and much less of an 
emphasis on big data.” (COUGHLAN 2018B)
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Does this then spell a wholesale move away from the 
use of predictive analytics in New Zealand government? 
The agency has signalled its intention to employ more 
staff trained in qualitative analysis to work alongside 
its current “quant-heavy” workforce. This move away 
from quantitative analysis does not so far appear to 
be reflected in the operation and forward planning of 
the government agencies surveyed in the Algorithm 
Assessment Report. One explanation for this discrepancy 
is that the signalled changes at the Social Investment 
Agency reflect a leavening of its use of predictive analytics 
in strategic policy-making decisions. The Algorithm 
Assessment Report is specifically directed towards 
operational, rather than strategic decision-making, a 
domain in which the use of predictive algorithms offers a 
plethora of benefits (discussed below). 
This report is not an evaluation of New Zealand’s social 
investment approach (past or present), but it is an 
evaluation of predictive algorithms as an important 
component of the philosophical and technical 
underpinnings of policy-making as well as the day-to-
day provision of government services to New Zealanders. 
In the context of the current mixed model for policy-
making signalled by the Social Investment Agency, this 
report aims to provide useful advice about the scope 
for which, and context in which, government use of 
predictive algorithms can provide the greatest benefit 
for New Zealand.
C. Benefits claimed for predictive 
tools: A preliminary discussion
A PricewaterhouseCoopers report (PwC 2017) recently 
estimated that artificial intelligence could contribute 
up to US$15.7 trillion to the global economy in 2030 of 
which US$6.6 trillion would likely come from increased 
productivity. So what exactly are the benefits that 
make this new group of technologies so exciting 
for economists and how might these translate into 
better public policy and better provision of public 
services? New Zealand’s Privacy Commissioner and 
the Government Chief Data Steward require that 
collection and use of public data must deliver “clear 
public benefit”. The Algorithm Assessment Report sets 
out seven ways in which current government use of 
predictive analytics meets this requirement. (Box 1.)
Current public benefit from the use of predictive 
algorithms
• improved efficiency, which reduces cost for the  
 taxpayer (for example, operational algorithms used  
 by Inland Revenue to administer the tax system)
• streamlining processes to reduce the burden on  
 members of the public (for example, the algorithm  
 that enables streamlined passport renewal used by  
 the Department of Internal Affairs)
• proactively targeting specific support to an   
 individual based on data (for example algorithms  
 used by ACC to improve client outcomes)
• supporting decisions which may be taken under  
 complex or challenging circumstances (for 
 example, the victim history scorecard the Police  
 use to understand the cumulative harm a victim is  
 subjected to)
• protecting New Zealand from risks and threats  
 while enabling growing volumes of travel and   
 trade (for example Immigration New Zealand   
 and Customs algorithms that screen and assess  
 passengers and goods at the border)
• providing empirical assessment to support   
 a decision that identifies individuals who would  
 benefit most from a new intervention or policy (for  
 example, the NEET algorithm  used by the   
 Ministry of Social Development which uses a   
 statistical predictive modelling tool to help identify  
 those school leavers who may be at greater risk of  
 long-term unemployment)
• providing assessment or forecasting to ensure   
 policies are targeted properly and resourced   
 adequately (for example the Social Housing   
 Test Case developed by the Social Investment   
 Agency).
At a more abstract level, predictive algorithms in public 
decision-making have the potential to deliver five types 
of benefit: accuracy, objectivity, fairness, efficiency, and 
transparency. 
Box 1. The Algorithm Assessment Report’s list of ways in which predictive 
algorithms can deliver clear public benefit (Stats NZ 2018, pp. 26-27).
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Accuracy
Predictive algorithms have some clear advantages 
over human decision-makers in the accuracy of their 
judgements. They can take account of more input 
variables, and many more training examples, in a more 
systematic way (again, see De Baets & Harvey 2018 for 
a review). They can also disregard variables that aren’t 
relevant, in ways that humans find hard to do. (This 
is well demonstrated in a study of stop-and-search 
decisions by New York police officers by Goel et al. 
(2016). Goel et al. showed that a statistical model of 
stop-and-search could find almost as many concealed 
weapons as human police officers, while searching 
far fewer people—and incidentally, being less biased 
against blacks and Hispanics.) Tools such as RoC*RoI 
implement a systematic analysis of decades of data. 
Although human employees can be made aware of 
relevant research, they will inevitably be less accurate 
at calculating probabilities where multiple factors affect 
a decision such as the likelihood that some individual 
will commit a crime. Learning algorithms can also 
update the functions they learn more readily than 
human reasoners when new data becomes available or 
new constraints on decision-making are imposed. But 
beyond these advantages, assessing accuracy remains a 
significant challenge.
In many contexts the efficacy of a decision-making 
procedure depends not just on now many errors 
it makes but also on what type of errors are most 
common. As discussed in Section 1B, to evaluate the 
performance of a binary classifier, data scientists often 
use a confusion matrix, which details the proportions 
of true positives, true negatives, false positives and 
false negatives in its decisions. As we noted earlier, if a 
system’s performance isn’t perfect, there will always be 
tradeoffs between false positives and false negatives 
(and true positives and true negatives). In different 
domains, different tradeoffs might be appropriate. 
Employing a predictive algorithm successfully often 
requires the developer to define an appropriate 
performance criterion in the confusion matrix, and then 
tune the algorithm to optimise for this criterion. But 
this will require policymakers to translate objectives 
characterised in terms of costs and benefits, and rights 
and duties, into recommendations that can guide 
software developers—a feat often easier said than done.
Assessing the accuracy of both human and machine 
reasoning is further complicated by the fact that 
correlations that hold within a dataset taken as a whole 
may be much less reliable when the dataset is partitioned. 
For example, although the accuracy of the COMPAS 
algorithm was found to be comparable to that of human 
experts making judgements about criminal recidivism, 
it was discovered to be very inaccurate when making 
predictions limited to individuals in the same dataset with 
a history of violent offending (Larsen et al. 2016). 
Finally, actual levels of accuracy are often not very high, 
either for human or algorithmic decision-makers: an AUC 
of 0.7 for algorithmic systems is deemed acceptable 
in many contexts (see Section 1B for discussion of 
the AUC evaluation metric). So it is important that 
those interpreting the outputs of predictive algorithms 
understand the approximate level of accuracy they can 
expect from the tools they use. Similarly, those designing 
interventions should have in mind the likelihood of error 
as well as the types of error typical of the predictive 
algorithms used in relevant operational decision-making.
Incidentally, the common assumption that policy 
interventions offering a benefit need not meet the 
same ethical standards as punitive measures is only 
sustainable if overall levels of accuracy are sufficiently 
high. The Algorithm Assessment Report appears to make 
such an assumption in stating that:
“ Almost all participating agencies use operational algorithms to inform human 
decision-making, rather than to automate 
significant decisions. Where decisions 
are automated, these usually relate to 
automatic approvals or opportunities for 
people. None of the participating agencies 
described a circumstance where a 
significant decision about an individual that 
was negative, or impacted entitlement, 
freedom or access to a service, was 
made automatically and without human 
oversight.” (STATS NZ 2018, P. 29)
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Even in cases where unsupervised decision-making 
only delivers benefits to data subjects, sufficiently 
low accuracy in the system can mean that significant 
numbers of people in need of a benefit will fail to 
receive it. While this could be addressed statistically 
by making the relevant algorithms err on the side 
of generosity, the expense of this strategy makes it 
infeasible for low levels of overall accuracy.
Objectivity
One reason for preferring the use of predictive analytics 
in operational decision-making is that such algorithms 
are scientifically validated tools and as such they are 
objective in a way that unaided human decision-makers 
tend not to be. Predictive algorithms employ large 
datasets of measures of relevant variables. Their outputs 
are calculated by well-understood statistical techniques. 
Hence we can validate the use of particular algorithms 
within specific contexts. So described, they appear to 
be maximally objective methods for making high-stakes 
decisions affecting New Zealanders. But there are several 
reasons for caution about this optimistic assessment. 
The objectivity of science is a complex ideal, difficult 
to characterise in the abstract and difficult to achieve 
in many practical settings (Reiss & Sprenger 2017). 
Philosophical characterisations of objectivity tend to 
see objective decisions as those that are not influenced 
by the values, perspectives, and interests of the 
individuals and social groups that make them. This idea 
that science can somehow jettison the perspectives 
of individual scientists (Nagel 1986) seems particularly 
implausible in the case of predictive analytics. Good 
data science is replete with judgements that are both 
intuitive and evaluative. For example, to develop an 
algorithm to aid in the amelioration of homelessness, 
a data scientists will have to decide on the best way to 
characterise homelessness in order to measure it. These 
sort of “what will count as X?” questions will often be 
evaluative, resting on moral and political judgements—in 
this case, why it is that homelessness is wrong, or that 
people have a right to adequate housing. Perhaps, 
most importantly, the data sets on which all predictive 
algorithms are based, effectively aggregate the past 
decisions of large numbers of individuals. The arrest and 
conviction records at the back of an algorithm such as 
PredPol are not, and cannot be, evaluated according to 
the objectivity of the decisions made by those involved.
None of this is intended to flag any inherent failing in 
data science. Rather it is to note that the objectivity of 
science on the ground is often difficult to evaluate and 
always a matter of degree. Hence it is not desirable for 
those working with algorithmic tools to be given the 
simplistic impression that the “objectivity” of predictive 
algorithms gives them an inherent advantage over 
human decision-making. Nor, given the current state of 
the technology, would we want high-stakes decisions 
about the lives of citizens to be wholly probabilistic, with 
no room for human discretion to protect data subjects 
from the operation of inexorable law. Of course, the 
decision-making of government employees should be 
evenhanded and free from various types of bias (see 
Sections 4C and 4F), but it is neither possible, nor 
perhaps wholly desirable, that it be completely objective. 
After all, as Aristotle pointed out long ago, injustice 
consists in the equal treatment of unequals as much as 
the unequal treatment of equals.
Fairness
The fact that algorithms can make decisions without 
the need for human intervention can be a benefit when 
impartiality is seen as important. This is particularly 
relevant in decisions about the distribution of scarce 
resources. New Zealand’s Clinical Prioritisation Access 
Criteria (CPAC) tool is a ranking system designed to 
prioritise elective surgery in a crowded health system. 
It ranks the treatment of individual patients based on 
clinically developed criteria. The Algorithm Assessment 
Report describes CPAC as providing “a more equitable 
and consistent way of national prioritisation” (p. 22). 
“Equitable” here refers to the fairness of using an 
algorithm that knows nothing about each patient except 
those facts that are directly relevant to the likely benefit 
they will receive from the elective procedure in question.
Use of algorithms in such contexts demonstrates 
commitment to the Aristotelian characterisation of 
justice as treating like cases alike. But it’s hard to 
avoid value judgements of some kind when building 
a ranking system. As discussed in Section 1B, a typical 
ranking system computes a weighted sum over the 
various factors to be considered. If the weights are 
directly specified, they build in the designers’ intuitions 
about the relative importance of the different factors. 
If the weights are learned, so they approximate a “gold 
standard” ranking produced by expert humans, they 
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are essentially building in the experts’ intuitions about 
relative importance, in a similar way. This definitional 
issue about the nature of fairness is compounded by 
recent studies suggesting that public conceptions of 
fairness are surprisingly complex and differ significantly 
from person to person (Webb et al. 2018). (For a more 
detailed discussion of these issues, see Section 4C.)
Efficiency
The very high volume of operational decisions required 
by many arms of government make efficiency and cost 
extremely important. So, it is not surprising that many 
of the “public benefits” of algorithmic decision-making 
listed in the Algorithm Assessment Report are essentially 
efficiency gains. It should be noted that efficiency is not 
just about cost. Many of the algorithms used by the 
New Zealand government are specifically designed to 
allow employees to spend more time on difficult cases 
and less time on simple ones. They have the added 
advantage of enhancing the working conditions of 
employees by relieving them from dull “mechanical” 
decision-making. (Although human employees should 
probably continue to perform some of the “mechanical” 
decisions, to provide new training data for the 
algorithms that run alongside them.) Efficiencies from 
the use of predictive algorithms might be expected to 
both speed up and enhance the accuracy of important 
interactions between citizens and government. This of 
course depends on the extent to which efficiency gains 
are used to enhance service rather than to cut cost 
by decreasing the number of employees delivering a 
particular service. 
Securing efficiency gains are particularly important in 
a country like New Zealand that has small government 
and low tax compared to other OECD nations. This is 
important both because New Zealand has relatively 
little to spend on the delivery of public services and 
because our low level of public spending has arguably 
exacerbated a number of intractable social issues such 
as our extraordinarily high incarceration rate, particularly 
for Māori. 
Transparency
The YORST (see Section 1D) is a publicly available 
algorithm. Publications available on the Corrections 
New Zealand website show the data collection form 
(see Appendix 1) which makes plain all the variables on 
which the algorithm operates as well as the very simple 
calculation on which it is based. However, as noted 
above, many algorithms are simply too complex for 
fine detail about their operation to be useful to citizens 
concerned about their use. Making details of algorithms 
such as RoC*RoI public can be beneficial if algorithms 
are well-designed and difficult to “game”. They only way 
that offenders can enhance their RoC*RoI score is to 
commit fewer offences. It would be difficult to secure 
this transparency benefit for more accurate but more 
complex deep learning algorithms given the general 
challenge of making them explainable (but see Sections 
1B and 4B for some promising strategies). 
To summarise: New Zealand has a history of carefully 
designing predictive algorithms that secure significant 
public benefit. Nonetheless, the benefits provided by 
these algorithms are complex and often difficult to 
evaluate. None of the goals listed above should be 
pursued in isolation (it is relatively simple to make an 
algorithm more accurate at the expense of making it 
too crude to be useful) and the various benefits that 
predictive algorithms offer sometimes compete with one 
another (see Section 4C for discussion of the tradeoff 
between accuracy and fairness).
Impact on Māori
A discussion of the benefits of predictive algorithms 
in New Zealand must include benefits as viewed from 
diverse perspectives. For example, we are aware that 
there appears to be very little articulation of the benefits 
of use of predictive algorithms by government from 
Māori perspectives, including how these benefits would 
be defined and assessed. The Algorithm Assessment 
Report found little, if any, evidence of consultation about 
algorithmic use with affected Māori. This is a significant 
gap which must be addressed and which we consider 
could usefully be done now, before algorithmic use 
becomes even more prevalent.
Likewise, the use of predictive algorithms in immigration 
processing may be significant for people in particular 
territories in the Pacific region with which New Zealand 
has special legal relationships (such as the Cook Islands, 
Niue and Tokelau) and to those and other Pasifika 
peoples in New Zealand. However, we are not aware of 
any consultations to gain their views on the benefits of 
predictive algorithms in areas which may affect them.
37
In this report we focus predominantly on criminal justice 
algorithms to illustrate the challenges and opportunities 
of predictive analytics. Our reasons for doing so are 
simple: criminal justice algorithms showcase many of 
the most pressing concerns which AI tools pose. The 
recent Liberty report (see Section 2B) on the use of 
algorithmic tools by various UK police forces complains 
of criminal justice algorithms “entrenching pre-
existing discrimination”;  it mentions offensive profiling 
techniques, limited transparency, breaches of privacy, 
and automation complacency (Couchman 2019). Liberty 
worries that these otherwise innovative and creative 
tools embed “discriminatory approaches in the system 
while adding a ‘neutral’ technological veneer that 
affords false legitimacy”. The same can be said of many 
predictive algorithms in use today. In this chapter, we 
provide a survey of these concerns.
Before doing so, we recall, as noted in the 
Introduction, that the government has a special 
relationship with, and related set of obligations to, 
Māori, the indigenous people of New Zealand. The 
Algorithm Assessment Report acknowledged that the 
government’s commitment to a Treaty of Waitangi 
based partnership with Māori should be reflected in 
its practice, by embedding a te ao Māori perspective 
into the development and use of algorithms, including 
“reflecting the taonga status of data that relates to 
Māori”. This chapter is largely a literature review and 
summary of discussions with overseas experts: it is not, 
and does not purport to be, any sort of summary of 
views and experiences of Māori or any other part of the 
New Zealand public. We do, however, emphasize the 
necessity of more research in this area.
The first four sections (Sections 4A-D) are important 
because they relate in obvious ways to the public 
sector’s use of predictive analytics. The last two sections 
(Sections E-F) are less relevant to the public sector, but 
they are too important not to mention at all.
A. Control, improper delegation and 
fettering discretion
The danger of human operators devolving responsibility 
to machines and failing to detect cases where they fail 
has been recognised for many years. There is no reason 
to believe machine learning tools will be any different 
in this respect. The problem is that, as automation 
becomes smarter and cheaper, its operators have to 
assume an increasingly supervisory role (Meister 1999; 
Strauch 2018). In aviation, for example, the role of the 
pilot appears to have become easier, but a closer look 
reveals that the pilot’s role has been transformed rather 
than simplified, with the pilot now performing a crucial 
monitoring function (Baxter et al. 2012; cf. Stanton 
2015). Likewise in financial trading, “[t]he human 
trader’s role is now largely one of setting strategies and 
monitoring their execution” (Baxter et al. 2012, p. 68). 
Scholars in the field known as “human factors”—a branch 
of industrial psychology—have known for many years 
that the shift from operator to supervisor affects the 
operator in profound ways, not all of them good as far 
as human safety is concerned (Bainbridge 1983). 
Automation has a significant impact on situation 
awareness (Stanton 2016). This is perhaps most clearly 
illustrated in respect of autonomous vehicles. Many 
semiautonomous vehicles issue “takeover requests” to 
the human driver when they require the human driver 
to resume control. But drivers in “autopilot” mode 
respond much more slowly to these requests than to 
stimuli occurring when they have full control (Stanton 
2015; Cunningham & Regan 2018; Banks et al. 2018a; 
Banks et al. 2018b). Instantaneously transitioning from 
low to high workload poses great difficulties for most 
people (Walker et al. 2015). Another conundrum is that 
as the quality of automation improves, and the human 
operator’s role becomes progressively less demanding, 
the operator “starts to assume that the system is 
infallible, and so will no longer actively monitor what is 
happening, meaning they have become complacent…
[T]he operator assumes that the system is reliable and 
therefore failure detection deteriorates” (Pazouki et al. 
2018, p. 299). 
Related to automation complacency is automation bias, 
occurring when human operators “trust the automated 
system so much that they ignore other sources of 
information, including their own senses” (Pazouki et al. 
2018, p. 299). Both complacency and bias “describe 
a conscious or unconscious response of the human 
operator induced by overtrust in the proper function of 
an automated system” (Parasuraman & Manzey 2010, p. 
406). Decades of research confirm that these problems 
are both pernicious and potentially intractable (Banks 
et al. 2018b; Cunningham & Regan 2018; Greenlee et al. 
2018). Somewhat alarmingly, they seem to afflict experts 
as much as novices, and are largely resistant to training 
(Parasuraman & Manzey 2010). Their effects may also be 
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observed beyond the limits of human-machine systems. 
For instance, it is well known that police officers, judges 
and jurors frequently overestimate the importance of 
forensic evidence—the so-called “CSI effect” (Marks et al. 
2017; see also Damaška 1997).
Machine learning algorithms that require human 
supervision run into many of the same problems 
that human factors researchers have pointed out for 
decades (Cummings 2004). As a recent French report 
into artificial intelligence notes, “it is far easier for a 
judge to follow the recommendations of an algorithm 
which presents a prisoner as a danger to society than 
to look at the details of the prisoner’s record himself 
and ultimately decide to free him. It is easier for a police 
officer to follow a patrol route dictated by an algorithm 
than to object to it” (Villani et al. 2018, p. 124). And as 
the AI Now Institute remarks in a recent report of its 
own: “[w]hen [a] risk assessment [system] produces 
a high-risk score, that score changes the sentencing 
outcome and can remove probation from the menu 
of sentencing options the judge is willing to consider” 
(AI Now 2018, p. 13). The Institute’s report also offers 
a sobering glimpse into just how long such systems 
can go without being properly vetted. A system in 
Washington D.C. first deployed in 2004 was in use for 
14 years before it was successfully challenged in court 
proceedings, the authors of the report attributing this 
to the “long-held assumption that the system had been 
rigorously validated” (AI Now, p. 14). 
In her book, Automating Inequality, Virginia Eubanks 
(2017) notes the complacency that high tech 
decision tools can induce in the social services sector. 
Pennsylvania’s Allegheny County introduced child 
welfare protection software as part of its child abuse 
prevention strategy. The technology is supposed to 
assist caseworkers deciding whether to follow up calls 
placed with the County’s child welfare hotline. In fact, 
however, Eubanks relates how caseworkers would 
be tempted to adjust their estimates of risk to align 
with the model’s. The Allegheny tool which features 
prominently in Eubanks’ book in fact has links to New 
Zealand: it was developed by Rhema Vaithianathan and 
colleagues at AUT (Vaithianathan et al. 2013), and was 
originally intended for use in New Zealand. Anne Tolley, 
the Minister of Social Development at the time, refused 
to allow the tool to be trialled in New Zealand; her 
statement that children should not be treated as “lab 
rats” became something of a trope in local discussions 
about government AI ethics.
In light of concerns about the true extent of human 
control over algorithmic tools, an increasing number 
of human factors experts have concluded that, except 
in certain special circumstances, algorithmic decision 
tools should not be used in high-stakes or safety-
critical decisions unless the systems are significantly 
“better than human” (see e.g.: Banks et al. 2018b; 
Cunningham & Regan 2018; Walker et al. 2015; Cebon 
2015; but see earlier discussion in Chapter 3 on the 
difficulties of defining “accuracy” in a policy context). 
Even though no technology is really 100% reliable, on 
this view it does not matter, because the dangers posed 
by human complacency diminish to nothing when a 
system exceeds human performance by a substantial 
margin. How many systems achieve this standard is 
another question. Currently, autonomous vehicles do 
not approach this level of capability (Banks et al. 2018a; 
Banks et al. 2018b), but many subcomponents within 
standard (nonautonomous) vehicles clearly do, such as 
automatic transmission, automatic light control and first 
generation cruise control (Walker et al. 2015). 
In more typical decision support settings, arguably 
medical diagnostic and legal case prediction software 
is approaching this better-than-human standard. There 
are at present AI systems which can distinguish between 
lung cancers and give prognoses more accurately than 
human pathologists armed with the same information, 
and systems which can spot Alzheimer’s with 80% 
accuracy up to a decade before the first appearance 
of symptoms, a feat vastly outperforming the ablest 
human pathologist attempting anything similar (Bridge 
2017). In the legal sphere, advances in natural language 
processing and machine learning have facilitated the 
development of case prediction software that can 
predict, with an average 79% accuracy, the outcomes 
of cases before the European Court of Human Rights 
when fed the facts of the cases alone (Aletras 2016). 
Most impressively, a similar system had better luck in 
predicting the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court than 
a group of 83 legal experts, of whom almost half had 
previously served as the justices’ law clerks (60% vs. 
75% accuracy) (Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2017). If the 
disparity between the performance of such systems 
and that of well-trained and experienced human 
professionals widens any further, presumably it will not 
much matter if humans perfunctorily adhere to whatever 
these systems decide or advise in a particular situation.
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Building on these ideas, some researchers advocate that 
in the short to medium term an optimal approach to 
the problem involves a complementary (and potentially 
dynamic) coupling between highly proficient (better-
than-human) algorithmic tools and human agents 
working alongside one another, where the tools 
themselves are so reliable that there is effectively no 
need for oversight. This has been called the “DCAF” 
approach (dynamic/complementary allocation of 
function) (Zerilli et al. 2019). Complementarity is its key 
feature. The basic idea is that some systems clearly 
need to replace the human agent and be left to operate 
autonomously. Human-machine decision systems that 
contain automated subcomponents work best when the 
human operator is allowed to concentrate their energies 
on the chunks of the task better suited to human rather 
than autonomous execution—a setup which only avoids 
the problems of complacency and bias if the automated 
subroutines are handled by systems approaching 
near-perfect (better-than-human) dependability. 
Complementarity means humans and machines have 
clearly defined and clearly separated roles, where the 
human is effectively barred from interfering with the 
machine’s outputs and in many cases even knowing 
what the outputs are. At the same time, DCAF 
emphasises that the allocation of functions should be 
flexible enough to support dynamic interaction, with 
hand-over and hand-back for shared competencies 
(as occurs when a driver disengages cruise control and 
thereby resumes control of acceleration). 
In New Zealand, the Accident Compensation Corporation 
has largely relied on manual control for processing 
claims. In the past this has involved ACC staff members 
sorting through and assessing individual claims one 
by one. Even with improvements to case handling 
procedures over the years, such as technology allowing 
electronic submission, all claims have required some 
degree of manual processing (ACC 2018a). As we 
discussed in Section 2A, the ACC has introduced an 
improved claim registration and cover assessment 
process. It aims to make the claims approval process 
quicker and more efficient, removing the need for 
manual control in standard cases altogether. The ACC 
hopes that by harnessing the power of big data—12 
million claims submitted between 2010 and 2016—it 
can both reduce the wait time for approvals as well as 
more efficiently distribute the more complex claims to 
ACC teams for final determination. An analysis of publicly 
available information about the workings of this system 
indicate that it exemplifies many virtues of the DCAF 
approach (Zerilli et al. 2019).
Whether systems that do not reach better-than-human 
levels of reliability can be used in high-stakes settings 
is difficult to answer straightforwardly. The problems of 
automation complacency and bias do not arise from 
the use of patently suboptimal automation, only from 
generally dependable automation. Therefore, depending 
on the exact nature of the human-computer interaction 
at issue, a less-than-reliable system might safely 
replace a human agent. Suboptimal tools may prove 
useful in circumstances where the tools have access to 
information to which the human does not, or otherwise 
“decide” things in ways that humans generally cannot. 
Such systems very literally augment human capacities: 
human and machine in effect share control. The clearest 
examples of this form of technology are the predictive 
risk systems used in law enforcement and policing, 
such as PredPol (for hot-spot policing) and COMPAS 
(predicting the likelihood of offender recidivism) (see 
Chapter 2). These systems answer questions of the form: 
How should we distribute police officers over a locality 
having such and such geographical characteristics? What 
is the likelihood that this prisoner will reoffend if released 
on parole? And so on. Often they use logistic regression 
or more advanced actuarial techniques to mine patterns 
from very large databases (see Sections 1B and 2B). 
This is not a feat unaided humans can hope to match. 
There are also some phenomena within human decision-
making that algorithms can help to counteract—for 
example, decision fatigue and decision inertia, of which 
some of the classic studies actually involve judges’ parole 
decisions (e.g. Danziger et al. 2011). 
Nevertheless, we would urge that great caution be 
exercised before any form of suboptimal automation is 
adopted in high-stakes/safety-critical settings. Many of 
these systems (like COMPAS) are after all tools which 
have attained notoriety for their problematic biases and 
inherent technical limitations (e.g. Blomberg et al. 2010; 
Larson et al. 2016; Dressel & Farid 2018). And as some 
of these systems gradually begin to overcome their 
limitations, our worry is that the control problem will 
gradually re-emerge, taking human operators unawares 
and decision subjects along with them. It will be all 
too easy for a judge with decision fatigue, for example, 
to simply rely on what a predictive risk instrument 
“objectively” recommends.
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Improper delegation and fettering 
discretion
So far we have not considered purely legal reasons 
for managing the control problem. But particularly in 
the public sector, where statutory office holders and 
public authorities may be conferred wide discretions 
by their enabling legislation, it is vital to ensure that 
the risks of automation complacency and bias are 
judiciously managed. Administrative and public law 
principles in the UK, Australia and New Zealand jealously 
guard the repository of statutory discretion. A power 
conferred upon a minister of the Crown, for example, 
not only must be exercised, it must be exercised by the 
minister. Public law principles effectively prohibit the 
delegation of statutory powers to third parties without 
express or implied authorisation in the decision-maker’s 
enabling legislation. Likewise, these principles inhibit 
the authorised decision-maker from “fettering” their 
discretion, for instance, by blindly following company 
“policy” or other organisational protocols. Crucially, 
improper delegation is not limited to situations where 
a third party is relied upon to make a decision—such as 
would be the case were the Department of Immigration 
to outsource refugee-status determinations to a private 
company in order to better regulate its work load. 
Improper delegation may also occur when the relevant 
decision-maker merely appears to have turned their 
mind to the decision but in fact has simply rubber-
stamped the advice of others, without coming to an 
independent view of the matter for themselves.
It is here that administrative law will have something to 
say about the use of algorithmic tools. As Marion Oswald 
explains:
“ A public body whose staff come to rely unthinkingly upon an algorithmic result in 
the exercise of discretionary power could 
be illegally “fettering its discretion” to an 
internal “home-grown” algorithm, or be 
regarded as delegating decision-making 
illegally to an externally developed or 
externally run algorithm, or having pre-
determined its decision by surrendering its 
judgment.” (OSWALD 2018, P. 14)
If the dangers of the control problem are as pronounced 
as our research suggests, there will inevitably come 
a point when complacency amounts to that very 
unthinking-rubber-stamping attitude which falls foul of 
public law prohibitions. 
A tool which does not induce this complacency will not 
be in breach of these rules: in such a case the tool will 
be used as it was intended, that is, as an aid to decision-
making. In the common law, statutory decision-makers 
were always free to inform themselves, consult widely, 
and so forth, with a view to producing high quality 
decisions. The use of algorithmic decision support tools 
that are used strictly as support tools are therefore 
unobjectionable from the point of view of administrative 
law. The law only looks askance at the abdication of 
decision-making responsibility. Unfortunately, the control 
problem strongly suggests that abdication is an ever-
present danger (indeed reality) once automated decision 
tools reach a certain level of reliability.
The basic point here is that if Parliament confers power 
upon a person, office or statutory authority to decide 
some matter within a particular jurisdiction, a delegation 
of this power to a third party will be legal only if the 
legislation itself contemplates such delegation, either 
expressly or by necessary implication.3  Therefore, to ward 
off future legal challenges against the use of algorithmic 
tools that are at risk of inducing complacency, it may 
be necessary to obtain express statutory authorisation 
for the “delegation”. Of course this authorisation should 
only be sought where it is safe to do so—that is, where 
the dangers of complacency no longer exist because the 
tools are better-than-human in the domain of interest. 
But in those public sector decision-making contexts in 
which discretion is truly required—because not every 
contingency can be anticipated in the ordinary course 
of day-to-day administration—it is at best unclear and at 
worst doubtful whether algorithms will indeed be able 
to offer superior decision-making capabilities to those of 
humans. Once again, caution is advised.
3. In New Zealand, the State Sector Act 1988, Crown Entities Act 
2004 and Local Government Act 2002 contain general delegation 
provisions. These Acts obviate specific statutory authority to delegate 
(i.e. entity-specific provisions in the relevant entity’s enabling 
legislation), although a delegation under them still needs to be in 
writing. In the Australian context, see e.g. section 495A(1) of the 
Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
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B. Transparency and the right to 
explanations
Transparency encompasses a number of distinct concerns 
about algorithms, perhaps befitting the politically and 
philosophically complex notion that it is (Meijer 2014; 
Dubnick 2014). At the broadest level transparency 
refers to accountability or answerability, indicating a 
general responsiveness to requests for information or 
a willingness to offer justification for actions taken or 
contemplated. This is a political, civic sense of the term, 
and embodies a dynamic or ongoing state of affairs. We 
expect our elected representatives to act in the public 
interest, and transparency stands for their commitment 
to do so. When government is open, answerable and 
accountable to its citizens, it is less tempted to become 
insular, self-serving or corrupt. Transparency in this broad 
sense is therefore prophylactic—a safeguard against the 
abuse of power. While all democracies notionally value 
this sense of transparency (Roberts 2006; Forssbæck 
& Oxelheim 2014; Lombrozo 2011; Heald 2006; Prat 
2006), it is abstract and aspirational. From here, the 
notion branches out in at least three directions, each of 
which takes the concept into much more specific and less 
abstract terrain. 
In one direction, transparency may be associated with 
moral and legal responsibility. This captures such familiar 
notions as blameworthiness and liability for harm. Here 
the sense of transparency is static, i.e. “once-for-all” or 
“point-in-time” (e.g. “Mary is liable for her negligence, 
and must compensate Amanda to the tune of $6000”). 
Unlike the broader notion, this sense of transparency 
is not intended to be dynamic, and nor is it necessarily 
public-interested (as the civic sense clearly is). Rather 
than prospectively preventing wrongdoing, it is 
corrective (and retrospective).
In a second direction, transparency retains its dynamic 
quality but relates more explicitly to the inspectability (or 
auditability) of institutions, practices and instruments. 
Here transparency is about mechanisms: How does 
this or that tool actually work? How do its component 
parts fit together to produce outcomes like those it is 
designed to produce? Algorithms can be “inspected” 
in two ways. First, we can enquire of their provenance: 
How were they developed, by whom, and for what 
purpose/s? This extends to procurement practices: 
How were they acquired, who commissioned them, 
and on what terms? This might be called process 
transparency. Second, we can ask of any algorithm: 
How does it work, what data has it been trained on, 
and by what logic does it proceed? This might be called 
technical transparency, and centres on the notion of 
explainability. Before any particular decision is reached 
using an algorithm, we may seek general explanations 
(“ex ante”): for instance, in a machine learning case, 
we can ask whether we’re dealing with a decision tree, 
a regression algorithm, or some mixture. Information 
about the kind of algorithm we’re dealing with can tell 
us quite a lot about its general principles of operation, 
and whether Algorithm A is better than Algorithm B. In 
the wake of any particular algorithmic decision, however, 
the questions posed can be more specific: Why did 
the algorithm decide this matter in this particular way? 
This is to seek a specific, individualised explanation 
for a decision (“ex post”). In both cases, though, it is 
important to realise that explainability immediately 
raises the question of intelligibility: Can anyone actually 
comprehend the explanation? Intelligibility is a distinctive 
sense of technical transparency-cum-explainability.
In a third direction, transparency denotes accessibility. 
Meaningful explanations of an algorithm may be 
possible, but they may not be available. Intellectual 
property rights might prevent the disclosure of 
proprietary code, or preclude access to training data, 
so that even if it were possible to understand how an 
algorithm operated, a full reckoning may not be possible 
for economic, legal or political reasons. Algorithms that 
are otherwise technically transparent may therefore 
be “opaque” for nontechnical reasons. Figure 5 depicts 
these various nested and interacting notions of 
transparency diagrammatically.








In the context of algorithms and machine learning, 
concerns have been raised about “transparency” in every 
one of these senses. The sense which most exercises 
policy specialists and a growing number of computer 
scientists, however, is technical transparency—specifically 
explainability and intelligibility (Miller 2017; Pasquale 
2014; Edwards & Veale 2017). Here the worry is that 
because deep learning systems arrive at their decisions 
unaided, i.e. in a manner that is not specified in advance, 
it is not possible to interpret the system’s internal 
processes except only approximately and imperfectly—
and even this much is doubtful (Mittelstadt et al. 2016; 
Wachter et al. 2017a). As discussed in Section 1B, the 
neural networks that implement deep learning algorithms 
mimic the brain’s own style of computation and learning: 
they take the form of large arrays of simple neuron-like 
units, densely interconnected by a very large number of 
plastic synapse-like links. During training, a deep learning 
system adjusts the weights of these links so as to improve 
its performance. If trained on a decision task, it essentially 
derives its own method of decision-making, much as we 
would expect of an intelligent system. 
But there is the rub. In neural networks, these 
processes run independently of human control, so that 
transparency inevitably becomes an issue: it is simply not 
known in advance what computations will be used to 
handle unforeseen information.4 Importantly, neither the 
operator nor the developer will be any the wiser in this 
respect. Ex ante predictions and ex post assessments of 
the system’s operations alike will be difficult to formulate 
precisely. This is the crux of the complaint about the 
lack of transparency in today’s algorithms. If we cannot 
ascertain exactly why a machine decides the way it 
does, upon what bases can its decisions be reviewed? 
Judges, administrators and departments of state 
can all supply reasons for their determinations. What 
sorts of “reasons” can we expect from an intelligent 
machine? Deep learning involves multiple hidden layers 
of processing that are fiendishly intricate and virtually 
impossible to unsnarl (Burrell 2016). Even certain simple 
algorithms which instantiate in the order of hundreds 
of rules “are very hard to inspect visually, especially 
when their predictions are combined probabilistically in 
complex ways’’ (Van Otterlo 2013).
On the other hand, some have worried that automated 
decision-making is being held to an unrealistically high 
standard (Zerilli et al. 2018). It is instructive to compare 
the kinds of explanation envisaged for predictive 
systems with those routinely provided by human agents. 
The latter do not yield the entrails of a decision, or 
“illuminat[e] the cognitive processes leading to…[a] 
conclusion”, as the IEEE’s Global Initiative on the Ethics 
of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems considers apt 
for algorithmic explanations (see p. 71 of version 2). It is 
true that human agents are able to furnish reasons for 
their decisions, but this is not the same as illuminating 
the cognitive processes leading to a conclusion. The 
cognitive processes underlying human choices, especially 
in areas in which a crucial element of intuition, personal 
impression and unarticulated hunches are driving much 
of the deliberation, are in fact far from transparent. 
Arenas of decision-making requiring, for example, 
assessment of the likelihood of recidivism, or the ability 
to repay a loan, more often than not involve significant 
reliance on factors beneath the level of conscious belief. 
As one researcher explains: “A large part of human 
decision making is based on the first few seconds and 
how much [the decision-makers] like the applicant. A 
well-dressed, well-groomed young individual has more 
chance than an unshaven, dishevelled bloke of obtaining 
a loan from a human credit checker” (Dutta 2017). 
A large part of human-level opacity stems from the fact 
that human agents are also frequently mistaken about 
their real (internal) motivations and processing logic, 
a fact that is often obscured by the ability of human 
decision-makers to invent post hoc rationalisations. The 
upshot is that while full technical transparency may be 
unattainable, this may not be as much of a problem as it 
is sometimes made out to be: human agents, including 
judges and officials, are never expected to furnish low-
level explanations for their decisions—descending to 
physical, biochemical or psychological explanations for 
their motivations and prejudices—so machines should 
not be either. Machines should offer explanations that 
are comparably situated vis-à-vis human reason-giving 
practices. This is at once a much less demanding 
standard of explainability than full technical transparency 
and one that computer scientists are in a much better 
position to meet.
4. For machine learning algorithms, it’s useful to distinguish between 
the “learning algorithm” (e.g. a deep network) and the “learned 
algorithm” (which for a deep network is an impenetrable set of 
computations). We can readily specify the (second order) learning 
algorithm in great detail, but the (first order) learned algorithm is 
impenetrable.
43
Perhaps the most useful thing a decision subject 
wants to know is how different factors were weighed 
in coming to a final decision. It is common for human 
decision-makers to disclose these allocations, even if 
the inner processing logic leading to them remains 
obscure. Weights are classic exemplars of what has 
been called “intentional stance” logic—the sort of 
explanatory logic that human agents are disposed to 
offer for their decisions, cast in terms of beliefs and 
desires (“Mary wants to save money, so she is staying 
in tonight, because she believes that the restaurant 
will be set her back at least $100”)—and one way for 
algorithmic decision tools to be held accountable in 
a manner consistent with human decision-makers is 
by having them divulge their weights (Montavon et al. 
2017). As Edwards and Veale (2018) remark, “Extracting 
estimates of the weightings within a complex algorithm 
is increasingly possible, particularly if only the area 
‘local’ to the query is being considered”. This is because 
local terrain, “unlike the complex innards of the entire 
network, might display recognisable patterns” (Edwards 
& Veale 2018). It is therefore heartening to see the 
development of various model-agnostic explanation 
systems that provide pedagogical guidance, or “models-
of-a-model” (Edwards & Veale 2017). (See Section 1B for 
discussion of explanation systems.)
An important question that all jurisdictions have had 
to consider is the availability and extent of a right to 
explanations for decisions reached partly or fully through 
automated means. What could make an otherwise 
straightforward issue a contentious one is that any such 
right necessarily accompanies a corollary “duty to give 
reasons”, which some common law jurisdictions (such 
as the UK and Australia) do not recognise even for 
public officials exercising statutory functions (Aronson 
& Dyer 2013). The European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), which entered into force 
in May of 2018, arguably does contain a general right 
to explanations (cf. Wachter et al. 2017b), at least for 
decisions reached solely through automated means, and 
this has inspired the hope that other jurisdictions lacking 
a clear right will follow suit.
Section 23 of New Zealand’s Official Information Act 
1982 has long provided citizens affected by government 
decisions with a “right of access…to reasons”. We will 
discuss this provision further in Section 5A.
C. Algorithmic bias
Bias is a predisposition towards or against a particular 
thing, person or group, such as an ethnic group, social 
class, political party, religion or other demographic (such 
as an age group). While it implies being one-sided or 
closed-minded, many biases are simple heuristics and 
need not be pernicious (e.g. a bias against simplistic, 
ideologically-driven solutions to complex problems). 
When the bias in question is pernicious, unfounded, 
unreasonable or resistant to rational influence, it is 
prejudice. When prejudice is acted upon in such a way 
as to exclude, disadvantage or marginalise its subject, 
it is known as discrimination, which can be either direct 
(called “disparate treatment” in the USA), or indirect 
(called “disparate impact” in the USA).
Different disciplines have different takes on “bias”. 
Statisticians have their own uses of the word, a fairly 
common one of which denotes “selection bias”. This 
bias arises from over- or under-sampling members of 
particular groups. Thus a face recognition system trained 
on a data set that over-represents a particular racial 
group is going to have trouble recognising the faces of 
members from any of the under-represented groups. As 
this example shows, however, selection bias frequently 
intersects with more common (non-statistical) notions of 
discrimination and injustice.
A further complexity is that there are diverse legal 
meanings of terms such as “bias” and “discrimination”. 
These concepts and definitions span administrative, 
human rights and other laws. For example, concepts 
of bias in administrative law (including judicial review) 
may relate to either, or both, the factors taken into 
account in decision-making (such as bias resulting in 
the taking into account of irrelevant factors or a failure 
to take into account relevant ones) and bias in the mind 
of the decision-maker (such as a known conflict of 
interest which the decision-maker has not declared or 
a prejudice against a particular party or pre-determined 
view on a particular topic which is the subject of the 
legal dispute). Depending on the type of bias and the 
particular form of decision-making, remedies may vary. 
For example, in administrative law, bias may result in a 
finding that a decision was unreasonable as a matter of 
law. Where this is due to a procedural flaw (for example, 
failure to take into account relevant information) the 
court might order the decision be made again so as 
to remedy the procedural flaw (for example, adducing 
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additional evidence or precluding the presentation 
of evidence that was previously taken into account). 
Alternatively, where the decision-maker is found to have 
acted with bias, the decision may be overturned and a 
fresh hearing ordered by the same or another decision-
maker. In either case, if the bias is not found to have 
tainted the substantive decision, the original decision 
may be affirmed. 
In New Zealand human rights law, concepts of equality, 
inequity, bias and discrimination are different again from 
those familiar in administrative law. Even within human 
rights law, these concepts and definitions also vary 
depending on whether the actors are government or 
private sector (for example the tests for discrimination 
under Parts 1A and Part 2 of the Human Rights Act 1993).
In addition to the complexity of existing concepts and 
definitions, both legal theory and general jurisprudence 
continue to evolve. The result is that concepts of bias and 
equality may change and improve over time. For example, 
in the early 1990s critical race feminist theorists developed 
concepts of intersectionality to identify and explain how 
race, gender, sexual orientation, disability and other forms 
of identity can intersect in the face of disadvantageous 
treatment to result in experiences of multiple forms 
of discrimination, rather than discrimination on one 
prohibited ground alone (Crenshaw 1993). 
We outline these issues briefly in order to note that 
while detailed analysis of concepts and definitions of 
bias in the context of administrative and human rights 
law have not been the focus of this project, it is clear 
that much more work is needed to understand how 
these concepts and definitions sit alongside the other 
issues of bias that we have identified. This is especially 
important if the remedies or measures to address bias in 
each sphere are to be assessed against each other.
Some scholars distinguish further between two types of 
bias: intrinsic and extrinsic (Zerilli et al. 2018). Intrinsic bias 
resides in a system by virtue of its design, structure and 
rules of operation, or as a consequence of inputs effecting 
a permanent change in these features. Racial bias is a 
good example of intrinsic bias in human beings, because 
the connection with emotion is relatively clear (the 
emotion being fear) and emotion is a constitutive feature 
of personality (Pohl 2008; Angie et al. 2011). Furthermore, 
racist conditioning may affect long-term the way a person 
processes information and makes decisions. Extrinsic bias, 
on the other hand, derives from a system’s inputs when 
they do not produce a permanent or long-term change 
in the system’s internal structure and rules of operation. 
In these cases, false information may affect a system’s 
outputs, but so long as the information is corrected, the 
outputs will be unbiased.
Overall, while it is true that an algorithm can be 
intrinsically biased (see below), extrinsic bias is probably 
the more immediate problem for AI (Friedman & 
Nissenbaum 1996; Johnson 2006). The so-called “dirty 
data” problem is an apt illustration. Errors and biases 
latent in data training sets tend to be reproduced in 
the outputs of machine learning tools (Barocas & Selbst 
2015; Diakopoulos 2015). Moreover, because humans 
label much of the training data by hand, biases often 
creep in and taint algorithms through data labelling. The 
problem is compounded by copyright and intellectual 
property laws, which presently limit the access users 
have to better quality training data (Levendowski 
2017).5 Still, extrinsic bias in principle is less difficult to 
overcome than intrinsic bias. Most of the problems we 
have mentioned arise from the use of unrepresentative 
data sets. For instance, face recognition systems trained 
predominantly on Caucasian faces might reject the 
passport application photos of Asian persons, whose 
eyes appear closed (Griffiths 2016). Speech recognition 
systems, too, are notorious for being less accurate 
when processing female voices than male ones (Tatman 
2016). Both situations arise from a failure to include 
representative members from all social groups in 
training data (an example of what we described earlier 
as selection bias). The obvious solution is to diversify 
the training sets (Klingele 2015; Crawford & Calo 2016). 
While there are political and legal barriers in the way of 
this, it is not as intractable a problem as the one posed 
by intrinsic human bias (Bezrukova et al. 2016; Plous 
2003; Allport 1954).
Not all dirty data suffers from being unrepresentative in 
this way, however. For instance, a machine learning tool 
that disproportionately classifies African Americans as 
posing a greater risk of recidivism has probably learnt 
from a data set that reflects racial prejudices inherent 
in previous discriminatory patterns of policing (Larson 
et al. 2016; Lum & Isaac 2016; Crawford & Calo 2016). 
This would not count as intrinsic bias because the data 
do not affect the system’s internal structure and rules of 
operation. But nor can such bias be said to originate from 
unrepresentative data, which can in theory be corrected 
by including more diverse ethnic groups in the training set. 
5. Other factors impeding access include privacy law and income 
disparities.
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There is another side to the story too. It seems that 
fairer algorithms are not possible that satisfy any more 
than one definition of fairness at a time, because “many 
notions of fairness are in conflict” (Corbett-Davies et 
al. 2017, p. 799; see also Chouldechova 2017; Hardt et 
al. 2016; Kleinberg et al. 2017). Three broad types of 
fairness definitions have been discussed.
(i) Anti-classification “stipulates that risk assessment 
algorithms not consider protected characteristics—
like race, gender, or their proxies—when deriving 
estimates” (Corbett-Davies & Goel 2018, p. 2).
(ii) Classification parity “requires that certain common 
measures of predictive performance be equal across 
groups defined by the protected attributes. Under 
this definition, a risk assessment algorithm that 
predicts loan default might, for example, be required 
to produce similar false negative rates for white 
and black applicants” (Corbett-Davies & Goel 2018, 
p. 2). The latter would be an example of “error rate 
balance” (Chouldechova 2017).
(iii) Calibration “requires that outcomes are independent 
of protected attributes after controlling for estimated 
risk. For example, among loan applicants estimated 
to have a 10% chance of default, calibration requires 
that whites and blacks default at similar rates” 
(Corbett-Davies & Goel 2018, p. 2).
As Corbett-Davies & Goel assess the situation: 
“ all three of these popular definitions of algorithmic fairness—anti-classification, 
classification parity, and calibration—
suffer from deep statistical limitations. 
In particular, they are poor measures 
for detecting discriminatory algorithms 
and, even more importantly, designing 
algorithms to satisfy these definitions can, 
perversely, negatively impact the well-being 
of minority and majority communities alike.
 In contrast to the principle of anti-classification, it is often necessary for 
equitable risk assessment algorithms to 
explicitly consider protected characteristics. 
In the criminal justice system, for example, 
women are typically less likely to commit a 
future violent crime than men with similar 
criminal histories. As a result, gender-
neutral risk scores can systematically 
overestimate a woman’s recidivism risk, 
and can in turn encourage unnecessarily 
harsh judicial decisions.
 Enforcing classification parity can likewise 
lead to discriminatory decision-making. 
When the true underlying distribution of 
risk varies across groups, differences in 
group-level error rates are an expected 
consequence of algorithms that accurately 
capture each individual’s risk….[C]alibration, 
while generally desirable, provides only a 
weak guarantee of equity. In particular, it is 
often straightforward to satisfy calibration 
while strategically mis-classifying 
individuals in order to discriminate. Indeed, 
the illegal practice of redlining in banking 
is closely related to such a discriminatory 
strategy. For example, to unfairly limit loans 
to minority applicants, a bank could base 
risk estimates only on coarse information, 
like one’s neighbourhood, and ignore 
individual-level factors, like income and 
credit history. The resulting risk scores 
would be calibrated—assuming majority 
and minority applicants default at similar 
rates within neighbourhood—and could 
be used to deny loans to creditworthy 
minorities who live in relatively high-risk 
neighbourhoods.” (2018, P. 2)
We mentioned in passing that algorithms can be 
intrinsically biased too (like humans). This is because 
algorithmic development is never an entirely objective, 
value-free endeavour: it will be influenced by a host of 
social and institutional norms, practices and attitudes 
that could well build bias into design. Such social and 
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institutional factors include—but are not limited to—the 
predominantly white, technically-educated and male 
composition of the field of AI (Crawford 2016). While 
these factors undoubtedly play a role in biasing algorithms, 
their effect is probably less palpable than extrinsically 
determined bias—such as dirty data. In any case, the two 
forms of bias are interconnected and originate from the 
same set of social and institutional conditions.
In the New Zealand context, this may be particularly 
important in relation to algorithms used in delivery of 
government services to Māori; for example, those which 
are trained on data that does not take account of Māori 
data concepts. Walter (2016) raises similar concerns 
in relation to how “Australia’s racial terrain permeates 
statistics on Indigenous Australians” so that “In a seemingly 
unbroken circle, dominant social norms, values and racial 
understandings determine statistical construction and 
interpretations, which then shape perceptions of data 
needs and purpose, which then determine statistical 
construction and interpretation, and so on”.
D. Informational privacy
The challenge here has been well stated by Lilian 
Edwards and Michael Veale (2017): “Machine learning 
and big data analytics in general are fundamentally 
based around the idea of repurposing data, which is 
in principle contrary to the data protection principle 
that data should be collected for named and specific 
purposes”. Purpose limitation strikes at the heart 
of big data, and both the commercial and political 
imperatives justifying its use. While consent to data 
sharing has been the traditional way of cutting this 
Gordian knot, consent has become increasingly illusory 
and virtually meaningless in an age that has seen 
privacy clauses become longer, more complex, and 
effectively mandatory if a data subject is to have any 
hope of accessing basic services (e.g. medical and tax 
information, online banking, lifestyle apps, etc.). 
A related set of problems arises from the curation 
of anonymised data sets, in which names and other 
identifying information have been removed from 
personal records. These data sets are typically used by 
commercial entities to construct “profiles” of types of 
people so that they can be more effectively targeted 
with advertising. While the obvious concern here is that 
such data, being anonymous, do not obviously fall within 
the reach of existing privacy provisions, the main worry 
concerns the potential for re-identification (Ohm 2010), 
which has become greater in the era of the Internet of 
Things and smart devices (Edwards and Veale 2017). It 
is also unclear whether the controllers of this data can 
be identified—obviously a crucial prerequisite to the 
enforcement of privacy rights for groups as much as 
for individuals; and whether collectives can, or should, 
have privacy rights in addition to individuals in these 
circumstances (Hildebrandt 2015; Mittelstadt 2017).
A major concern relates to the kind of consent which 
must be obtained (if any) for the use of inferred 
data—i.e. data inferred from other data whose collection 
has been consented to—and the rights of access data 
subjects have to such inferred data. In the era of 
machine learning, where inferences are the veritable 
stock-in-trade of advertising and social media business 
models, inferences potentially represent an enormous 
gap in the reach of existing data protection provisions. 
When a machine learning tool detects that a submitted 
tax return is fraudulent, for example, it is not doing so 
through directly ascertainable information, but on the 
basis of inferences drawn from directly ascertainable 
information (e.g. larger-than-usual losses reported in 
consecutive tax years). Indeed, in response to concerns 
about the intrusive nature of inferential analytics and 
perceived gaps in data protection laws in Europe, a new 
data right, the right to reasonable inferences, has been 
proposed (Wachter & Mittelstadt 2019).
Note that there are therefore at least two consent-
related data protection issues thrown up by big data. 
One is the question of whether consent must be 
obtained from a data subject before an entity can 
engage in inferential analytics (i.e. whether purpose 
limitation prevents use of a data subject’s information 
for the drawing of inferences). The other is the question 
of whether consent must be obtained for the use of 
inferred data (i.e. does inferred data count as data in the 
same way as primary data?).
Other information privacy issues relate to the application 
of well settled data protection standards to personal 
information used for machine learning and big data 
analytics. These issues include: obligations for informing 
an individual about when, how and what personal 
information is being collected and the intended 
recipients of the information (including third parties); 
how individuals can exercise their right to access 
information (to whom should an individual direct a 
request for access to data held about them?); who 
controls the information for the purposes of liability 
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for correction; exactly where obligations for ensuring 
accuracy should fall in the data chain (particularly when 
information is re-purposed or passed to a third party); 
what obligations for data deletion should be imposed 
(when must an agency delete information?); and the 
proper periods for data retention.
E. Liability and personhood
To the extent they can, settled principles of private law 
will continue to guide courts assigning liability for harms 
caused by technology. The traditional doctrine in tort, for 
example, would direct that if there is a problem with a 
mechanical component in an autonomous vehicle (say), 
and the problem arises from negligent assembly, the 
proper person to sue for any resulting damage is the 
manufacturer. However, if the problem resides in the 
vehicle’s software, tracing liability may not be as simple 
as this. Machine learning algorithms learn to do things 
(including make mistakes) for themselves. This raises the 
prospect of a danger inherent in the software for which 
no human can be identified as directly responsible. It 
is true that product liability regimes generally hold the 
manufacturer responsible for defects even when the 
manufacturer could not have known of them given 
the state of knowledge at the time.6 From this springs 
the thought that a software developer should always 
be liable in these situations—perhaps the software 
developer did not bake the glitch into the vehicle’s code, 
but they should be liable regardless. One difficulty with 
this solution is that the analogy to product liability is 
fraught, the principles of which apply clearly enough 
to products, but not to services. It is not clear whether 
software is a product or a service.7
One way forward may be to recognise algorithms as 
juridical persons, which would presumably entail the 
creation of an insurance scheme enabling damages to be 
recovered from them (AlgoAware 2018, p. 33). A proposal 
along these lines is currently being debated in Estonia. 
New Zealand, of course, has a no-fault insurance scheme 
in the ACC, which should (or could be made to) provide 
cover for personal injuries inflicted by autonomous 
systems. For all other harms caused by autonomous 
systems, a separate or parallel insurance scheme could 
supplement the ACC’s coverage, hand-in-hand with de 
jure (or merely de facto?) personality in algorithms.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
corporate personality was an answer to a specific 
problem of regulation: how to encourage investment in 
the newly created joint stock companies. The answer the 
courts hit upon was to restrict the liability of investors to 
what each had agreed to pay as the price of company 
membership. Juridically the result was obtained by a 
fiction (i.e. that a company of people is itself a type 
of person). Today the question is whether artificial 
personhood is an acceptable solution to the opposite 
problem, namely, where there is no recognisable entity 
to whom liability unambiguously attaches (because 
“the machine did it”). But unlike the case of companies 
a hundred years ago, the recognition of technological 
personhood will probably have to come from parliament 
rather than the courts. This is because the issue will 
likely demand reflection on a more comprehensive set of 
factors and reference to a broader range of stakeholders 
than any single court can reasonably be expected to 
contend with. Vital contributions are required from 
software engineers, human factors psychologists, 
policy analysts and other social scientists—the sorts of 
contributions better canvassed through a consultative 
parliamentary committee process than through an 
amicus curiae or Brandeis brief.
This report limits itself to three observations regarding 
the feasibility of recognising legal personhood in 
algorithms. First, though strict liability for software 
developers is an apparently uncomplicated option—one 
which does not depend on the attribution of blame to 
a culpable entity, and does not require the recognition 
of artificial personhood in algorithms—it will almost 
certainly have repercussions for the tech industry as a 
whole, which can be expected to pass on the increased 
risk of liability, in the form of higher insurance premiums, 
to the aspiring owner of an autonomous vehicle (for 
example). The strict liability option should therefore 
only be chosen with the full acknowledgment and 
backing of the public. It is true that the UK, Australian 
and New Zealand legal systems have traditionally 
enjoined strict liability for the actions of substances 
(e.g. chemicals) or chattels (e.g. animals) that cause 
harm without the knowledge of their controller, a 
situation that might be thought directly parallel to 
the “mindless” but independent actions of machine 
learning algorithms which “learn” to classify and execute 
6. Although under UK law, lack of technical and scientific knowledge 
at the relevant time is now a defence, the so-called “state of 
scientific knowledge” or “development risks” defence. See Consumer 
Protection Act 1987 (UK).
7. See e.g. Computer Associates UK Ltd v The Software Incubator Ltd 
[2018] EWCA Civ 518 at [67].
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procedures without being explicitly programmed to do 
so by their developers. The chilling effect of strict liability 
on innovation may be reason enough, however, to 
reconsider its aptness in the circumstances. 
Second, New Zealand has recently recognised 
natural entities as legal persons (Te Urewera and the 
Whanganui river). In the case of rivers, of course, the 
motivation is protection of the natural environment 
rather than restriction or expansion of financial liability. 
But there is precedent for an extension of the category 
of artificial persons within domestic law. Of course 
one of the requirements of personhood is identity. 
A company obtains its identity from registration in a 
companies register. Algorithmic personality presumably 
calls for a similar form of registration so that subsequent 
versions of an algorithm can be recognised as either the 
“same” or “new”.
Third, contrary to the usual worry, if the problem posed 
by the new algorithms is not that they generate an 
accountability gap, but rather what has been called a 
“moral crumple zone”—in which humans risk being liable 
for harm-generating algorithmic decisions even when 
they have no effective control over them (Elish 2016)—
then the problem to which artificial personhood may 
be a solution will more nearly resemble the nineteenth 
century problem of investor liability. There the problem 
was how to limit the liability of a visible agent (the 
owner of stock); here the problem would be how to 
shield a visible agent (the human element in a human-
machine system) from the unfair burden of responsibility 
falling on their shoulders simply because there is no one 
else around to blame. Analogy with the strongest case 
for personhood in common law jurisprudence makes the 
case for artificial personhood in algorithms somewhat 
easier to maintain.
F. Human autonomy
How we are to understand and potentially regulate 
the influence of algorithms on the way we perceive 
the world is among the most important—perhaps 
the most important—of the questions that advanced 
artificial intelligence poses today. For instance, 
“nudging” algorithms filter information so that it 
appeals to users based on an in-depth understanding 
of their preferences. These preferences are reliably 
surmised through retail history, Facebook likes, Twitter 
posts, YouTube views, and the like. More worryingly, 
in the democratic sphere this technology potentially 
facilitates active manipulation through targeted political 
advertising. So-called “dark” ads can be sent to the very 
people most likely to be susceptible to them without the 
benefit—or even the possibility—of open refutation and 
contest which the marketplace of ideas depends on for 
its functioning. The extent of “perception-control” that 
new digital technologies make possible is really a first in 
history, and likely to concentrate unprecedented power 
in the hands of a few big tech giants and law-and-order-
obsessed state authorities (Susskind 2018). 
To date, very few jurisdictions have come up with 
strategies that convincingly curb this potential. In 
Australia, the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission’s Preliminary Digital Platforms Inquiry 
(December 2018) has recommended that a regulatory 
body be given authority to monitor, investigate and 
publish reports on the operation of the algorithms 
used by large market players (those generating more 
than $A100 million annually from digital advertising). 
However, the Commission’s recommendations stop 
short of indicating what powers any such regulator 
would have in the event it uncovered anticompetitive or 
discriminatory algorithms.
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In this chapter, we consider some of the actual and 
potential regulatory responses to the use of predictive 
algorithms by government. Some of these already exist 
in New Zealand, others have been implemented in other 
jurisdictions. A third cohort is at the stage only of being 
proposed or considered.
“Regulation” is a much discussed and somewhat 
contested term in legal literature. Some definitions 
extend the concept far beyond legal rules. A very 
influential definition proposed by Julia Black defines 
regulation as 
“ regulation is the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others 
according to defined standards or purposes 
with the intention of producing a broadly 
identified outcome or outcomes, which may 
involve mechanisms of standard-setting, 
information-gathering and behaviour-
modification.” (BLACK 2002, P. 26)
On this definition, regulation is not confined to legal 
prohibitions and orders, and neither is it limited to rules 
issues by government or parliament. As Brownsword 
and Goodwin say: “We should not assume that 
‘regulation’ is co-extensive with ‘law’; and we should 
not assume that ‘regulators’ are only those who are 
authorised to issue legal directives” (Brownsword & 
Goodwin 2012, p. 25) This expansive definition could 
even include “unintentional influence such as market 
forces” (Bennett Moses 2013, p. 4).
Other definitions are more restrictive, seeking to confine 
the concept to legal restrictions. According to Susy 
Frankel and John Yeabsley (2011): 
“ Regulation takes many forms. Regulation includes legislation, legal rules, codes 
of practice (both formal and informal), 
and a combination of these. As such, it 
includes government regulation, regional 
and local government regulation and self-
regulation.”
We take no position on the wider notion of regulation, 
but for the purposes of this report, our focus will largely 
be on actions that could be taken by the New Zealand 
government or parliament. This is not to deny that 
factors such as market forces or cultural norms can be 
highly influential in dictating behaviour. But the question 
of how they might be used or controlled is beyond the 
scope of this particular project.
Our concern, then, is with the application of legislation, 
legal rules and codes of practice to the use of predictive 
algorithms in government. At present, New Zealand has 
no legal rules specifically directed at algorithms, or at 
artificial intelligence more generally, though this is not of 
course to say that there are no rules applicable to them. 
Whether an algorithm- or AI-specific regulatory response 
is merited, or whether existing laws and norms could 
(perhaps with some modification) adequately regulate 
these technologies, is an important question. Before 
rushing to scratch-build a regulatory response to a new 
technology, it is prudent to consider what about it we 
think requires regulation, and to consider whether existing 
rules are sufficient to deal with that. As the US National 
Science and Technology Council (2016) proposed:
“ If a risk falls within the bounds of an existing regulatory regime…the policy 
discussion should start by considering 
whether the existing regulations already 
adequately address the risk, or whether 
they need to be adapted to the addition  
of AI.” 
And, as Brownsword and Goodwin noted, technologies 
rarely emerge into a complete legal vacuum:
“ Although there might be no part of the regulatory array that is specifically 
dedicated to the emerging technology, 
and although there might be gaps in 
the array, it will rarely be true to say that 
an emerging technology finds itself in 
a regulatory void.” (BROWNSWORD & GOODWIN 2012, P. 64)
5. REGULATORY/GOVERNANCE STRATEGIES
50
That said, we should not too readily discount the 
possibility that a new technology genuinely does pose 
concerns that are sufficiently new to merit a targeted 
response. As Lyria Bennett Moses says: “There is nothing 
illogical in arguing for technology-specific legislation, but 
it only makes sense to do so if the regulatory rationale 
is closely tied to the technology itself” (Bennett Moses 
2013, p. 15). For a targeted regulatory response to be 
justified, then, there must be something about the 
regulatory target that sets it apart from the sorts of 
actions or decisions governed by existing rules. That may 
be because the technology, by its very nature, raises new 
ethical or political concerns, or it may be because the 
nature of the technology means that existing rules do 
not protect adequately against the risks that it poses. 
Part of our task in this section is to consider the array of 
legal rules currently in place in New Zealand that might 
be relevant to decisions made or informed by predictive 
algorithms. Are these rules up to the task of addressing 
the concerns we identified in Chapter 4? Can they do 
so without unduly negating the advantages discussed 
in Chapter 3? Have they kept pace with the changing 
nature of the technology as outlined in Chapter 1?
It is also important, though, to lift our heads and survey 
the international scene. In recent years, a range of 
initiatives have been adopted or proposed in other 
jurisdictions, in attempts to address the sorts of risks and 
concerns we have identified. Some of these might merit 
serious consideration in a New Zealand context, and we 
examine some of the most influential or promising of 
those here.
Although this section will focus primarily on legal rules, 
the potential role of non-legal mechanisms should not 
be entirely ignored. In the latter part, therefore, we turn 
our brief attention to some other initiatives, including 
self-regulatory models.
Ultimately, our purpose here is not to recommend 
an ideal system of legal rules or regulatory control of 
predictive algorithms. The options we discuss all have 
much that could be said for and against them, and our 
main purpose is to present a balanced view of each. We 
do, however, begin with a few recommendations of a 
fairly general nature about regulatory initiatives.
Desiderata for regulation of AI
In considering the regulation of government use of 
predictive algorithms, we propose nine desiderata. 
Some of these are general principles akin to Lon Fuller’s 
well-known desiderata for valid law, particularly scope of 
application, evenhandedness and certainty (Fuller 1964). 
Others are specifically directed toward the regulation 
of new technologies such as predictive algorithms. 
It is accepted that particular desiderata will be more 
important in particular contexts and that no type of 
regulation is maximally efficient at meeting all nine 
desiderata.
1. Fairness:
 • regulations should apply evenhandedly, i.e. to  
 all those employing a technology with a particular  
 attendant risk;
 • regulations should not decrease public wellbeing  
 or stifle innovation by placing undue burdens on  
 any particular sector of society. 
2. Parsimony:
 • existing laws that cover an identified problem  
 should be maximally utilised before new laws are  
 proposed;
 • overlapping laws and regimes should be avoided  
 where possible;
 • regulations should have broad scope where   
 possible.
3. Proportionality:
 • regulations should be reasonably necessary to  
 secure their stated purposes (inasmuch as means  
 should be reasonably adapted to their ends);
 • regulations should not impose a higher burden  
 than is necessary to achieve a stated outcome.
4. Timeliness:
 • regulators should give due consideration to the  
 maturity of new technologies when assessing the  
 appropriate point at which to regulate.
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5. Flexibility and Reviewability:
 • regulations should be flexible and adaptable in  
 light of technological change and should be   
 subject to appropriately regular review.
6. Certainty:
 • regulations should enhance certainty for citizens  
 who are data subjects, government employees,  
 and other stakeholders.
7. Oversight and appeal:
 • regulations should be consistent with existing  
 rights to appeal important decisions made about  
 data subjects by public officials;
 • where appeal is impracticable or inappropriate,  
 decision-making procedures should be subject to  
 independent oversight. 
8. Social license:
 • regulations should enhance public trust and   
 confidence;
 • regulations should enhance political legitimacy. 
9. Externalities:
 • regulations should prevent the externalisation  
 of costs associated with new technologies such  
 as decreasing the privacy or security of the public.
A. “Hard law” and individual rights
We begin with a range of what are sometimes called 
“hard law” responses: legislation (primary or delegated) 
and the decisions of courts charged with interpreting 
and applying them. In particular, we will consider various 
parts of the regulatory environment that are oriented 
towards the concerns we identified in Chapter 4: control, 
transparency, bias, privacy and the like.
 As we will show, New Zealand law already has a 
number of rights and remedies that are relevant in this 
context. We will then consider some of the international 
initiatives that have been proposed or implemented. This 
will include the European Union’s much-discussed GDPR, 
as well as proposals that have arisen in the USA.
Control
The Government’s Algorithm Assessment Report placed 
considerable importance on the retention of human 
agency alongside algorithmic decisions:
“ where algorithms are material to decisions which affect people’s lives in significant 
ways, it is reasonable to expect that a real 
person has exercised human judgement 
during the process and over the final 
decision.” (STATS NZ 2018, P. 31)
This has certainly been claimed to be true of the 
RoC*RoI algorithm. Although it has been said of RoC*RoI 
that “It requires no clinical judgement or manual 
calculation” (Wilson 2013) provision for manual over-
ride appears to have been made. In a 2009 report, the 
Department of Corrections acknowledged that, as 
“ an offender’s officially recorded criminal history does not always reflect the true 
extent of actual offending (and thus 
future risk), “professional over- ride” was 
also available to staff if other information 
existed to suggest high risks posed by an 
offender.” (DOC 2009, P. 14)
An Official Information request for specific information 
about the provision to override a RoC*RoI score 
was submitted to Corrections in November 2018, 
but at the time of writing, no response has been 
published (see https://fyi.org.nz/request/8982-roc-roi-
override?unfold=1).
Other jurisdictions seem to have followed the same 
assumption. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Loomis 
(see Section 2A), in deciding that the use of the COMPAS 
algorithm in sentencing did not violate due process 
rights, noted their expectation “that circuit courts will 
exercise discretion when assessing a COMPAS risk score 
with respect to each individual defendant”.
52
Perhaps the best known example can be found in the 
European Union’s GDPR. Article 22 states:
“ The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on 
automated processing, including profiling, 
which produces legal effects concerning 
him or her or similarly significantly affects 
him or her.”
This right is not absolute; paragraph 2 sets out limited 
exceptions. Paragraph 3, however, requires that where 
those exceptions apply:
“ the data controller shall implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s 
rights and freedoms and legitimate 
interests, at least the right to obtain human 
intervention on the part of the controller, 
to express his or her point of view and to 
contest the decision.”
New Zealand has no right directly analogous to Article 
22. However, it may be that other legal protections 
could indirectly contribute to the same result. In a 2010 
case before the Privacy Commissioner,8 a complaint was 
made about a fully automated transfer process between 
a debt collector and a credit reporter. The process was 
deemed to breach Principle 8 of the Privacy Act 1993, 
which requires an agency holding personal information 
to take reasonable steps to ensure that “the information 
is accurate, up to date, complete, relevant, and not 
misleading”. 
The Commissioner held that, to be compliant with the 
accuracy aspect of Principle 8, a manual notation had 
to be added to the record. In effect, a human had to 
be kept “in the loop”. The complainant, however, was 
unable to show that breach of Principle 8 caused her 
any harm. This is a significant limitation of the Privacy 
Act regime. It is also unclear how many agencies are 
aware of this decision or requirement.
Although we have noted that there are no algorithm-
specific laws in New Zealand, this may to some extent 
change with the passage of the Courts Matters Bill into 
law. This applies to what appears to be the first New 
Zealand statute-based automated electronic decision-
making system. Of interest for present purposes, it also 
contains a right of human review. New sections 86DA 
to 86DD, provide for the Chief Executive to authorise an 
automated electronic decision-making system for setting 
fine payment arrangements, including a greater time 
for payment or payment by instalments. Where such a 
system is approved, the Chief Excutive must, pursuant to 
section 86A(4), also approve procedures for operating 
the system which must also include procedures for:
(a) setting the criteria for variations;
(b) identifying the information that will be sought from 
the individual;
(c) notifying the individual or their representative of the 
right to seek variation of the arrangement; and
(d) notifying of the right to review by a person of any 
automated decision. 
New section 86DC provides that the Chief Executive may 
only approve an automated system if satisfied that “each 
system has the capacity to do any actions required with 
reasonable reliability” and “there is a process available 
under which a person affected by an action performed 
by an electronic system can have that action reviewed 
by a person authorised by the chief executive to review 
those actions, without undue delay” (emphasis added).
A possibility for New Zealand law, then, would be to 
“firm up” the right to “a human in the loop”. How might 
this right operate? It could, for example, grant to an 
affected person a right to demand a human review of an 
automated decision. Or it could it place a prior restriction 
on all agencies to refrain from delegating such decisions 
to automated processes. The former seems to have 
the limitation of requiring the affected party to be 
aware that they have been subject to an automated 
decision, and as such, might require to be bolstered by a 
requirement on the agency to inform them of this.
8. PCC276 Case Note 205558 [2010] NZPrivCmr 1.
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A further question arises with regard to remedies for 
breach of this entitlement; it will not always be an 
easy thing for the affected person to demonstrate that 
they have been adversely affected by the absence of a 
human decision-maker in a particular decision. 
More generally, and obviously, whether any such right 
is required depends on the desirability of requiring a 
“human in the loop”. There are certainly contexts where 
the sorts of information provided by the algorithm 
are only part of what should inform the judgment, 
and where over-reliance upon it would therefore be 
problematic. As we saw in Section 2A, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court acknowledged that the risk prediction 
provided by the COMPAS algorithm is only one factor 
informing a sentencing decision. In relation to the HART 
tool in Durham, Oswald et al. (2018) have noted that 
“ The model simply does not have all of the information available to it, and can 
therefore only support human decision-
makers, rather than replace them.…With 
both their own local knowledge and their 
access to other data systems, custody 
officers will frequently be aware of other 
information that overrides the model’s 
predictions, and they must apply their 
own judgement in deciding upon the 
disposition of each offender’s case.”
This has also been recognized by the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal. Belcher v Chief Executive of the Department 
of Corrections9 concerned an appeal against the 
imposition of an Extended Supervision Order. The original 
granting of the Order had been supported by the results 
of “instruments measuring the likelihood of Mr Belcher 
reoffending including RoC*RoI, Static-AS and SONAR” 
(at [19]). In considering the relationship between the 
appellant’s personal circumstances and the actuarial 
results, the Court made the following observation:
“ Obviously factors which have arisen post-release must be allowed for in an ESO 
assessment. For instance if the appellant 
had been rendered a tetraplegic as a result 
of a post-release accident, this would have 
presumably eliminated the likelihood of 
him reoffending and would undoubtedly 
have negated any adverse inferences 
which might otherwise have been drawn 
for actuarial assessments.” (AT [90])
This is redolent of what some experts have referred 
to as the “broken leg problem”. Derived from the work 
of psychologist Paul Meehl, this referred to a thought 
experiment whereby an actuarial prediction of the 
chances of someone attending the cinema on a given 
night is undermined by knowledge that they have 
broken their leg that day. In cases of that sort, the value 
of discretionary human input seems obvious. 
Other instances are more contentious. Cathy O’Neill 
(2016) has argued for human involvement on the basis 
of the desirability of discretion:
“ you cannot appeal to a WMD. That’s part of their fearsome power. They do not 
listen. Nor do they bend. They’re deaf not 
only to charm, threats, and cajoling but 
also to logic—even when there is good 
reason to question the data that feeds 
their conclusions.”
Yet at the same time, it could be argued that discretion 
is the mechanism that allows for prejudice, favouritism 
and nepotism. Might it sometimes be the case that less 
rather than more human discretion might be the better 
approach to bias?
9. [2007] 1 NZLR 507.
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Interestingly, the evidence on this does not provide 
strong support for removing discretion. In a report into 
bias in the criminal justice system, Bronwyn Morrison 
found that the evidence for this was far from conclusive:
“ Responses directed towards reducing discretion implicitly assume that the key 
problem is too much discretion and that 
rule tightening will reduce discretion and 
therefore lead to less disproportionality. 
A number of research studies, however, 
have questioned this assumption 
and demonstrated that, in isolation 
from cultural, individual and broader 
organisational and/or social change, this 
type of response is unlikely to be successful 
in addressing disproportionate criminal 
justice outcomes.” (MORRISON 2009, P. 113)
Specifically, Morrison pointed to “research from the 
United Kingdom [that] suggests that efforts to curb 
police discretion have not been particularly successful in 
reducing ethnic disproportionality” with stop and search 
(Morrison 2009, p. 111). Worse, she reported evidence 
that reducing judicial discretion in South Australia, 
through the introduction of mandatory sentencing, 
impacted most harshly on Aboriginal youth (Morrison 
2009, p. 112). 
The role of human discretion in perpetuating, mitigating 
or even exacerbating the disproportionate treatment 
of minority populations in the criminal justice system 
is a complex question, and one that obviously requires 
considerable empirical research. This is a particular 
concern in New Zealand, given the widely recognised 
over-representation of Māori in the criminal justice 
system (Waitangi Tribunal 2017). Clearly, though, it 
cannot be an area governed by unchecked assumptions.
We should also remain open to the possibility that, 
at least for certain kinds of decisions, algorithms 
are “better” than humans (see Section 4A)—and 
the advantages they offer could be curtailed by the 
insistence on human interference. Although Meehl 
recognized the “broken leg” problem, his research 
became famous chiefly for showing that, in a range 
of situations, algorithms made better predictions than 
even trained, expert humans. The Nobel Prize-winning 
psychologist and economist Daniel Kahnemann has also 
investigated the relative performances of algorithms 
and human experts. He has suggested a number of 
reasons for this, including that humans over-complicate 
sometimes simple decisions, and that we “are 
incorrigibly inconsistent” (Kahnemann 2011, p. 224).
The superiority of algorithms at certain kinds of 
calculations has been recognized by New Zealand’s 
Court of Appeal. R v Peta10 is another case that 
concerned an appeal against the imposition of an 
Extended Supervision Order. One of the reasons given 
by the Court for allowing the appeal related to an error 
attributable to human error in a calculation that should 
have been conducted electronically, leading the Court to 
direct that “In future, only electronically scored ASRS test 
results should be presented in evidence.” (Peta at [63]).
Of course what is meant by “better” here and how it may 
be determined in different contexts is a live research 
question. In those cases where it is considered that 
retaining some human input into decisions is valuable, 
though, we should be wary of false reassurance. Again, 
it may be the case that, in certain contexts, automated 
decision-making should not be used at all—particularly 
where there is a reasonable concern that its impact 
on a decision will exceed its reliability. This is in part a 
political and ethical question, but one that should be 
informed by research from the fields of human-machine 
interaction, human factors and psychology. In Chapter 4, 
we considered some of the possible challenges around 
the questions of control and discretion in the context of 
algorithmic decisions.
Whatever decisions are made about when and whether 
humans should be kept “in the loop”, it is important 
that the rules put in place around this are likely to 
promote the desired outcomes. A rule that is satisfied 
by a nominal human presence, effectively rubber-
stamping an algorithmic decision, may serve only to 
offer false reassurance, and as such, be worse than no 
rule at all. On the other hand, guidelines recommending, 
for example, that decision-makers consult their own 
judgment first before consulting an algorithm, using the 
algorithm merely as a check on their intuitions, could 
assist in offsetting some of the effects of automation 
10. [2007] NZCA 28.
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complacency and bias. The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
in Loomis required that sentencing judges be given a 
list of warnings about COMPAS if they intend to rely on 
its predictions to inform their decisions. More empirical 
(human factors) research is required to see whether 
such approaches really do work.
Algorithmic bias
As we have noted, New Zealand presently has no law 
directed specifically at algorithmic decision-making, nor 
any law implemented with algorithms specifically in 
mind. The risk of bias and discrimination, however, is not 
unique to this context, and is likely to engage existing 
and more general provisions in New Zealand law. 
Section 19 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 (“BoRA”) provides that “Everyone has the right 
to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of 
discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993”. Section 
20I-L of the Human Rights Act 1993 (“HRA”) specifically 
apply this right to “the legislative, executive, or judicial 
branch of the Government of New Zealand” or “a person 
or body in the performance of any public function, 
power, or duty conferred or imposed on that person or 
body by or pursuant to law”. 
It is clear, then, that anyone subject to algorithmic 
decision-making by government agencies or courts has a 
legal protection from discrimination. Section 21(1) of the 
HRA lists those prohibited grounds, including sex, race, age 
and employment status—all factors that have occasioned 
controversy in relation to algorithmic decisions. 
Some of the algorithms currently used in New Zealand 
make use of some of these protected categories. The 
Algorithm Assessment Report says that ethnicity is not 
a variable in the RoC*RoI algorithm. In fact, ethnicity 
was originally a variable (Bakker at al. 1997). In 2003, 
however, in response to concerns about the “negative 
connotations” of using that variable, Department of 
Corrections re-examined the role that ethnicity played 
in RoC*RoI’s predictive accuracy. The Department “found 
that, because of the high correlation of ethnicity with 
other variables, the predictive accuracy of RoC*RoI could 
be maintained by recalibrating other variables and 
reducing the effect of the ethnicity variable to zero”. 
Since then, the ethnicity variable has been set to zero 
(Waitangi Tribunal 2005).
It does not follow, though, that the use of the RoC*RoI 
algorithm poses no concerns about prohibited grounds 
of discrimination. For one thing, gender and age are also 
protected categories, and these still feature as variables 
in the RoC*RoI calculation. For another, the possibility 
must seriously be considered that other variables act as 
effective proxies for ethnicity. And concerns about inputs 
are only part of the story regarding discrimination and 
algorithms. We return to these considerations shortly.
Determining whether there has been a breach of a right 
involves several steps. As the Court of Appeal ruled in 
Ministry of Health v Atkinson [2012] NZCA 184, the first 
step is “to ask whether there is differential treatment 
or effects as between persons or groups in analogous 
or comparable situations on the basis of a prohibited 
ground of discrimination” (at [55]). As the Court went on 
to explain, though, not all differential treatment will be 
discriminatory (at [75]), and the differential treatment 
will satisfy this part of the test “if, when viewed in 
context, it imposes a material disadvantage on the 
person or group differentiated against” (at [109]).
Discriminatory treatment, then, must treat individuals 
or groups both differently and disadvantageously, on 
the grounds of a protected characteristic. But even this 
will not suffice to establish a rights violation. The right 
to be free from discrimination is not an absolute one, 
which means it may be permissibly restricted in some 
circumstances. According to section 5 of the BoRA, 
rights “may be subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society”.
What would it take to satisfy the requirements of section 
5? Tipping J in R v Hansen [2007] NZSC 7 set out a 
number of criteria that would have to be satisfied: 
(a) does the limiting measure serve a purpose 
sufficiently important to justify curtailment of the 
right or freedom?
(b) (i)  is the limiting measure rationally connected with  
 its purpose? 
 (ii)  does the limiting measure impair the right or  
 freedom no more than is reasonably necessary  
 for sufficient achievement of its purpose?
 (iii) is the limit in due proportion to the importance  
 of the objective? (at [104])
If these criteria are satisfied, then the use of variables 
such as ethnicity, sex and age may be justified. It is 
important to realise, though, that the burden will lie with 
the party seeking to justify a limit on the right.
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As we saw in Section 2A, the use of gender as an input 
variable formed part of Eric Loomis’s challenge against 
the use of the COMPAS algorithm in his sentencing. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected that part of his 
claim, holding that “if the inclusion of gender promotes 
accuracy, it serves the interests of institutions and 
defendants, rather than a discriminatory purpose”. 
Predicting the likely outcome of a discrimination 
challenge in circumstances like those in Loomis is 
not easy, in view of what has been noted to be “the 
relative dearth of decisions regarding s 19” (Butler 
& Butler 2015, p. 857). It seems likely, though, that 
if such a challenge were raised in New Zealand, the 
importance of including ethnicity, gender or   age to the 
predictive accuracy of the algorithm would likely be a 
key consideration in determining whether the Hansen 
criteria were satisfied. If the discriminatory variable could 
be removed without sacrificing accuracy—as apparently 
was the case with RoC*RoI and with the ACC algorithm—
then its inclusion will not be justified.
Even where the variable has some significance, it must 
be proportionate to the objective. When the state’s 
objective is public protection from dangerous criminals, 
this may seem easily satisfied; other objectives will be 
harder to justify as being of sufficient importance. But 
even in the most compelling cases, the “reasonably 
necessary” requirement means that the objective could 
not reasonably have been fulfilled without the limiting 
measure.
Excluding prohibited grounds as input variables might 
seem like an obvious way of avoiding any suspicion of 
discrimination. But leaving aside the possible tradeoff 
in terms of predictive accuracy in some cases, this only 
avoids one form of discrimination. The HRA also extends 
to indirect discrimination, that is, conduct that has the 
effect of treating a person or group differently on the 
basis of a prohibited ground (section 65). 
As we explained in Chapter 2, disparate effects 
on prisoners of different races was at the heart of 
ProPublica’s criticism of the COMPAS algorithm. As 
this case shows, avoiding discriminatory inputs will not 
always guarantee against discriminatory outputs. As 
Edwards and Veale (2017) have warned, the danger 
exists that the 
“ excluded variables are likely related to some of the variables that are included, 
e.g. transaction data, occupation data, 
or postcode. Put simply, if the sensitive 
variable might be predictively useful, and 
we suspect the remaining variables might 
contain signals that allow us to predict 
the variable we omitted, then unwanted 
discrimination can sneak back in.”
In a New Zealand context, Emily Keddell has warned that 
“ while we are offered the reassurance that ethnicity is not used as a variable 
in the ROC ROI algorithms, literally every 
other variable such as age at first offence, 
frequency of conviction, number of 
convictions will over-identify Māori as being 
high risk.” (KEDDELL 2018)
Support for this view can also be found in Bronwyn 
Morrison’s report for the Ministry of Justice:
“ Research has consistently shown that legal factors such as offence seriousness, 
evidentiary strength, offending history, 
the direct context of decision making, 
victim charging preferences, as well as 
extra-legal factors such as socioeconomic 
status account for most (but not all) of 
the variation between different ethnic 
groups.” (MORRISON 2009, P. 12)
As Morrison explains, opinions vary as to how to account 
for these relationships. If we are to be confident that the 
algorithm is operating in a non-discriminatory manner, 
though, then we would also need to confident that 
the variables on which its decisions are based are not 
themselves the product of past discrimination. This is 
the “dirty data” problem that we referred to in Chapter 
4. If, for example, Māori over-representation in prison 
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populations is at least partly attributable to historic 
discrimination in policing or sentencing practices, then 
there is a danger that that discrimination will “creep” 
back into decisions through reliance on variables that 
appear innocuous but which are heavily tainted by those 
attitudes and practices. Hence it is important to realise 
that simply excluding certain variables from the range 
of input factors is unlikely to ensure anything about the 
algorithm’s outputs. 
Guarding against problematic discrimination “sneaking 
in” will therefore involve ongoing monitoring of the 
algorithm’s outputs and impacts. As a UN (2018) Special 
Rapporteur recently explained:
“ This involves, at a minimum, addressing sampling errors (where datasets are 
non-representative of society), scrubbing 
datasets to remove discriminatory 
data and putting in place measures to 
compensate for data that “contain the 
imprint of historical and structural patterns 
of discrimination” and from which AI 
systems are likely to develop discriminatory 
proxies.”
As we discuss further later in this chapter, this may 
involve the capacity to take a “wide angle” perspective 
that may not be available to individuals. A serious 
commitment to monitoring human rights compliance 
may not be the sort of function that can be delegated to 
affected citizens.
Transparency and the right to 
explanations
As we have seen, a great deal of the concern about 
algorithmic decision-making relates to the potentially 
opaque nature of those decisions. After all, if we cannot 
understand how a decision has been arrived at, then we 
cannot check it for accuracy or bias, and importantly, we 
cannot challenge it if we think it is wrong or unfair.
In response to this concern, much has been made of 
what some claim is a “right to an explanation” in the 
GDPR. Whether such a right can in fact be discerned or 
inferred from the GDPR is the subject of considerable 
and ongoing academic debate (contrast Wachter et al. 
2017b with Selbst & Powles 2017). Even if such a right 
does exist, a range of concerns have been raised about 
its usefulness in addressing the transparency problem 
(Edwards & Veale 2017).
As we mentioned in Section 4B, section 23 New 
Zealand’s Official Information Act 1982 (“OIA”) provides 
a right to reasons. If requested, these reasons are to 
be supplied in a written statement that includes any 
findings on material issues of fact and (subject to a few 
exceptions) a reference to the information on which 
the findings were based. Grounds for withholding such 
information are quite limited. But does this address 
concerns about the intelligibility of any explanation 
given about algorithmic outputs?  As we have seen, 
in the context of algorithmic decisions, providing an 
explanation that is intelligible to affected persons and 
the general public could prove especially problematic.
In the context of the OIA, some reassurance has been 
provided by the High Court decision in Vixen, where it 
held that:
“ Where the legislature has specified that reasons must be given I should think 
those reasons must be sufficient to 
enable any body with a power of review 
to understand the process of thought 
whereby a conclusion was reached. Equally 
the reasons must allow those with vested 
interests, like those of the appellant, to 
so understand the basis for decisions as 
to be better informed in predicting that 
which is or is not within the law. Further, 
in this case the public has a general 
interest in knowing and comprehending 
the standards that the Board sees as 
important.” (RE VIXEN DIGITAL LIMITED [2003] NZAR 418 AT [43])
Still, the OIA leaves citizens affected by private sector 
decision-making without a comparable right, and this 
is true whether the decisions are made by humans or 
algorithms. At least in the private sphere, New Zealand’s 
laws lag considerably behind the EU’s.
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An alternative legal basis for access to information 
about a decision about personal information can 
be found in the Privacy Act 1993. The Act relates to 
information about oneself, held by private and public 
agencies. It applies to “personal information”, which 
means information about an identifiable individual 
(section 2). Therefore, the Act applies if an individual 
is identifiable at any stage of the construction or use 
of the algorithm, including the results of an application 
of the algorithm using personal information about an 
identifiable individual. The application of an algorithm 
may not be enough on its own, because the algorithm 
does not appear to be personal information within the 
meaning of the Privacy Act. However, the processing of 
information about an identifiable individual by algorithm 
comes under the remit of the Act.
The Act’s Information Privacy Principles (“IPPs”) set out 
the requirements for the collection, storage, use and 
disclosure of personal information. Section 6 sets out 
11 IPPs which cover the collection, holding and use of 
personal information (and a 12th IPP concerning unique 
identifiers which doesn’t appear in an equivalent Act in 
any other jurisdiction).
Principle 6 states that:
(1) Where an agency holds personal information in such 
a way that it can readily be retrieved, the individual 
concerned shall be entitled—
 (a) to obtain from the agency confirmation of   
 whether or not the agency holds such personal  
 information; and
 (b) to have access to that information.
As with the OIA, the question of intelligibility of that 
information is likely to be highly relevant. Section 42 of the 
Act provides further details about how information must 
be provided. The recent decision in Naidu v Australasian 
College of Surgeons [2018] NZHRRT 234 provides some 
guidance on how this is likely to be applied. 
Dr Naidu asked the College for access to personal 
information held about him in relation to an application 
for admission to a specialist medical training course. 
The request was not responded to within the statutory 
time period and, when finally complied with, the 
information included a score sheet with codes allocated 
to summaries of a referee’s views about Dr Naidu’s 
application. These scores were not in a form he 
considered meaningful (for example, what the score was 
out of or whether it was weighted). 
The tribunal noted that paragraphs (c) and (d) of the 
Privacy Act’s section 42(1) require information to be 
made available in a “form which can be comprehended”. 
Considering the proper application of this section to the 
score results, the tribunal concluded that the College 
must provide “the key” which unlocks the information. 
The tribunal ordered the summary coding information 
be made available to Dr Naidu in a “meaningful” way, 
namely, “in a manner that is transparent, intelligible and 
easily accessible”.
To satisfy the requirements of current New Zealand 
law, then, it appears that it will not suffice to provide 
information about the decision in a manner that is 
incomprehensible to all but experts. Instead, means 
must be found to render these explanations sufficiently 
clear for the individual themselves, the public, and 
any authority with the power to review that decision. 
The challenge of how best to achieve this is one that 
agencies will need to take seriously; certainly, ideas like 
“explainable AI” will merit consideration. 
Equally important, though, will be ensuring that 
intellectual property rights and policies of suppliers 
do not hinder the agency’s ability to give proper 
explanations. As far as we are aware, this has not yet 
presented the sort of problem in New Zealand that 
manifested in the Loomis case. The algorithms used 
by government agencies here are either manufactured 
in-house or (as in the recent ACC example) bought 
from local firms who are willing to make the details of 
their algorithms available to the public. As algorithms 
become more commonly employed, though, this is a 
consideration that will need to be kept in mind.
Informational privacy
Privacy concerns are a near-ubiquitous feature of the 
“information age” as noted by the New Zealand Human 
Rights Commission (2018). In the specific context of AI 
algorithms, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression has written that:
“ AI-driven decision-making systems depend on the collection and exploitation of data, 
ranging from ambient, non-personal data 
to personally identifiable information, with 
the vast majority of data used to feed AI 
systems being somewhere in the middle 
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— data that are inferred or extracted from 
personal data, or personal data that have 
been anonymized (often imperfectly).” (UN 2018, [34])
The Privacy Act 1993 is the starting point for a regulatory 
response to the issues around data collection and 
re-purposing (see Section 4D). The Act regulates the 
collection, access, use, correction, storage and deletion 
of personal information, and provides that, in general, 
personal information may only be used for the purpose 
for which it is collected (Principle 10(1)). This reinforces 
the obligations of agencies to be very clear, at the point 
of information collection from an individual, about the 
purposes for which the personal information is to be 
used, and to ensure that consent for these purposes has 
been given (Principles 1-4). 
Unlike other jurisdictions, the New Zealand Privacy Act 
does not provide a means for “purpose setting”, not set 
out a standard for the specificity with which an agency 
must articulate the purpose or purposes for which 
information will be collected and used. However, the 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner generally construes 
collection and purpose provisions narrowly and has, for 
example, ruled unlawful a coercive collection that was 
not tied to a clear purpose (see, for example, Inquiry into 
Ministry of Social Development Collection of Individual 
Client Level Data from NGOs (2017). 
Unfortunately, given the nature of the technology at 
issue, the current regulatory regime is likely to prove 
unsatisfactory. While some concerns—such as those 
around inferential analytics—do not appear to have 
been considered in New Zealand at all, the application 
of existing laws to some of the other concerns we have 
mentioned is far from adequate.
For example, in relation to concerns about the re-
purposing of information without consent, the Act 
provides that an agency holding information may use the 
information for a different purpose from that for which it 
was collected where an agency “believes on reasonable 
grounds” that the information has been “used in a form 
in which the individual concerned is not identified”, or 
where the information “is used for statistical or research 
purposes and will not be published in a form that 
could reasonably be expected to identify the individual 
concerned” (Principle 10(1)(f)). Principle 11 also permits 
disclosure of personal information to third parties in 
limited circumstances. Principle 11(h) is on the same terms 
as 10(1)(f), creating authority for sharing anonymised data 
sets. Principle 11(b) permits disclosure if the “source of 
the information is publicly available information” and “in 
the circumstances of the case, it would not be unfair or 
unreasonable to disclose the information”.
There are a number of problems here in relation to 
machine learning and the training of artificial intelligence 
tools. For one thing, it is unclear what constitutes 
“reasonable grounds to believe” that the information will 
be used in a form which will not identify the individual. 
In some cases the technology to enable re-identification 
may not exist at the time the information is used, 
but may emerge later. Risks of re-identification have 
increased with greater sharing of anonymised data sets 
and improvements in data analytics, with commentators 
debating whether it is now possible to guarantee 
anonymity by de-identification (see e.g. Cavoukian & 
Castro (2014) and Narayanan & Felten (2014)). While 
some concerns may be overstated, the law is not settled.
A further legal difficulty is how the authority to re-
purpose information sits with the controller agency’s 
obligations not to keep information “for longer than is 
required for the purposes for which the information 
may lawfully be used” (Principle 9). Since anonymised 
information may lawfully be used for any purpose if 
the individual is not identifiable, the point at which 
the obligation to delete personal information arises 
is unclear. Authority to use personal information for 
“statistical and research purposes” holds so long as 
publication of the information is not “in a form that 
could reasonably be expected to identify the individual 
concerned”. The potential for discoveries of new uses 
for information combined with a “goldrush” approach 
to the potential of artificial intelligence creates strong 
commercial and other incentives for agencies to hold on 
to information as long as possible “just in case” they are 
able to use it for some other, potentially commercial or 
public benefit purpose in the future. Concerns with the 
inadequacy of current law in this area have prompted 
calls for a strengthened “right to be forgotten”, which 
would require deletion of personal information, including 
personal information used to train AI systems. 
Even where it is possible to identify a breach of an 
information privacy principle, this is not enough, in most 
cases, for a finding of interference with privacy under 
the Privacy Act. The legal test requires both breach of 
an information privacy principle and harm that meets 
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the relevant legal threshold. In the context of big data 
analytics and machine learning, questions arise as to 
whether the harm from data re-purposing (or as a result 
of breach of any other privacy principle) can meet the 
legal tests for harm in various regulatory standards and, 
if it does not, whether other ethical issues may arise. 
More research is needed in this area, including on how 
tests of harm here compare and contrast to tests of 
harm in other areas of the law, such as those concerning 
discrimination, transparency, and consumer protection.
Algorithmic data protection impact assessments, closely 
modelled on the existing privacy impact assessment 
tools, have been developed by a variety of researchers 
and institutions as a practical means of providing 
both transparency and a means of accountability 
where personal information is used (Wachter 2018). 
However, there are no universal standards for privacy 
impact assessments. In New Zealand, a large number 
of government agencies publish privacy or algorithmic 
impact assessments. In the light of concerns about 
inadequate application of information privacy laws to 
data analytics and increased use of data analytics by 
government agencies, the New Zealand Government 
Chief Data Steward and the Privacy Commissioner 
recently issued a set of six “Principles for safe and 
effective use of data and analytics”. The principles 
encourage agencies to: show clear public benefit; 
ensure data is fit for purpose; focus on people; maintain 
transparency; understand the limitations of analytics; and 
retain human oversight. The recent algorithm stocktake 
used these principles to assess algorithmic use, and 
found that some agencies have published information 
about algorithms they use. But the stocktake also 
concluded that many agencies do not comply with these 
principles, recommending that agencies consider making 
more detailed information available about the algorithms 
they use, including publication of operating code (which 
could enable technical peer review), and consulting with 
those likely to be affected by algorithmic use.
Regulators in New Zealand, Australia and the United 
Kingdom have warned of the perils of the current 
regulatory approach to information privacy concerns. In 
response, in 2016 the Australian Government proposed 
amending the Australian Privacy Act 1988 to create 
criminal offences and civil penalties as deterrents against 
attempts to re-identify personal information that has 
been published in anonymised form in government data 
sets. However, the Australian Bill is not yet law. 
The United Kingdom has recently introduced two new 
offences. The first is an offence to re-identify information 
which has been anonymized, the second to knowingly 
or recklessly using information that has been re-
identified unlawfully. The offences are subject to specific 
defences, including consent of the individual or the data 
controller, acted with reasonable belief of consent, for 
certain special purposes or where certain prescribed 
conditions for testing effectiveness, or notification to the 
Information Commissioner, are met (sections 171 and 172 
of the Data Protection Act 2018).
The New Zealand Law Commission identified the 
emerging issue of re-identification as one that would 
need to be addressed in reform of the New Zealand 
Privacy Act. No progress was made and in 2016 the 
Privacy Commissioner reported to the Minister of Justice 
that new controls on re-identification of personal 
information were needed including protection against 
risks that personal information might be unexpectedly 
identified from information that had allegedly been 
anonymised or de-identified for the purposes of sharing 
in data sets. The Commissioner has also recommended 
three new measures: controls on those who receive 
de-identified information to better protect the privacy 
of individuals; more stringent requirements on agencies 
to take adequate steps to de-identify information 
before using or publishing it; and introduction of a new 
privacy principle conferring a right to erasure of personal 
information (the so-called “right to be forgotten”).
A Privacy Bill introduced to Parliament in 2018 
neither amends existing provisions nor introduces 
new provisions addressing these concerns. A number 
of submissions to the Bill have called for reforms, 
including new provisions prohibiting re-identification 
and prohibition on use of de-identified personal 
information of the kind we have mentioned. In March 
2019 the Bill was reported back to the House, with no 
substantive amendments with respect to privacy issues 
we have highlighted such as transparency, the right to 
an explanation, right to erasure and re-identification 
protections.
The Ministry of Justice report on the Bill to the Select 
Committee summarised submissions about automated 
decision-making and the GDPR indicating that the 
majority of submissions favoured new and stronger 
privacy protections, but concluded:
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“ The new rights in the GDPR raise interesting issues, including whether 
having a human involved as a check at 
the end of an automated process is an 
effective protection—some people think 
that humans tend to defer to the algorithm 
in that situation. “Explainable AI” is also a 
developing field and some people think 
that putting the burden on the affected 
individual to raise concerns about an 
algorithm is not realistic, and instead favour 
systems of algorithmic auditing. These 
issues require further consideration. We do 
not recommend any change to the Bill.”
Many of the issues were deferred, slated instead for 
“future work on privacy reform” and deferred pending 
further policy analysis and consultation.
The Bill did, however, introduce some tightened 
requirements for transparency in collection of personal 
information, including from children and young people. 
Clause 18 introduces a new requirement for the Privacy 
Commissioner, in carrying out any of his or her functions, 
“to take account of cultural perspectives on privacy”. 
This new requirement may also strengthen protection 
for taking account of te ao Māori perspectives on privacy 
issues with algorithms and other automated decision-
making technologies.
Taking rights seriously in the AI era
Rights around accuracy, privacy, transparency and 
freedom from discrimination already exist in New 
Zealand law, and all are likely to have important roles in 
the context of predictive algorithms. The possibility of 
strengthening or fine-tuning these rights so that they 
better respond to this technology is certainly worthy 
of consideration, and it will be worthwhile to keep a 
watchful eye on international initiatives such as the 
GDPR for comparison. 
As the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression 
and opinion reported in late 2018, there are a number 
of steps that governments can take when procuring or 
deploying algorithms to ensure they act consistently with 
human rights instruments. These include undertaking 
human rights impact assessments, an approach we 
consider later in this chapter. The Rapporteur also makes 
the important observation that, to ensure ongoing 
compliance, these systems “should be subject to regular 
audits by external, independent experts” (UN 2018, [62]).
Such “top-down” scrutiny is likely to be necessary if 
human rights obligations are to be taken seriously. 
Leaving it to affected individuals to enforce their rights 
of privacy or against discrimination is unlikely to be an 
adequate method of ensuring compliance, not least 
because, as Virginia Eubanks has pointed out, many of 
those affected by algorithmic decisions “don’t know that 
they are being targeted or don’t have the energy or 
expertise to push back when they are” (Eubanks 2017, 
p. 6). On a similar note, Edwards and Veale (2017) have 
cautioned that “Individuals are mostly too time-poor, 
resource-poor, and lacking in the necessary expertise to 
meaningfully make use of these individual rights”. 
Edwards and Veale also warn against approaches that 
“rely too much on individual rights for what are too often 
group harms”. These are concerns worth taking seriously. 
Those at the “sharp end” of algorithmic decisions will 
often not be well placed to interrogate the basis for 
those decisions, less still to challenge them. And where 
they are able to do so, their concern will typically (and 
understandably) be directed at how those decisions 
affected themselves and their families. Determine whether 
algorithms are impacting differentially on different groups 
will typically require a “wide angle” perspective that it may 
be unrealistic to expect from affected individuals. 
We are also aware that concerns about indigenous 
rights and data sovereignty in relation to new forms of 
data collection and use have emerged, as Kukutai and 
Taylor note:
“ While indigenous peoples have long claimed sovereign status over their lands 
and territories, debates about “data 
sovereignty” have been dominated by 
national governments and multinational 
corporations focused on issues of 
legal jurisdiction. Missing from those 
conversations have been the inherent 
and inalienable rights and interests 
of indigenous peoples relating to the 
collection, ownership and application of 
data about their people, lifeways and 
territories.”
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Kesserwan (2018) notes that in the Canadian context 
discussion of AI could be assisted by indigenous 
concepts of what is human, including “what has spirit”. 
Such concepts, she suggests, offer another way of 
conceptualising artificially intelligent personhood and 
might assist discussion of issues such as whether 
humans should have obligations of inter-generational 
stewardship in respect of AI. 
We mention these as examples of how and why more 
research on the diversity of rights issues raised by 
algorithms, beyond individual rights, may be important 
and useful. With that in mind, we now turn to the next 
class of potential regulatory responses to the concerns 
around predictive algorithms.
B. Regulatory agencies
Legislation is only one of the tools available to address 
the concerns around algorithms. Regulatory bodies or 
agencies might also have an important role to play. Suzy 
Frankel and John Yeabsley have written of “a strong 
New Zealand tradition in establishing independent 
agencies at arm’s length from the government” (Frankel 
& Yeabsley 2011, p. 6). It is to this part of the regulatory 
terrain that we now turn.
The 2017 Government Expectations for Good Regulatory 
Practice describe a “regulatory agency” as 
“ any agency (other than courts, tribunals and other independent appeal 
bodies) that has any of the following 
responsibilities for the whole or part of a 
regulatory system: monitoring; evaluation; 
performance reporting; policy advice; 
policy and operational design; legislative 
design; implementation; administration; 
information provision; standard-setting; 
licensing and approvals; or compliance and 
enforcement.” (NZ GOVERNMENT 2017)
Regulatory agencies come in a wide variety of forms, 
and have a wide array of remits and responsibilities. 
As with legislation, they could be specific to a 
particular technology or family of technologies (ACART, 
for example, exists to formulate policy for assisted 
reproductive technologies). Or they could be fashioned 
with a particular policy objective or value in mind (the 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner and the Human 
Rights Commission focus respectively on privacy and 
human rights issues, across a wide array of contexts).
Regulatory agencies can also be constructed with a wide 
array of powers. Some have compulsory inspectorate 
functions, others are able to hand out penalties and 
sanctions. Some can construct rules, while others exist 
to enforce or monitor compliance with rules constructed 
by others. Often, they will operate at a “softer” level, for 
example, in issuing best practice guidelines or codes 
of practice, or simply giving advice when requested. 
(ECART sometimes gives non-binding advice to fertility 
clinics in response to queries concerning ethical issues.) 
Which of these models would be best suited for the 
context of predictive algorithms is obviously going to be 
an important consideration.
In this section, we will examine some of these. We 
begin, though, by examining the suggested advantages 
of such an approach.
Advantages
In a 2016 article considering regulatory options for AI 
systems, Matthew Scherer set out some of the possible 
advantages of regulatory agencies over legislatures 
or courts when it comes to responding to emerging 
technologies.
• Agencies can be tailor-made for the regulation of a 
specific industry or for the resolution of a particular 
social problem. Policymakers in agencies can be 
experts with a background in the relevant field rather 
than the generalists that fill the ranks of courts and 
legislatures.
• They need not be bound by rules that restrict courts 
from conducting independent factual investigations 
and from making policy decisions based on broad 
social considerations rather than the facts of 
the specific case in front of them. 
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The idea of a regulatory agency with the requisite 
expertise in this area is obviously attractive. ACART 
may serve as a useful model here. Section 34(4) of the 
Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 
requires that the Committee must include:
(a) one or more members with expertise in assisted 
reproductive procedures; 
(b) one or more members with expertise in human 
reproductive research; 
(c) one or more members with expertise in ethics; 
(d) one or more Māori members with expertise in Māori 
customary values and practice and the ability to 
articulate issues from a Māori perspective; 
(e)  one or more members with the ability to articulate 
issues from a consumer perspective; 
(f)  one or more members with expertise in relevant 
areas of the law; and
(g)  one or more members with the ability to 
articulate the interests of children.
What an analogous range of expertise look like for 
predictive algorithms is a topic that could merit further 
consultation, but on the face of it, expertise in computer 
science,  data analytics, law and ethics seem like obvious 
inclusions. But some degree of input from those most 
likely to be adversely affected by algorithmic decisions 
would be vital. Given the extent of disproportionate Māori 
representation in some of the areas we have considered, 
a member who is well placed to speak of those 
experiences would be indispensable. A requirement 
for the agency to take account of cultural perspectives 
when carrying out its work would also strengthen likely 
engagement with the diversity of communities that may 
be affected by use of predictive algorithms.
Scherer’s second point is that regulatory bodies 
can be proactive rather than merely reactive. They 
could be empowered to take steps without the 
necessity of someone already having been harmed or 
disadvantaged. Furthermore, their decisions could be 
more broad ranging than the facts of the case before 
them, a limitation that significantly restricts the effect 
of court decisions. The point about courts is echoed 
by Frankel and Yeabsley (2011), who point out that 
regulating through court decisions is unlikely to be well 
suited to a small country like New Zealand, which will 
typically not have many test cases.
Of course, it is true that legislatures are also free to make 
rules in an “upstream” regulatory phase, and they are 
not confined to any particular set of facts. It is almost a 
cliché in emerging technology regulation, though, that 
the process of legislative reform is too slow to respond 
to fast-changing technologies. While major questions of 
policy should properly be dealt with at that level, a range 
of more detailed decisions could better be handled by 
more agile regulatory mechanisms.
As Scherer acknowledged, regulatory bodies or agencies 
might also have certain disadvantages, not least—relative 
to legislators—the lack of accountability to the public. 
Nonetheless, “In the context of AI”, he concluded, “this 
makes agencies well-positioned to determine the 
substantive content of regulatory policies” (Scherer 2016).
Regulatory approaches in other 
jurisdictions
A review of regulatory approaches to AI in other 
jurisdictions reveals a very diverse approach. By 
December 2018, 26 countries (including the European 
Commission) had developed some form of national 
AI strategy or undertaken a national assessment of 
AI implications including France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, Japan, China, Russia, Kenya, India, South 
Korea, Sweden, the United States of America and 
Singapore. The number of such strategies is rapidly 
increasing, but no country has yet regulated AI in 
general. In this section we give a brief overview of some 
of the approaches, particularly in relation to creating 
new regulatory bodies. 
In 2017, only seven countries had national AI strategies, 
whereas by the end of 2018, this number had jumped to 
26, including some multi-lateral strategies. Most strategies 
focus on adoption and promotion, with ethical and social 
implications the subject of research and consultation 
rather than specific policies or regulation. Most were 
developed by, or propose, expert bodies of various 
kinds, such as steering groups, research institutions, 
public/private think tanks, task forces, consortiums or 
multi-stakeholder advisory groups. The functions of 
these various bodies varies widely: from research, to 
development, economic impacts, skills and training, 
increasing scientific talent, and social implications.
A significant number of strategies propose the 
establishment of some kind of centre for AI, for example, 
Finland has established the Finnish Centre for AI which 
is a partnership between Aalto and Helsinki universities 
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with the goals of increasing AI research, skills and 
industry collaboration. Most of these kinds of centres 
are not focused on regulatory issues. Some countries 
have established mechanisms to carry out research 
or to examine particular issues. India, for example, 
developed a national strategy focused on scientific with 
Centres of Research Excellence in AI and creating AI 
applications of social importance. Germany, in addition 
to a comprehensive strategy for AI development, has 
established a commission to inquire into “Artificial 
Intelligence: Social Responsibility and Economic 
Potential” similar to a previous commission that had 
examined the ethics of autonomous vehicles.
Another trend is the establishment of ethics councils, 
or similar groups. For example, in June 2018 Singapore 
announced a number of new AI initiatives including a 
new Advisory Council on the Ethical Use of AI and Data. 
The function of the Council is to assist development of 
standards and governance frameworks for data use and 
ethics for the use of AI. 
Some strategies are more comprehensive than others, 
and China has the most comprehensive national 
strategy, the New Generation Artificial Intelligence 
Development Plan (2017). The plan is unique for the 
breadth of its vision to create new theoretical models for 
AI and to develop intelligent AI infrastructure on which a 
variety of AI related services can be deployed. The plan 
proposes to develop these over three phases: develop AI 
to be alongside competitors by 2020; be world leaders 
in some fields by 2025; and by the primary global centre 
for AI innovation by 2030. 
In France, the national initiative draws on the report For 
Meaningful Artificial Intelligence: Towards a French and 
European Strategy (Villani 2018) and was announced 
by President Macron in December 2018. The national 
strategy aims to address four challenges: building the 
AI workforce including research capability, creating open 
data policies to encourage adoption of AI technologies, 
creating a regulatory and financial framework to support 
development of “AI champions” (for example in the 
area of driverless cars) and, development of ethics to 
prevent discrimination or other arbitrary treatment. 
While President Macron’s announcement of the national 
strategy (and associated 1.5 billion Euros funding 
package) mentioned regulation a number of times, no 
new regulatory bodies were announced and it remains 
to be seen whether any will emerge. However, the 
strategy includes the creation of an international panel 
of experts in artificial intelligence based on the model 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
The panel’s aim will be to organise independent global 
expertise, with an initial focus on issues of transparency 
and fair use.
In late 2018 Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada 
announced new policy and regulatory proposals. Given 
the legal and other similarities between these two 
countries and New Zealand, we have taken a closer look 
at these developments for the purposes of considering 
the options for regulatory approaches in New Zealand.
The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has a national AI strategy in the 
form of the AI Sector Deal, part of a larger initiative in 
UK industrial and economic policy. The UK House of 
Lords Select Committee also conducted a significant 
review of AI and its report, AI in the UK: Ready, Willing 
and Able? reviewing the economic, social and ethnical 
aspects of AI technologies and contained a range of 
recommendations. In addition, early work was done to 
map the roles of different existing UK regulatory bodies 
in order to determine whether to regulate and, if so, 
how might be best. For example, the role and powers 
of the Information Commissioner’s Office and the CCTV 
Commissioner were considered along with other options. 
Ultimately, the government determined that a new body 
was needed, a decision which appeared to have broad, 
if not universal, support.
The UK Government Office for Artificial Intelligence 
(“OAI”) was established in April 2018. While still 
developing its work programme, the OAI has a strong 
initial focus on promotion and adoption of AI across 
government. The mission of the OAI is to drive adoption 
of AI and its use to develop new services and uptake 
of related technologies. The OAI had already identified 
some barriers to adoption, particularly for small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) such as lack of access 
to data to use to develop AI services and SMEs being 
unaware of business models and how to calculate 
returns on investment. Tool kits and other resources to 
assist SMEs are planned. The Office is also monitoring 
whether there were any legislative barriers to adoption 
and working with others on innovative responses. For 
example, in response to concerns about intellectual 
property laws restricting access to data, the Open Data 
Initiative was establishing Data Trusts, where data could 
be shared.
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The OAI work programme is still developing and 
workstreams include a proposed AI review, data, skills and 
adoption. The government AI review will comprise an audit 
of AI use (rather than a stocktake which has been done 
in New Zealand). The aims of the audit are to provide 
baseline information about existing of AI use, enable 
assessment of opportunities for AI adoption and to show 
that it is safe to use AI. Other areas of work for the OAI 
include a proposed procurement policy and a survey of 
the government’s 3,000 data scientists to elicit potential 
areas for testing and deployment of AI related services. 
The UK Government has recently established a new 
Interim Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (“CDEI”). 
The Centre is still nascent, with a Ministerial consultation 
about its role starting in November 2018. The CDEI was 
set up with the support of the British Prime Minister, 
partly in response to public concerns about AI.
The CDEI is currently hosted in the Department of 
Culture, Media and Sport and aims to be a statutory 
body in the next 2-3 years if it is clear there are 
insufficient regulatory measures and a statutory body is 
needed, for example, for education or other purposes. 
CDEI is reviewing in more detail the current gaps in 
regulation and possible levers for regulation and will 
assess evidence and may propose regulation where 
it thinks this is needed. Eventually, CDEI will be an 
independent advisory body, rather than a regulator 
although it may advise about the need for regulation 
in a particular area or alternatively about regulations 
that are perceived as barriers to innovation. CDEI’s main 
functions are to:
(i) analyse and anticipate—horizon scanning, looking for 
opportunities and risks; 
(ii) deep dive into particular issues—initially at the 
issue of bias and micro-targeting and the harms it 
might have in particular domains (e.g. advertising 
promoting gambling to individuals at risk of 
addiction); and
(iii) bring people together—helping to develop networks 
involving government, commerce and diverse other 
groups.
The role of CDEI does not include developing ethical 
standards. Despite the likely lack of regulatory powers, 
CDEI do have some powers, for example to request 
information from agencies and give advice. In addition, 
insofar as regulation might be considered, our research 
meetings in the United Kingdom, revealed that there 
was more of an appetite for AI regulation in the UK than 
previously and some considered regulation sector-by-
sector would be preferable, as some sectors were more 
advanced in deployment of AI than others.
Australia
The Australian Human Rights Commission (“AHRC”) is 
currently investigating human rights and technology. 
In July 2018, the AHRC released a discussion paper 
asking, among other things, whether “Australia needs a 
better system of governance to harness the benefits of 
innovation using AI and other new technologies while 
effectively addressing threats to our human rights”. The 
AHRC has also established an advisory group to assist its 
work in this area. 
In early 2019 the AHRC and World Economic Forum 
released a white paper Artificial Governance and 
Leadership seeking feedback on which its proposal 
for governance of AI by a new body, a “Responsible 
Innovation Office”. The AHRC made the proposal in 
response to consistent feedback that a new regulatory 
body was needed in relation to new technologies, 
developing a “straw” proposal for comment which, 
it says, is “unlike traditional oversight or compliance 
bodies”. 
Specifically in relation to AI, the AHRC suggests a range 
of functions the new body could carry out. For example, 
the proposed body would need to “establish a normative 
framework for the development and deployment 
of AI”, have an inclusive governance structure 
(including participation by those most affected by new 
technologies), focus on AI in government and the private 
sector, and have a wide remit, for example to examine 
big data sets and related issues (such as ensuring 
collection and ownership of data sets was democratic). 
The paper recommends the body have both coercive 
and non-coercive powers, the ability to develop 
standards, a certification scheme for human rights 
compliant AI development, and power to investigate 
complaints. In addition, the proposed body would 
evaluate data sets, promote open data standards, build 
a repository of best practice for stakeholder consultation 
and engagement, and write and publish ethical codes of 
practice drawing on those developed elsewhere.
66
The white paper is seeking comment on: 
• the nature and scope of the challenge for human 
rights protection posed by the rise of AI; 
•  whether Australia needs a new or existing 
organisation to lead in the promotion of responsible 
innovation in AI; and if so, 
•  what might be the aims, functions and roles of such 
an organisation.
As we noted in Section 4F, the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (“ACCC”) is also looking 
at consumer concerns about the impact of online 
search engines, social media, and digital platforms on 
competition in the advertising and media markets. The 
ACCC has identified a range of functions that a new 
regulatory body could perform, such as monitoring, 
investigating and reporting on discriminatory and 
anti-competitive conduct, and providing assurances 
to consumers, government and businesses on the 
performance and impact of algorithms and policies. 
The issues being examined by the AHRC and ACCC reach 
much further than the remit of our research, which 
is focused more narrowly on artificial intelligence. In 
addition, some of the functions proposed by the ACCC 
(such as complaints about harmful online content) are 
already being performed in New Zealand by NetSafe, 
the Approved Agency for the purposes of the Harmful 
Digital Communications Act. The ACCC’s final report is 
due to be released in mid-2019.
Canada
During 2018 the Canadian government developed a 
directive to federal government agencies on automated 
decision systems with applies to automated decision 
systems developed or procured after 1 April 2020. The 
directive is intended to be a guide for government 
agencies and its expected results are that:
a) Decisions made by federal government departments 
are data driven, responsible and comply with 
procedural fairness and due process requirements;
b) Impacts of algorithms on administrative decisions are 
assessed and negative outcomes, when encountered, 
are reduced;
c) Data and information on the use of automated 
decision systems are made available to the public, 
where appropriate
The directive applies to systems which provide external 
services, and to an “system, tool, or statistical models 
used to recommend or make an administrative decision 
about a client”. The directive applies only to systems in 
production, not those in test environments, nor to any 
national security systems. The directive imposes five 
main requirements on those developing automated 
decision systems, namely:
a) Completion and publication of an algorithmic impact 
assessment (including any update that affects the 
initial assessment)
b) Transparency (including prominent, plain English 
notices that an automated decision system is in 
use, providing meaningful explanations of decisions, 
access to software components for review and audit 
and release of source code);
c) Quality assurance (including testing and monitoring, 
of outcomes and data quality, peer review, employee 
training, contingency systems, legal compliance and 
retention of human oversight);
d) Access to recourse, or remedy, for a client to 
challenge a decision;
e) Reporting by publishing information about the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the system. 
The directive sets out definitions to assess the impact 
levels, together with detailed requirements for how each 
impact level should be addressed for each of the five 
areas. Decision levels range from those with an impact 
that is reversible and brief, to reversible and short-term, 
difficult to reverse and ongoing and (at the highest 
level) impacts with are irreversible and perpetual. The 
government has also established a website where more 
detail is provided about how to implement the directive, 
including the different expertise that should be included 
during design/ build and deployment/operational phases.
As a guide to assist government agencies the directive is 
a useful step and has been welcomed as a standard that 
the private sector could emulate. The directive appears 
to be a regulatory tool implemented within existing 
Canadian public sector laws and policies, including 
accountability systems, rather than a statutory tool 
accompanied by a new model of regulatory oversight.
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A pharmaceutical model
An existing instance that has recently attracted some 
interest as a possible model for AI and algorithms is 
the pharmaceutical industry. Although specifics vary 
between jurisdictions, most countries have some sort of 
regulatory agency in place.
The suitability of this model has been advocated by 
several writers. Coravos et al. (2019) pose the following 
question: 
“ For decades, pharma and biotech companies have tested drugs through 
meticulously fine-tuned clinical trials. Why 
not take some of those best practices 
and use them to create algorithms that 
are safer, more effective, and even more 
ethical?”
Coravos and colleagues are sceptical of the notion 
of a single AI regulator that could operate across all 
disciplines and use cases. Instead, they suggest that 
“oversight can and should be tailored to each field of 
application” (Coravos et al. 2019). The field of healthcare, 
they claim, would be one field “already well positioned 
to regulate the algorithms within its field”. Writing in 
a US context, they offer the Federal Drug Agency as a 
potential model, while “[o]ther industries with regulatory 
bodies, such as education and finance, could also be 
responsible for articulating best practices through 
guidance or even formal regulation” (Coravos et al. 2019).
How would such an agency function? In an article that 
also made the case for an FDA-based model, Andrew 
Tutt considered a range of possible functions. These 
occupy a range of places on a scale from “light-touch” to 
“hard-edged”. The agency could:
• act as a standards-setting body that coordinates and 
develops classifications, design standards, and best 
practices;
• classify algorithms into types based on their 
predictability, explainability, and general intelligence, 
but only subject the most opaque, complex, and 
dangerous types to regulatory scrutiny—thereby 
leaving untouched the vast majority of algorithms 
with relatively deterministic and predictable outputs 
(Tutt 2017, p. 107);
• establish guidance for design, testing, and 
performance to ensure that algorithms are 
developed with adequate margins of safety—that 
guidance, in turn, could be based on knowledge of 
an algorithm’s expected use, types of critical versus 
acceptable errors it might make, and the suggested 
predicted legal standard to apply to accidents 
involving that algorithm (Tutt 2017, p. 108);
• promulgate guidance for developing algorithms that 
meet satisfactory standards of predictability and 
explainability (Tutt 2017, p. 109);
• require that technical details be disclosed, potentially 
pre-empting state-level trade secret protections in 
the name of public safety; and
• require that certain algorithms slated for use in 
certain applications receive approval from the agency 
before deployment.
The last of these suggestions would, on Tutt’s analysis, 
be restricted for the most “opaque, complex and 
dangerous” uses. It could “provide an opportunity for the 
agency to require that companies substantiate the safety 
performance of their algorithms”. Tutt also suggests 
that pre-market approval could be subject to usage 
restrictions. “Off-label use of an algorithm, or marketing 
an unapproved algorithm, could then be subject to legal 
sanctions”.
Tutt’s suggestion of a use-based approval system has 
much to recommend it. Regulation pitched at the level 
of particular algorithms seems likely to overlook the 
fact that these are in many cases highly flexible tools. 
An algorithm approved for an innocuous use could be 
repurposed for a much more sensitive or dangerous one. 
The regulation of pharmaceutical substances in New 
Zealand falls under the Medicines Act 1981, and the New 
Zealand Medicines and Medical Devices Safety Authority 
(Medsafe). They are subject to pre-market approval, 
which sees them assessed for safety, quality and efficacy. 
Before they can be advertised or supplied, consent 
must be granted from the Minister of Health. In addition, 
post-market mechanisms exist to enable medicines to 
be removed from use if they are found to be unsafe 
or ineffective. Manufacturers and importers are also 
legally required “to report any substantial adverse events 
arising from the use (in New Zealand or overseas) of a 
medicine” (Medsafe website).
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A regulatory scheme that is similar in several ways exists 
for the management of hazardous substances. These 
are regulated under the Hazardous Substances and 
New Organisms Act 1996 (“HSNOA”), various related 
regulations, and the Environmental Protection Agency. 
The HSNOA creates a Hazard Classification System 
(section 74 (a)), which classifies substances according 
to various hazardous properties: for example, 
explosiveness, flammability and toxicity. If a substance 
falls below certain minimum levels for these properties, 
it falls outside the regulatory scheme. Those substances 
that reach the minimum hazard levels require 
regulatory approval before they can be imported into or 
manufactured in New Zealand. Hazardous substances 
can also be subject to a range of different “performance 
requirements”, depending on the extent of hazards they 
pose. These can relate to a range of matters, including 
minimum degrees of hazard, packaging and disposal. As 
with the medicines scheme, mechanisms exist for post-
market regulation.
“Trusted third party”
A more “light-touch” role for a specialist agency has 
been proposed by researchers at the highly influential 
Oxford Internet Institute. Recognising that a challenge 
to transparency arises from “sensitivity of trade secrets 
and intellectual property rights”, they suggest that a 
“solution would allow for examination of automated 
decision-making systems, including the rationale and 
circumstances of specific decisions, by a trusted third 
party”. This role could be discharged by expanding 
the powers of an existing supervisory authority, or by 
creating a new (European) regulator specifically for this 
purpose (e.g. see Wachter et al. 2017b, pp. 43-44).
Regulatory phase
Proposals for new regulators have not met with universal 
approval in the wider area of AI. This scepticism has 
taken a number of forms. For some, the issue is one of 
what Brownsword calls “regulatory phase”. Simply put, 
the time for such regulation has not yet arrived. 
Chris Reed is one commentator who has expressed this 
sort of regulatory scepticism. In his view:
“ any regulatory body needs a defined field of operation, and a set of overriding 
principles on the basis of which it will 
devise and apply regulation. Those 
principles will be based on mitigating 
the risks to society which the regulated 
activity creates. Until the risks of AI are 
known, at least to some degree, this is not 
achievable.” (REED 2018, P. 2)
It is not entirely clear why a detailed list of risks posed 
by a new technology would need be known before 
a regulator can act effectively. In as much as this 
argument has merit, though, it seems to apply to AI in 
the wider sense. The distinct subset with which we are 
concerned—predictive algorithms, particularly as used 
by government—does plausibly pose a range of known 
risks, as we have outlined in Chapter 4. That this list may 
not be exhaustive should not detract from their viability 
as a regulatory target.
Relations with other regulatory agencies
Another reason for scepticism about the creation of 
a new regulator is that a variety of regulators already 
exist, whose remit is likely to overlap with the new body. 
This sort of consideration led the House of Lords Select 
Committee on AI to conclude that 
“ existing sector-specific regulators are best placed to consider the impact on their 
sectors of any subsequent regulation which 
may be needed (House of Lords Select 
Committee on Artificial Intelligence.” (2018, [386])
In a New Zealand context, this would be likely to involve 
at least the Office of the Privacy Commissioner and the 
Human Rights Commission. It may well also overlap with 
the role of Stats NZ.
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In our prelude to discussing legislative provisions, we 
identified a number of desiderata for regulation of 
AI regulation. One of these, parsimony, includes the 
following aims: 
• existing laws that cover an identified problem should 
be maximally utilised before new laws are proposed;
• overlapping laws and regimes should be avoided 
where possible.
There is reason to believe that these are also valid 
considerations with regard to regulatory agencies. 
Indeed, in its Expectations for Good Regulatory Practice, 
the New Zealand Government has explicitly noted that 
regulatory systems should be “well-aligned with existing 
requirements in related or supporting regulatory systems 
through minimising unintended gaps or overlaps 
and inconsistent or duplicative requirements” (NZ 
Government 2017, p. 2). To this effect, all regulatory 
agencies should
develop working relationships with other regulatory 
agencies within the same or related regulatory systems 
to share intelligence and co-ordinate activities to help 
manage regulatory gaps or overlaps, minimise the 
regulatory burden on regulated parties, and maximise 
the effective use of scarce regulator resources (NZ 
Government 2017, p. 5).
Could the function of supervising and regulating 
predictive algorithms in government be discharged by 
these existing agencies? We consider that there would 
be a number of obstacles to this approach. 
(i) Diffuseness: a government agency intending to use 
a new algorithm or to put an algorithm to a new use 
would be required to liaise with all of these separate 
bodies. 
(ii) Capacity: as the Lords Select Committee noted, 
asking existing regulators to assume the burden 
of monitoring algorithms could place a substantial 
additional burden on them (2018, [386]).
(iii) Expertise: it is not clear that any of the existing 
regulators currently possess expertise sufficient to 
allow them to scrutinise an algorithm in the manner 
that would be needed to evaluate or confirm its 
accuracy, or check it for bias. This is no criticism of 
these agencies; this is, after all, a fair way from their 
current function.
For these reasons, we believe that a strong case can be 
made for the creation of a specialist regulator to address 
predictive algorithms in government. It should be kept 
in mind, though, that such a regulator need not be 
“scratch-built”. It may be possible to entrust these new 
regulatory functions to an existing body or agency. For 
example, the Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015 
provided for the establishment of an “approved agency” 
to act as a first stop for complaints. Rather than create 
this agency de novo, the role was given to Netsafe, an 
“independent, non-profit online safety organisation”. 
While we make no specific recommendation in this 
respect, we note that vesting this role with an existing 
agency (presumably with a commensurate increase in 
resources) is an option to be kept in mind. In any event, 
we strongly suggest that the potential for collaboration 
between that new regulator and the existing bodies we 
have identified should be explored and pursued.
Further thoughts on regulatory agencies
Regulatory agencies have often formed part of the 
overall regulatory landscape for new and emerging 
technologies. They are widely considered to offer a 
range of advantages, including expertise, and the 
capacity to respond relatively quickly to unexpected 
developments. On the other hand, they lack the 
accountability of an elected legislature. Mechanisms exist 
to mitigate this potential accountability gap, including 
restricting the range of decisions such an agency can 
make, and a requirement to consult prior to making 
policy decisions.
Agencies come in a wide variety of forms. At the 
lightest touch end of the spectrum, their role will be 
confined to issuing best practice guidelines and codes 
of practice, and to responding to requests for expert 
advice. The importance of such functions should not 
be underestimated and the presence of such guidance 
can play an important role in promoting safe and ethical 
practice.
One possible role for such an agency in New Zealand 
would be in providing a pre-implementation “safety 
check” for government use of predictive algorithms. For 
example, technical experts could validate their accuracy 
and transparency, while legal and ethical members 
would consider potential human rights or privacy 
breaches. This could be carried out prior to using a 
new product, or to employing an existing product for a 
new purpose. Although deciding whether the product 
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purpose was sufficiently “new” to merit a separate 
check could itself be a matter of contention, this is not 
unique to this context (for a discussion of the regulatory 
challenge around classifying nanomaterials as “new” 
material, see Gavaghan and Moore 2011).
An important consideration with the “safety check” 
model is the requirement for regular follow-ups. As with 
many other new technologies, ostensibly innocuous 
uses of predictive algorithms could have unexpectedly 
adverse consequences, that may not become apparent 
for months or years. A regular “warrant of fitness” may 
mitigate against this concern.
Finally, a relatively light-touch regulator could act as 
a trusted third party, in the manner suggested by 
Wachter and colleagues at the OII. We note, though, 
that if government agencies continue to avoid using 
algorithms where intellectual property might conflict with 
transparency, this is not a function that would be required.
Regulatory bodies with harder edged remits might 
be able to demand that algorithms are submitted 
for “safety checks”. We have considered two models 
that already exist in New Zealand, in the context of, 
respectively, medicines and hazardous substances. 
Both make provision for a process of consents and 
conditions prior to importing or marketing. Some readers 
may question the extent to which these models are 
particularly relevant to the context of algorithms. The 
dangers from medicines and hazardous substances 
may seem to be of a different order to those posed by 
predictive algorithms, such that any analogous system 
of pre-market approval could seem excessive. On the 
other hand, while the harms caused by use of biased 
or inaccurate algorithms may not be as immediately 
obvious as those caused by unsafe medicines or 
flammable or toxic substances, they could be very 
substantial. When decisions relate to detention or 
release of prisoners, for example, or removing children 
from their families, the stakes are high.
Perhaps there is something to be said for a HSNOA-
type model, whereby the first level of evaluation is to 
determine whether a substance (or in our context, an 
algorithm) presents new risks that reach a minimum 
threshold. The extent of regulatory scrutiny thereafter 
will depend on the outcome of that first evaluation. 
This would tally with Tutt’s suggestion that “only subject 
the most opaque, complex, and dangerous types” of 
algorithms should be subject to regulatory scrutiny (Tutt 
2017, p. 107). How that first level of “pre-regulatory” 
evaluation could be conducted is something to which 
we return in the next section.
Another question arises as to whether this should apply 
only to new products and purposes, or whether those 
predictive algorithms that are already in use should 
also be within scope. Given the fairly small number of 
algorithms identified in the government’s Algorithm 
Assessment Report, we note that extending this power 
to those already in use may not be especially onerous 
for the new agency at this stage. It may also be that 
most or all of the algorithms currently in use would 
satisfy the first stage of pre-regulatory evaluation.
If it is decided to create or empower a regulatory agency 
with anything but the softest of edges, consideration will 
need to be given to its capacity to ensure its decisions 
are followed. As has been pointed out in relation to 
another emerging technology:
“ it should be borne in mind that even the most comprehensive regulatory framework 
will be an ineffective safeguard of public 
health if no effective mechanism exists to 
monitor and enforce compliance with it. 
This is what we identified as a third level 
regulatory gap.” (GAVAGHAN & MOORE 2011)
This may involve provision for post-deployment 
monitoring.
C. Self-regulatory models
The creation and deployment of self-checking 
frameworks within agencies may have a valuable role to 
play, though we believe that this would be in conjunction 
with rather than as an alternative to independent 
regulatory oversight. We have already considered one 
overseas example earlier in the report: the ALGO-CARE 
framework used by Durham Constabulary alongside 
the HART tool (see Section 2B). But New Zealand 




The Privacy, Human Rights and Ethics Framework 
(“PHRaE”) was developed by the Ministry of Social 
Development (“MSD”) in conjunction with Professor 
Tim Dare from Auckland University. It is a questionnaire 
designed to aid project teams within the MSD 
developing and deploying new algorithmic tools 
intended to support operational decision-making. 
The PHRaE is interactive, requesting information from 
developers depending on details of the deployment 
and design of the tool under development. The MSD 
describes it as: 
“ …a structured way of asking the right questions to make sure that we take into 
account privacy, human rights, and ethics 
from the very beginning of designing 
new services that are using personal 
information. This enables PHRaE risks to 
be designed out rather than risk being a 
barrier to implementation (or having to be 
accepted).”
The areas covered in the framework are: 
• The intention behind any new use of data or the 
development of a new algorithm;
• The likely benefits and harms and to whom they 
would accrue;
• Whether the new use of personal information is 
necessary;
• Legal restrictions on the use of information already 
held by the MSD;
• Whether personal information would be used for the 
purpose for which it was collected;
• How and from whom new information would be 
collected;
• Design to ensure information is kept safe;
• Ensuring information used to make decisions is 
accurate;
• Whether people would be able to access their 
information;
• Whether the initiative would discriminate against 
some people;
• How this new use of information would be 
communicated to data subjects; and
• Whether personal information would be shared with 
others and if so why.
The interactive PHRaE tool is extremely detailed, 
requiring considerable research and analysis from 
developers as they progress through the design process. 
It also contains excellent resources explaining complex 
principles and technical and philosophical ideas required 
to assess the privacy, human rights, and ethical impact 
of new uses of data. 
Evaluation
The Algorithm Assessment Report describes the PHRaE 
as an example of “good practice” in meeting the 
requirement that those deploying data and analytics 
be aware of the limitations of such tools set out in 
the Principles for Safe and Effective use of Data and 
Analytics (Stats NZ 2018, p. 29). We agree and note 
that it will help developers of predictive algorithms for 
government use meet all the Principles: 
• Delivering clear public benefit;
• Maintaining transparency;
• Understanding limitations of various forms of data 
use;
• Retaining human oversight;
• Ensuring data is fit for purpose; and
• Focusing on people.
In assessing the PHRaE and other similar self-regulation 
frameworks, there are two fundamental questions to be 
answered. The first is: “should government departments 
use them”. Related to this is: “How effective are they in 
addressing desiderata for regulation of government use 
of predictive algorithms?” The second question is about 
scope: “how many of the desiderata are addressed by 
this type of self-regulatory mechanism?”
One of the great advantages of the PHRaE is that it 
addresses a very broad array of issues very early on 
in the life of a predictive algorithm. This allows some 
problems to be “designed out” of the software and 
others to be addressed by the development of business 
rules that maximise benefit and minimise harm. Use of 
the interactive PHRaE tool provides a detailed record 
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of decisions made and problems addressed during the 
development phase. Its use is also likely to produce 
productive discussion between data scientists and policy 
analysts on exactly the sorts of issues on which there 
is likely to be misunderstanding between them. Use 
of the tool is likely to be a significant task for software 
developers but it is not so onerous as to stifle innovation. 
Compulsory use of the PHRaE within MSD will effectively 
provide a set of standards tailored to the work that that 
MSD does and to the particular contexts in which its 
employees make operational and strategic decisions. 
Moreover, while the PHRaE is designed for use by the 
MSD, tools like this could be used in a wide variety of 
government contexts. 
So our short answer to the question of whether 
Ministries like MSD should use tools like the PHRaE, is 
“yes”. That said, in-house self-regulatory tools like the 
PHRaE inevitably lack some of the advantages of other 
forms of regulation. As such, it could be that these work 
best in conjunction with, rather than as an alternative 
to, regulatory oversight. We also note the PHRaE is new 
and results not yet externally reviewed, so care should 
be taken not to over-emphasize it as a tool which can 
or does enable agencies to deal with all of the issues 
which arise. In addition, its detailed application may 
need specialist expert support (along with necessary 
resources). The efficacy of the PHRaE might be a useful 
area for further research, including to assess if changes 
or improvements are needed.
Addressing issues early in the design process has both 
pros and cons. Some issues that arise from the use of 
new predictive algorithms will be difficult to identify 
before the new algorithm is put to use. While we 
can predict a general risk for an algorithm to cause a 
feedback loop exacerbating existing inequality, the actual 
nature and extent of such harms can only be assessed 
by audit of the tool once it has been put to use and 
close study of its effects within the populations to which 
it is applied. These sorts of issues could be addressed by 
requiring regular review of algorithms in use including 
empirical study of risks originally “estimated” during the 
design process. 
As noted in our Introduction, particular attention needs 
to be paid to government’s obligations to Māori. This 
includes Māori views on the evaluation of the use of 
algorithms, particularly where this has been in areas of 
service delivery that disproportionately affect them. A 
general question for researchers in response to these 
issues is to consider whether the increasing use of 
algorithms exacerbates, reduces or disguises social 
inequalities, particularly for Māori. This will often not be a 
straightforward matter to evaluate but measures can be 
taken to ensure that such risks are at least identified and 
monitored, and mitigated or avoided as far as possible. 
The Algorithm Assessment Report found little, if any, 
evidence of consultation about algorithmic use with 
Māori affected by algorithmic use. This is a significant 
gap which, as we have said, must be addressed and 
which we consider could usefully be done now, before 
algorithmic use becomes more widespread.
Regular reviews and other assessments should also take 
into account the government’s commitment to reflecting 
a Treaty of Waitangi based partnership with Māori in 
its practice. More work needs to be done to assess 
whether, and if so how, a te ao Māori perspective can 
be embedded into the development, use and evaluation 
of algorithms. This includes, how “the taonga status of 
data that relates to Māori” is reflected. Given the Ministry 
of Social Development’s role in leading development 
of social investment policies (which disproportionately 
affect Māori) there is an opportunity for the Ministry to 
improve and strengthen its in-house work by engaging 
with Māori, including Māori data scientists and other 
experts, when using the PHRaE. 
Normative disconnection (see discussion in Section 
1A) occurs where a new technology is put to an 
unanticipated use, particularly one that poses different 
risks or ethical concerns. This is what would have 
happened had the YORST (see Section 1D) been 
employed for assigning young offenders into boot 
camps. The ethical implications of repurposing existing 
tools might be addressed to some extent by requiring 
that new uses of existing tools trigger a new assessment 
using the PHRaE (or other similar tools). It is unclear 
whether such a restriction would be politically viable. 
In-house tools are of course not as visible as black letter 
law. So their operation is less transparent to the public 
in general and data subjects in particular. While they 
de facto provide well designed and flexible standards 
for the development of predictive algorithms, those 
standards are not visible to the community in a way that 
would provide certainty about government use of data 
and analytics. As such they only provide limited support 
for appeals of the use of particular algorithmic tools 
developed by government. 
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Finally, many of the issues addressed in this report set 
out in Chapter 4 are complex and their possible future 
effects on New Zealanders are poorly understood. New 
Zealand needs to decide how it will address issues such 
as algorithmic bias, hyper-surveillance, control, and 
transparency. As such we are not yet in a position to 
design these problems out of the tools we develop.
How might self-checking frameworks like PHRaE work 
with external and independent regulatory oversight? 
Further work will be required to consider precisely how 
this could be operationalised, but one possibility would 
look like this. 
1. A government agency seeking to design or purchase 
a new algorithmic tool, or to use an existing tool 
for a new purpose, would first pass their proposal 
through a framework like PHRaE. This could either be 
a framework that is common across all government 
agencies; a framework that is tweaked for particular 
uses; or a framework designed for use within a 
particular agency. The new regulator could work with 
government agencies to help devise appropriate 
frameworks for this purpose.
2. That process would culminate in the production of 
a report on the proposed new algorithm/use, that 
would address issues such as accuracy, privacy, 
human rights compliance and transparency. 
3. If the agency’s internal review is not satisfied with 
the outcome of this internal assessment, then the 
proposal will be revised and resubmitted.
4. If/once the agency is satisfied, a report would be 
passed to the new regulator. This will address 
concerns with privacy, human rights compliance 
and transparency. In addition, it should supply an 
accuracy rating for the algorithm/proposed use.
5. If the regulator takes the view that the new tool/
use posed no new risks, or if it takes the view that 
provision was being made for those risks to be 
managed adequately, no further pre-procurement/
deployment regulatory steps will be required. 
6. If the regulator is not so satisfied, then further 
information could be demanded, or conditions 
imposed on the use of the algorithmic tool. In 
presumably rare cases, permission to construct, 
purchase or use the new tool could be denied 
altogether.
7. The regulator will maintain a register of uses of 
predictive algorithms within government agencies. 
Those agencies will be required to conduct ongoing 
assessments of the use of those algorithms, and 
submit reports to the regulator at regular intervals—
either every year or three years as required by the 
regulator.
8. The regulator will produce an annual public report 
on use of predictive algorithms within government. 
This report will make public the uses of predictive 
algorithms in its register, including input and output 
variables for each algorithm, with exceptions made in 




It is important to consider both the opportunities 
offered and the concerns presented by the use of 
predictive algorithms in government. It is also important, 
though, not to compare them with notionally perfect 
human decisionmakers. Human beings are subject to 
cognitive biases, logical fallacies, and a wide array of 
prejudices and errors. Equally, we must keep in mind 
that algorithms are not being introduced into a system 
that is in any sense perfect. In New Zealand, in common 
with the rest of the world, ethnicity, gender and social 
class are highly predictive of health and longevity, 
employment and economic security, and relationships 
with the legal system, including likelihood of 
imprisonment. The nature of these various relationships 
is complex and contested, but they have not been 
introduced de novo by the use of algorithmic decision-
making.
Neither is the use of predictive algorithms within 
the New Zealand government sector entirely a new 
phenomenon. As we have shown, algorithms such as 
RoC*RoI have been in use for decades. However, the 
increasing use of these tools, and their increasing power 
and complexity, presents a range of concerns and 
opportunities. These include the potentially vast amount 
of information that can be factored into decisions; the 
opacity of the decision-making process; and the veneer 
of scientific objectivity that can cover the results. 
We have sought to approach this topic from as neutral 
a starting position as we can: neither welcoming of 
nor hostile to the use of algorithmic tools, but keen to 
explore how their advantages can be maximised and 
their risks either avoided altogether or at least mitigated.
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“Algorithms” come in many forms and variable degrees 
of complexity and transparency. We have suggested 
that law/regulation/ethical analysis should sometimes be 
targeted at the level of use/potential harm, rather than 
on the precise form of technology, as the latter approach 
risks regulatory disconnection. Nonetheless, the general 
concept of a “predictive algorithm” is useful for many 
regulation/oversight purposes, and covers a useful 
subset of the algorithms referred to as “AI” in recent 
public discourse.
Accuracy
There should be independent and public oversight of 
the accuracy of the predictive models being used in 
government. This is of central importance, but such 
information is not yet readily or systematically available.
Acknowledging that algorithms of various types are 
used in many different circumstances generating diverse 
ethical concerns, government agencies should not 
employ single standards (such as AUC thresholds) for 
different algorithms used in different circumstances. 
Context-aware processes like the PHRaE are instructive.
Government should not assume that algorithms used 
to deliver positive interventions can be subject to lower 
levels of scrutiny than those delivering punitive or onerous 
interventions. At sufficiently low levels of accuracy, 
significant numbers of people in need of a benefit may 
fail to receive it. While tuning the algorithm to err on the 
side of false positives may be one way to address this 
problem, it will not always be financially feasible.
Control and human input
Solutions such as requiring a “human in the loop” have an 
obvious appeal. The Government’s Algorithm Assessment 
Report makes much of the role of human oversight with 
existing algorithms, and many commentators have spoken 
favourably of the right not to be subject to automated 
decisions within the GDPR. Our research, however, has led 
us to be more cautious about this approach.
In particular, there is a risk that, if we do not approach 
them carefully, such guarantees could serve as little 
more than regulatory placebos. Given the well-
researched tendency of humans within human-machine 
systems to overestimate the value of a machine’s 
outputs, a human in the loop may add nothing more 
than token reassurance.
In other situations, the addition of a human factor to 
an automated system may have a detrimental effect on 
that system’s accuracy. 
Nonetheless, there are situations where human 
involvement in automated decision-making is certainly 
valuable. This may be where the automated systems are 
not reliable enough to be left to operate independently, 
where factors need to be considered that are not 
readily automatable, or in situations where a measure of 
discretion is for whatever reason desirable. 
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Context-specific requirements for human oversight, such 
as is provided for in the Court Matters Bill, may be a 
more proportionate and useful response.
If a general right to human involvement were deemed 
to be desirable, such provision should be accompanied 
by a “right to know” that automated decision-making is 
taking place, akin to Articles 13-15 of the GDPR. Without 
such information, a right to demand human oversight 
would be meaningless to most affected parties.
Where human involvement or oversight is considered 
desirable, a number of measures can be employed that 
may reduce the risks of “automation bias”. Guidelines 
recommending that decision-makers exercise their 
own judgment before consulting an algorithm could 
assist in offsetting some of the effects of automation 
complacency and bias. In these cases the algorithm 
would serve merely as a check on a decision-maker’s 
intuitions. Guidance may also have a role to play. The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Loomis required that 
sentencing judges be given a list of warnings about 
COMPAS if they intend to have its predictions inform 
their decisions. While these measures are worth 
exploring, more empirical (human factors) research is 
required to see whether such approaches really do work.
A legal obstacle to automated decisions may arise in the 
public sector context, where statutory powers generally 
cannot be delegated or fettered without parliamentary 
approval. Statutory authorities that use algorithmic tools 
as decision aids must be wary of improper delegation to 
the tool, or otherwise fettering their discretion through 
automation complacency and bias. In those (rare) cases 
where systems are reliable enough to be used because 
they reach a better-than-human threshold, public sector 
bodies can get approval through New Zealand’s general 
statutory delegation provisions (i.e. State Sector Act 
1988, Crown Entities Act 2004 and Local Government 
Act 2002).
Transparency and a right to
reasons/explanations
New Zealand law already provides for a right to 
reasons for decisions by official agencies, primarily 
under section 23 of the Official Information Act. This is 
supported by judicial authority that such reasons must 
be understandable, both to a review body, to someone 
with vested interests in the decision and at least in some 
cases to the public at large. 
To ensure that agencies can comply with this 
requirement, policies should be adopted to ensure that 
algorithms are either developed “in house”, or, when 
purchased from outside vendors, acquired on terms 
that allow for transparency, so that neither their form 
nor conditions of sale preclude or obstruct details of the 
algorithm being made publicly available. 
To this end, government agencies’ procurement policies 
should give preference to companies which are open 
(i.e. publish information) about their algorithms, rather 
than those who hide behind proprietary code.
Review of new algorithms or new uses of existing 
algorithms should pay particular attention to provision 
of explanations. It should be kept in mind that the form 
and level of detail of an explanation will be context-
specific, and agencies should be prepared to explain 
decisions at both lay and expert levels.
Bias, fairness and discrimination
“Fairness” can take several forms. It may be impossible to 
satisfy all definitions simultaneously. Government agencies 
should consider the type(s) of fairness appropriate to the 
contexts in which they use specific algorithms.
Exclusion of protected characteristics from training data 
or input variables does not guarantee that outcomes are 
not discriminatory or unfair. For example, other variables 
can serve as close proxies for protected characteristics, 
and input data that appears innocuous can nonetheless 
be tainted by historic discrimination. 
Awareness of error rates is important, but it must be 
remembered that not all errors are equal; some impact 
disproportionately on certain parts of the population. 
Quite often, those will be parts with little political or 
economic power. In New Zealand, this is likely to include 
Māori people, as well as those in a range of vulnerable 
situations.
A regulatory response must include processes for 
addressing the risks of algorithmic bias due to historical 
injustices or to inaccuracies in existing datasets. Further 
research needs to be done to explore possible strategies 
for ameliorating such risks. 
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Informational privacy
In the realm of privacy and data protection law, we 
recommend that effect be given to more specific 
requirements to identify the purpose of collection of 
personal information (information privacy principle 3). 
Doubts persist about the status of inferred information. 
New Zealand is not unique in this respect; even in the 
post-GDPR European Union, a “right to reasonable 
inferences” has recently been proposed. Further 
consideration should be given to the adequacy of New 
Zealand law in this respect. Parliament should consider 
both a right to reasonable inferences (and a cognate 
right of access to these inferences), and whether 
inferred data should be afforded the same protections 
as primary data.
New Zealand should also consider introducing better 
protections regarding re-identification, de-identification, 
data portability and the right to be forgotten (erasure).
The limitations of individual 
rights models
Individual rights are of course vital for any democracy, 
but we should be wary of relying exclusively on 
individual rights models that depend on affected parties 
holding predictive algorithms to account. Often, they 
will lack the resources to do so. Furthermore, individual 
rights models might offer limited efficacy in monitoring 
group harms.
Oversight
Government agencies should adopt or develop in-house 
processes to evaluate proposals to develop or procure 
new predictive algorithms. These should also apply 
when it is proposed to apply existing algorithms to a 
new purpose. These processes should evaluate a range 
of considerations, including accuracy, transparency, 
privacy and human rights impacts. 
The PHRaE process being developed at MSD could serve 
as an instructive example in this regard, though we are 
aware that further research will be required on its use 
and efficacy. It is also likely that different agencies will 
require purpose built frameworks that are responsive to 
the particular concerns that arise in their contexts.
Internal processes should be sufficiently thorough to 
alleviate concerns, but this can be burdensome for staff 
having to navigate these processes. Provision should 
be made in workload models for this, and if necessary, 
training should be provided in the use of such tools.
Government should consider the establishment of 
a regulatory/oversight agency. This would work with 
individual government agencies who intend either 
to introduce a new predictive algorithm, or to use an 
existing predictive algorithm for a new purpose. 
We have considered several possible models for the 
new regulatory agency. These all have strengths and 
weaknesses, but at this time we offer no detailed 
proposal as to the form it should take. At present, there 
are very few international examples from which to learn, 
and those which exist (such as the UK’s CDIE) are in 
very early stages. We would welcome the opportunity 
to discuss this further with government and other 
regulatory agencies, and to contribute to the next stage 
of discussion about this.
We have proposed a possible structure for how the new 
regulatory agency could work with government agencies. 
This would involve
• a report from the internal review process described 
above to be provided to the new regulator;
• where new regulator decides that no new or non-
trivial risks are being posed, or that they are being 
adequately managed, no further action will be 
required;
• where the new regulator is not so satisfied, it will be 
able to require answers to questions or additional 
steps to be taken;
• in presumably rare instances, the regulator will be 
able to deny permission for the new algorithm to 
be designed or acquired, or used in the manner 
proposed.
The new regulator could serve range of other functions, 
including
• Producing best practice guidelines;
• Maintaining a register of algorithms used in 
government;
• Producing an annual public report on such uses;
• Conducting ongoing monitoring on the effects of 
these tools.
77
We consider the last point to be important. The nature 
of these tools is such that a snap-shot assessment 
will be insufficient to ensure that concerns about, 
for example, control and bias are being adequately 
addressed.
Our preference is for a relatively “hard-edged” regulatory 
agency, with the authority to demand information and 
answers, and to deny permission for certain proposals. 
However, even a light-touch regulatory agency could 
serve an important function. The recent Algorithm 
Assessment Report acknowledged use of algorithms 
across NZ government to be somewhat piecemeal.
If a regulatory agency is to be given any sort of hard-
edged powers, consideration will need to be given to its 
capacity to monitor and enforce compliance with these. 
If the agency is to be charged with scrutinising 
algorithms, it must be borne in mind that these are 
versatile tools, capable of being repurposed for a variety 
of uses. Scrutiny should apply to new uses/potential 
harms and not only new algorithms.
Consultation
We stress the need for consultation with a wide range 
of stakeholders across New Zealand society, especially 
with populations likely to be affected by algorithmic 
decisions, and with those likely to be under-represented 
in construction and training. This is likely to include those 
in lower socio-economic classes, and Māori and Pacific 
Island populations. Quite simply, they are likely to have 
insights, concerns and perspectives that will not be 
available to even the most well-intentioned of outside 
observers.
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APPENDIX 2: ROC*ROI INPUT VARIABLES
Regression Variable Description/weighting
(Risk of Reconviction) 
MaleFirstOffenderFree13 Log of time not in prison since age 13 for male first time offender
MaleReoffenderFree13  Log of time not in prison since age 13 for male re-offender
FemaleFirstOffenderFree13 Log of time not in prison since age 13 for female first time offender
FemaleReoffenderFree13  Log of time not in prison since age 13 for female re-offender
MaleEpisodesFree Log of time between the two most recent sentence periods (“episodes”) of  
  male offenders
FemaleEpisodesFree Log of time between the two most recent sentence periods (“episodes”) of  
  female offenders
Reoffender Is this not a first offence – value 1 for yes, 0 for no
MaleReoffender For males, is this not a first offence, for females, is this a first offence
MaleReoffenderSerious History of offending based on seriousness, for males
FemaleReoffenderSerious History of offending based on seriousness, for females
FemaleFirstOffenderSerious Seriousness of offence for first time female offender
MaleFirstOffenderSerious Seriousness of offence for first time male offender
MaleEpisodeCount Total number of sentence periods (“episodes”), for male offender
FemaleEpisodeCount Total number of sentence periods (“episodes”), for female offender
FemaleOffendingRate Number of sentence periods / time not in prison, for females
MaleOffendingRate Number of sentence periods / time not in prison, for males
PreAge13Offence Any offence committed prior to age 13 – value 1 for yes, 0 for no
Male  Is offender male – value 1 for yes, 0 for no
FemaleReoffenderDrive Is current most serious offence a traffic offence, and is it not a first offence  
  for female offender – value 1 for yes, 0 for no
MaleReoffenderDrive Is current most serious offence a traffic offence, and is it not a first offence  
  for male offender – value 1 for yes, 0 for no
FemaleFirstOffenderDrive Is current most serious offence a traffic offence, and is this a first offence for  
  female offender – value 1 for yes, 0 for no
MaleFirstOffenderDrive  Is current most serious offence a traffic offence, and is this a first offence for  
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